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ABSTRACT 
 
Multi-stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) have been strongly advocated as strategies for 
filling global governance gaps. MSIs bring multiple stakeholders (usually 
government, business, and civil society) to a common platform in order to dialogue, 
design, and implement suitable mechanisms for addressing identified governance 
issues. However, what factors are likely to determine the effectiveness of MSIs?  The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global MSI, established in 
2003, that seeks to improve the management of natural resource wealth in 
implementing countries through increased transparency.  This study examines the 
Nigerian EITI to explore the factors that influence the organisation and effectiveness 
of MSIs for achieving resource transparency. We find that the Nigerian EITI, 
although often acknowledged as a model for country implementing the EITI, falls 
short of a truly multi-stakeholder initiative and hence is limited in its impact and 
effectiveness in improving resource wealth management in Nigeria. We find that four 
factors deduced from a combination of agency and collective action theories appear to 
be strong in explaining the shortcomings of the NEITI. These factors are the Nigerian 
structural environment, the characteristics of the stakeholders to the Nigeria 
extractives industry, the emergent governance structure of the Nigerian EITI, and the 
nature of external influence on NEITI. Evidence gathered from the implementation of 
NEITI, in the period covered by this study, demonstrates that a combination of these 
factors has contributed to the difficulty in achieving a truly multi-stakeholder 
structure and hence the limited impact of the initiative on improving resource wealth 
management in Nigeria.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In our contemporary world, it is obvious that the systems for coordinating interactions 
between and amongst states, groups and individuals have witnessed significant 
transformations since the early 1990s. Keohane (2002:1) notes that “states remain the 
most powerful actors in world politics, but it is no l onger even a reasonable 
simplification to think of world politics simply as politics among states.” ‘Global 
governance’ is the popular term used to reflect this transformation and Rosenau 
defines it as: 
“Systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the 
international organisation – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise 
of control has transnational repercussions.” (Rosenau, 1995:13).  
 
The controversy on the meaning of global governance as a concept notwithstanding, 
there seems to be a co nsensus that the challenges facing humanity would require 
innovative strategies for resolving them. In recent times there has been a s trong 
recommendation for the collective action of multiple players towards providing 
solutions to global governance issues.  
 
The term ‘collective action’ was made popular by Mancur Olson through his book 
The Logic of Collective Action, published in 1965. Olson espoused the theory of 
collective action by challenging the age long logic about group behaviour – that 
individuals will act collectively in pursuit of their common interests. In recent times, a 
particular form of collective action has become popular. It is called multi-stakeholder 
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initiatives (MSIs) and refers to the process whereby multiple stakeholders – usually 
government, business and civil society – come together to dialogue and agree on 
mechanisms for addressing identified governance issues. Why are MSIs increasingly 
advocated in global governance? Their growing popularity notwithstanding, there 
seems to be little understanding of the concept of MSIs. As a result MSIs have been 
ill-applied in certain circumstances. This study explores the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of MSIs with a view to contributing to existing knowledge in the use of 
MSIs. 
 
MSIs have been applied in numerous issue areas. It is important to also understand 
that MSIs tend to be issue specific and a proper understanding of the issue they 
address is essential for their effective organisation. From climate change to terrorism, 
and from governance failures to poverty and inequality, it is believed that many of the 
problems of global governance cannot be effectively addressed without the collective 
action of various stakeholders. These global challenges with consequences that extend 
beyond national boundaries and beyond generations are collectively referred to as 
Global Public Goods (GPGs). The description of GPGs has expanded over time and 
with globalization and its implications there seems to be fewer problems without 
global consequences. This study focuses on t he example of the failure of natural 
resource wealth to translate into economic prosperity in many resource-rich countries, 
a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “resource curse”. 
 
This study highlights the key debates in the “resource curse” discourse especially the 
argument that the quality of institutions more than anything else seems to determine, 
to a considerable extent, the outcome of abundant natural resources. However, within 
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this school of thought, there are yet some further debates regarding for instance, 
which institutions matter and how best can institutional quality be improved? This 
study follows the debate that many of the problems associated with poor resource 
management emanate from the opacity that often times pervades the governance of 
natural resources. Hence, it is believed that resource transparency is a key way of 
improving the management of natural resource wealth. 
 
Resource transparency is the public disclosure of  relevant and accessible information 
about the management of all the activities involved in the natural resource chain from 
discovery and exploitation to the collection and application of revenues. It is believed 
that resource transparency can enable the citizens, who are the ultimate owners of 
natural resources, to demand accountability from the public and private agents 
entrusted with the responsibility of managing resource wealth. 
 
However, the greater challenge seems to be in the fashioning of a practicable and 
effective strategy for achieving resource transparency, considering the complexity of 
the problem especially in many resource-rich developing countries. It is argued in the 
literature that agents who are rational and self-interested are often unwilling to 
relinquish the advantage that information asymmetry offers them in their relationships 
with the principals (Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo 2001). At the same time, the 
consequences of poor management of resource wealth (e.g. poor reputation and 
community restiveness and hostility) also negatively affect and threaten the interests 
of the agents as well (Waterman and Meier, 1998; and Shapiro, 2005). Therefore, 
collective action of all stakeholders, in the form of a multi-stakeholder initiative 
(MSI) is considered a second best option or the best alternative to no a ction 
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(BATNA). But how effective can this option be towards engendering better 
management of natural resource wealth, and what factors are likely to influence its 
effectiveness, especially in the context of a resource-rich developing country?  
 
This study therefore explores the challenges to effective collective action for resource 
transparency. Relying on the suggestions from collective action and agency theorists, 
the framework for this study is built around four key challenges that are likely to 
influence the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency. These 
challenges arise from the structural environment, the nature and character of the 
stakeholders, the governance structure for the collective action, and the nature of 
external influence. This study adopts a holistic single case study approach to examine 
the effectiveness of a multi-stakeholder initiative designed for resource transparency 
in a typical resource-rich developing country. 
 
This chapter provides an overall introduction for this thesis. Section 1.2 presents a 
statement of the problem addressed in this study while the aims and objectives of the 
study are highlighted in section 1.3. T he scope and justification of the study are 
discussed in section 1.4 while section 1.5 outlines the structure of the thesis. Section 
1.6 concludes this introductory chapter. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
What hopes are there for the two-thirds of the world’s poorest people who live in 
countries rich in natural resources?1 Can collective action improve the governance of 
resource wealth in resource-rich countries? With the increasing reliance on collective 
                                                 
1 The Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) http://archive-2011.revenuewatch.org/our-work/issues/revenue-
transparency accessed 24/01/2012 
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action for GPG provision, the frontiers and understanding of the collective action 
theory have become stretched. Innovative strategies that maximise the basic 
assumptions of the (Olsonist) collective action theory have hence evolved in recent 
years. The belief in collective action for resource transparency carries with it s ome 
hope that after several decades of resource exploitation, resource wealth could 
genuinely benefit the citizens who dwell in the lands where it is found in abundance. 
However, this new strategy has been warranted not just in consideration of the plight 
of these citizens, but also because the consequences of poor resource wealth 
management are spilling beyond the borders of their countries, and jeopardizing the 
peace and stability of the rest of the world. Interestingly, this new strategy often 
originates from the global level yet its success would depend essentially on factors 
that are inherent in the local context. The same factors that in one way or another 
engendered the ‘resource curse’. 
 
It is believed that the proportion of the world’s poor could be drastically reduced if 
the resource wealth of resource-rich countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Kazakhstan 
and Venezuela were managed better. For a very long time, there was emphasis on aid 
as a means of salvaging these poor countries, but experience has shown that it has 
become rather imperative to address the problem of poor resource wealth 
management.  
 
The search for alternative solutions for tackling world poverty shifted attention to the 
concept of good governance as a prerequisite for sustainable development and poverty 
reduction. At the heart of the good governance campaign is also the emphasis on 
building appropriate institutional capacity considered weak in many poor countries. 
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Corruption, for instance, was identified as a problem and had to be tackled for any 
meaningful progress to be achieved. More importantly, the popular view that 
corruption was endemic in poor countries was slowly jettisoned and it was 
acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, that foreign (private) actors also play a significant 
role in corruption in poor countries. This admission proved to be momentous as it 
both informed the solutions that emerged and also made it easy for poor country 
governments and politicians to buy into global anti-corruption initiatives.  
 
However, there were high profile cases of corruption and embezzlement of public 
funds in some of the resource-rich countries that the world could not ignore. For 
instance, when Sani Abacha, the head of the Nigerian military government died in 
1998, it emerged that he and his close family had stolen over half a billion dollars 
which they stashed away in foreign bank accounts (Scher, 2005). In addition, the 
Global Witness report Crude Awakening (1999) also chronicled the cases of 
corruption and embezzlement of public funds in resource-rich Angola. There were 
several cases from other countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, and 
Kazakhstan. These cases were all linked to institutional weaknesses and lack of 
effective checks and balances on government in these societies. 
 
On the other hand, there was mounting evidence that international companies, in their 
quest to secure business opportunities at all costs both contributed to corruption and 
were indifferent to acts of injustice and abuse of human rights committed by 
governments and their agents, even when they could have intervened. In Nigeria, for 
instance, Shell was accused of complicity in the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and 
seven other human rights activists by the Nigerian military government headed by late 
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Sani Abacha in 19952 (Mares, 2004). The malpractices of international companies in 
their host communities were further exposed by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
who capitalised on the wave of democratisation in these countries to mobilise local 
agitations on issues such as human rights violations and environmental degradation. 
 
However, on t he issue of corruption, the Organisation for Economuic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) took a bold step  in 1997 when it adopted the Anti-bribery 
Convention which came into effect the following year. This convention established 
“legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign public officials in 
international business” (OECD Website, accessed 30/12/2009). From that moment it 
was no longer business as usual, at least in principle3.  The OECD convention, created 
further awareness on t he direct and indirect contributions of business not only to 
corruption in poor countries but also to conflict, human rights violations, deplorable 
labour practices and environmental degradation in the process of carrying out 
business in poor countries. Although there were initiatives prior to the 1990 to address 
some of these issues, the late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a rise in MSIs in order 
to accommodate the growing influence of business and Civil Society in world politics, 
who equally showed some eagerness to join in finding solutions. In the area of natural 
resource management, initiatives such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights, the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) were introduced.   
 
                                                 
2 Shell denied this allegation at the time but in June 2009 accepted to pay the sum of $15.5 million as 
compensation to the families of the executed activists. 
3 In December 2009, the Further Recommendations on the Anti-Bribery Convention was adopted as a 
follow up to the 1997 convention. 
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A common theme underlying many of these initiatives has been the recognition that 
the collective action of all stakeholders is essential for meaningful and sustainable 
results (Sandler, 2001; Barret, 2007). Therefore, beyond the overwhelming global 
recommendation of MSIs, how effective are they in addressing issues such as 
resource transparency? What hope do initiatives such as the EITI bring for over 3.5 
billion of the world’s population who live in countries rich in natural resources? The 
answers to these questions lie in a critical evaluation of the MSI framework and in 
understanding the critical success factors that are essential for its effectiveness. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study/Purpose of the study 
 
This study aims to contribute to the knowledge and understanding of collective action 
for the provision of global public goods (GPGs). public goods refer to goods and 
services that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. When the provision or non-
provision of such goods or services have implications beyond national boundaries and 
across generations, they are reffered to become global public goods (Kaul, 2007 ). 
Often times, public goods are required to be provided within the boundaries of a given 
country. However, for certain public goods, the benefits or consequences of non 
provision tend to spill beyond national boundaries. Lack of transparent management 
of natural resources in most resource-rich developing countries has been strongly 
linked with conflict and poverty in these societies and serious consequences for the 
rest of the world. Hence, resource transparency is strongly advocated as a panacea to 
the negative national and global consequences of poor natural resource management. 
In this study, we classify resource transparency as a ‘globalised national public good’ 
(GNPG). Inge Kaul (2007) has used a number of characteristics to categorise GPGs 
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(see detailed discussion in Chapter 3). Like resource transparency, GNPGs 
particularly globalised national public goods (GNPGs). As discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, t his study views resource transparency as belonging to the category of 
GPGs called GNPGs. This study highlights the characteristics of resource 
transparency as a G NPG that have implications for the choice of strategy for their 
provision. The assertion that GNPGs would be best provided through the collective 
action of multiple stakeholders is also explored. Specifically, this study aims to 
improve the understanding of multi-stakeholder initiatives especially for the provision 
of resource transparency. Therefore, the broad objectives of this study include the 
following: 
 
 Identify the factors that influence the organisation of collective action for 
resource transparency; 
 Understand how these factors manifest; and 
 Explore why the identified factors influence the effectiveness of collective 
action for resource transparency. 
1.4 Justification of the Study 
 
Recent developments especially in resource-rich countries have heightened global 
concerns for effective solutions to poor resource wealth management. In the rush to 
find solutions, certain strategies are ill-examined and are often churned out with 
mixed outcomes. With diminishing resources available for the provision of global 
public goods, there is need to examine these strategies in order to understand the 
fundamental considerations necessary for their effectiveness. For instance, strategies 
for better management of abundant natural resources, notably Structural Adjustment 
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Programme (SAP), have evolved over time yet the problem of poor resource 
management seems to be on the increase. At the moment, there is an overwhelming 
clamour for resource transparency through the collective action of all stakeholders. 
This study contributes to this debate by investigating the challenges that are likely to 
influence the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency.  
 
Business has grown so influential and powerful that the options for regulating them 
are reduced to the use of (self-regulatory) voluntary codes of conduct (COCs) and 
other soft power mechanisms. An observer notes that “privatization, free trade 
agreements and economic integration have limited government’s ability to regulate 
TNCs [Transnational Corporations]. … the demand for FDI [foreign direct 
investment] has meant that governments are less willing to contemplate regulating 
companies” (Sullivan, 2003:13). However, at the same time, a third group of actors – 
the civil society organisations - has also become very prominent in the global arena 
and their participation and inclusion is crucial to effective and sustainable solutions to 
global governance issues. MSIs offer a fairly acceptable strategy to these three broad 
groups of actors – government, business, and civil society. Therefore, it is only timely 
that the growing popularity and application of this form of collective action is 
subjected to some deeper analysis in order to expand knowledge on the fundamental 
assumptions and the challenges that influence their organisation and effectiveness.  
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
 
This study generally explores the challenges to achieving resource transparency 
through the collective action of multiple stakeholders in a given environment. The 
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study focuses on highlighting the theoretical assumptions that underlie this school of 
thought and examining evidence from an identified empirical case. Evidence for this 
study was gathered specifically from the Nigerian experience with the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative from inception in 2004 t o 2009. H owever, where 
necessary, references have been made to the period beyond 2009 to provide further 
support to the argument being made. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is arranged in 8 c hapters. The first three chapters, including this 
introduction, form the overall introductory part of the thesis. This introductory chapter 
is followed by a chapter on the review of literature, which explores the key arguments 
in the literature highlighting the point of departure for this study. Chapter 3 presents 
the theoretical and analytical framework for the study and identifies the specific case 
study and research methods employed. 
 
The second part of the thesis is constituted of chapters 4-7 which are the analytical 
chapters of the study. Each of these chapters presents the findings of the study with 
each dedicated to one research question towards answering the overall question on 
determining the factors that influence the effectiveness of collective action for 
resource transparency. Chapter 8 forms the third and concluding part of the thesis. It 
presents the summary of the findings, highlights the key contributions of the study 
and concludes the thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
‘RESOURCE CURSE’ HYPOTHESIS: A REVIEW OF 
LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the trend of key debates in the natural resource governance 
literature. It is important to understand this trend in addressing the main research 
question of this thesis which is: what factors influence the effectiveness of collective 
action for the provision of resource transparency? It centres on the growing emphasis 
over time on t he key role of institutions in determining the outcome of natural 
resource abundance. It explores the popular recommendation that greater transparency 
is a viable means of strengthening the management of resource wealth. However, the 
challenge appears to be in fashioning an adequate strategy that will facilitate and 
institutionalise transparency in natural resource management. With the inadequacy of 
conventional systems of global governance in addressing sustainable development 
issues and the rise of new forces in the global arena, creative innovations have 
become inevitable and the collective action of all stakeholders have been suggested as 
an effective means of addressing some of these global issues. The possible strategies 
for achieving resource transparency are explored and the gaps are identified. The need 
for a framework for a better understanding of resource transparency and how it can be 
effectively achieved is also highlighted. 
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The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 2.2 revisits the debate on the 
popular ‘resource curse’ hypothesis as an explanation for poor resource wealth 
management, and the challenges from the institutions school of thought. Section 2.3 
highlights the emerging focus on i nstitutions as an alternative explanation to the 
‘resource curse’ hypothesis, while section 2.4 discusses the entrance of the resource 
transparency route as one of the suggestions emanating from the institutions 
perspective. Section 2.5 explores possible strategies for achieving resource 
transparency and the challenges that the uniqueness of resource transparency may 
pose to them, and points out the need for a proper framework that would aid the 
understanding of how best the provision of resource transparency could be organised. 
Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 Explaining the Problem: The ‘Resource Curse’ Hypothesis 
Revisited 
 
There are several reasons why some countries tend to grow faster than others. For 
decades, the inability of abundant natural resources to effectively transform into 
economic growth and prosperity has attracted a lot of attention. The disparity in the 
economic fortunes of countries is common in history, what is however puzzling is 
when such disparity is engendered by the abundance of natural resources instead of 
the opposite.  This global concern has continued to generate countless explanations 
for this phenomenon. At first, it w as thought that the terms of trade imbalance 
between developed countries and developing countries, and the limited integration of 
primary products exporting countries, were generally responsible for the economic 
growth discrepancies among nations (Prebisch, 1950 a nd 1964; Singer, 1950; 
Hirschman, 1958; Seers, 1964). It was later found that the volatility of the prices of 
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some natural resources especially oil, presented major challenges to resource-rich 
countries which hindered their ability to properly manage their resource wealth 
(Mabro and Munroe, 1974; Mabro, 1980; Neary & Van Wijnbergen, 1986). However, 
it was further discovered that the tendency of natural resource exploitation to crowd 
out manufacturing and other sectors of the economy, a phenomenon known as ‘Dutch 
Disease’, also hampers the economic growth and development of resource-rich 
countries (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984). 
 
Of course, each of these explanations had policy implications. However, the 
persistence of the problem especially in resource-rich developing countries suggested 
that there were possible weaknesses in these explanations and their policy 
prescriptions. The question then remains: why do resource abundant countries often 
times develop or grow slower than their less endowed counterparts? Sachs and 
Warner (1995, 1997), using cross-country data for the period 1971 to 1990 from 20 
countries, discovered that in fact resource abundance has a n egative effect on 
economic growth with evidence showing that countries endowed with abundant 
natural resources grew slower than their less endowed counterparts. This, according to 
them, confirmed the existence of a n atural ‘resource curse’ earlier mooted by Auty 
(1993). This ‘resource curse’ hypothesis significantly changed the long held 
assumption that the abundance of natural resource wealth was a decisive advantage to 
economic growth. The ‘resource curse’ thus emerged as a concept to represent the odd 
reality of the inability of resource-rich countries to successfully transform resource 
wealth into economic growth and prosperity.  
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From the mid-1990s, the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis dominated the debate on t he 
poor outcome of natural resource abundance. The concept itself seems to possess 
some form of appeal as it aptly captures the situation common in most resource-rich 
countries. Experiences from countries such as Nigeria, Angola, and Venezuela, 
provided robust empirical evidence to support the “resource curse” hypothesis (Sachs 
and Warner, 1995, 1997) . Despite increasing natural resource exploitation, key 
economic indicators for these countries deteriorated over time.  
 
However, this belief in the existence of a resource curse as postulated by Sachs and 
Warner generated some controversy in the literature. Some authors insist that the 
‘resource curse’ does not in fact exist (Ng, 2006). Many authors also believe that the 
‘resource curse’ hypothesis seems to leave limited options or hope for resource-rich 
countries. The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis also suggests that resource-rich countries 
would fare better if they left their natural resources unexploited. The lure and 
temptation that come with discoveries of natural resources make this option almost 
impracticable. Interestingly, evidence from countries such as Norway, Botswana and 
Chile, with considerable positive outcomes of natural resource abundance, also 
suggest that natural resource abundance may sometimes be a b lessing (Davis, 1998; 
Ahammad and Clements, 1999; Clements and Johnson, 2003). This has prompted an 
expanding body of literature seeking alternative explanations to the ‘resource curse’ 
hypothesis. 
 
First, a number of scholars disagree with the methodology employed in the study that 
led to Sachs’ and Warner’s conclusion on the existence of a ‘resource curse’. Their 
use of a cross country analysis especially has been strongly challenged. It is believed 
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that a time series rather than a cross-country analysis is better suited for such studies 
and would guarantee a more reliable result (Collier, 2007b). Stijns (2000) also argues 
that the parameters used by Sachs and Warner in their study are at best misleading. He 
(Stijns) re-investigated their (Sachs’ and Warner’s) claims by using actual data about 
energy, mineral reserves and production and found that resource abundance is not a 
significant structural determinant of economic growth. He (Stijns) asserts that rather 
what matters most in terms of economic development is how countries manage their 
natural resources. In a similar study,  B ulte (2007) using data on r esource wealth 
released by the World Bank, finds that there is a rather positive relationship between 
resource abundance and both economic growth and institutional quality. His finding 
prompted him to revisit Sachs’ and Warner’s study and uncovered that their use of the 
ratio of primary exports divided by national income is not a measure of abundance 
but a m easure of dependence. Based on hi s finding, Bulte dismisses the ‘resource 
curse” hypothesis as not only ‘a mere hype’ but also a ‘red-herring’. After extending 
the sample period used in Sachs and Warner’s article, Arezki and van der Ploeg 
(2007) also concur that “much of the empirical evidence for a negative effect of 
natural resource dependence on growth performance does not survive”(2007:20).  
 
However, despite the controversy it has generated, the appeal of the use of the concept 
of ‘resource curse’ appears somewhat irresistible. Overtime, both proponents and 
opponents of the concept have used it to generally represent the problems inherent in 
many resource-rich countries. Although some authors concur on t he existence of a 
‘resource curse’ they believe that it is only a symptom and not a cause of the problem. 
For instance, Collier and Goderis (2008) using a panel co-integration methodology find 
strong evidence of a ‘resource curse’. However, their conclusion is that the resource curse can 
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be avoided by countries with sufficiently good institutions,  insisting that if their  “tentative 
diagnosis of the root cause of the resource curse as being due to errors in governance 
is correct, then this prognosis could be avoided by improvements in the quality of 
governance” (2008:29). Thus, there is an emerging consensus in the literature that the 
abundance of natural resources alone does not sufficiently explain the poor economic 
performance of most resource-rich countries.  
 
2.3 The Emerging Focus on Institutions 
 
The emerging consensus on the significance of the quality of institutions on the effect 
of natural resource abundance on economic development appears to be linked to the 
works of Douglas North (1981, 1990) and Dani Rodrik et al (2004) on the role of 
institutions in development, and the spread of liberal democracy often referred to as 
‘the third wave’ (Huntington 1991).  Hence, the debate on the poor performance of 
resource-rich countries has recently focused on t he interplay between the quality of 
institutions and abundant natural resource wealth. 
 
Acemoglu et al (2001) in their study find that institutional quality alone can explain a 
great deal of cross-country differences in economic development and not natural 
resource abundance or lack of it. This view is also supported by Mehlum, Moene, and 
Torvik (2006) who also believe that institutions are ‘decisive’ in the management of 
resource wealth. This view is shared by Brunnschweiler (2006) who concludes that 
“there may in fact only be a curse when natural resource wealth occurs together with 
low quality institutions” (2006:8). There is robust evidence that natural resources 
negatively affect institutions. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that natural resource 
abundance increases the chances of civil conflict in a country, and civil conflict is 
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considered a sign of institutional failure (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). It is 
believed that abundant natural resources induce rentier effects and also reduce the 
incentives for citizens to demand accountability which is critical for strong effective 
governance (Karl, 1997, 2007; Isham et al, 2005; Iimi 2006). Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003:24) also support the view that abundant natural resources “have 
serious detrimental effect on t he quality of domestic institutions and, through this 
channel, on long run growth”. 
 
However, there seems to be a controversy on the causal relationship between quality 
of institutions and resource abundance. While some authors tend to admit that this 
relationship is unclear (Mehlum et al, 2006), others insist that resource abundance has 
a positive effect on institutions (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2007). Couttenier (2009) 
offers an interesting explanation. He argues that every country’s institutions have a 
limited capacity of natural resources which it can effectively absorb. Beyond this 
limit, additional resources tend to have a negative impact on institutions leading to an 
inverted U-shaped curve. Some authors also believe that the effects of natural 
resources on institutions would be determined by some contextual variables (Basedau, 
2005). These contextual variables may either be country-specific - ‘developmental’ or 
‘predatory’ (Stevens, 2003a); or resource-type specific – ‘point source’ or ‘diffuse 
source’ (Leite and Weidman, 1999). For instance, Leite and Weidman (1999) argue 
that ‘point source’ resources (such as oil) are more likely to have a negative effect on 
institutions than ‘diffuse source’ resources (such as solid minerals) because of their 
greater tendency to stimulate corruption and rent-seeking.  
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Another source of controversy relates to the question of which institutions matter 
most in the management of natural resource wealth. Kolstad (2007) argues that only 
improved institutions governing the private sector ameliorates the ‘resource curse’.  
However, Larsen (2004) argues that Norway managed to escape the ‘resource curse’ 
through the arrangement of political and economic institutions, a strong judicial 
system and social norms. Furthermore, Iimi (2006) using evidence from Botswana, 
found that especially in developing countries, governance issues such as the quality of 
regulation, and level of transparency and accountability in the public sector determine 
the extent to which the growth effects of resource wealth can materialize. Kolstad and 
Soreide (2009) argue that the problems of poor institutions are created by ‘rent-
seeking’ and ‘patronage’ and improving resource wealth management must entail 
solutions targeted at the two. 
 
These controversies notwithstanding, a common concern seems to be: how best can 
the quality of institutions be improved towards achieving better resource wealth 
management? The lack of transparency in the management of natural resource wealth 
has been identified as a m ajor obstacle to achieving better management of resource 
wealth (Collier, 2006; Florini, 2008). Ogwumike and Ogunleye (2008) using Nigeria 
as a case study find in their study of the determinants of resource-led development 
that the greatest inhibitors to oil-led development are corruption, lack of transparency, 
accountability and fairness in the use and distribution of resources. Kolstad and 
Soreide (2009) also argue that “policy in resource-rich countries should be less about 
macro-economic management and more about institutions to prevent rent-seeking and 
patronage, and about giving the right incentives to players in the resource sector.” If 
rent-seeking and patronage are the attendant consequences of resource revenue 
20 
 
(Kolstad, 2007) and the lack of political restraint to the use of power (Collier, 2006), 
how best can institutions be strengthened to address these? The argument, therefore, is 
that greater transparency in the management of natural resources empowers citizens 
and the civil society to demand accountability and hence ensure the responsible use of 
natural resource revenue, and also reduce the tension and instability often associated 
with natural resources.  K arl (2007:257) therefore suggests “a far-reaching “fiscal 
social contract” based on transparency”, and also acknowledges an “emerging 
convergence over the importance of transparency as a first step in overcoming the 
resource curse”. 
 
2.4 Resource Transparency 
 
The recent global financial crisis highlights the significance of transparency (or lack 
of it) in global governance. International organisations, governments, and corporate 
bodies increasingly adopt necessary policy adjustments to accommodate the important 
role of transparency. It is becoming increasing acknowledged that “secretive decision-
making by small elites can no longer be sustained” (Florini, 1999:37).  Transparency is 
also believed to be critical towards the strengthening of institutions, and more so for 
the institutions for the management of resource wealth (Florini, 1998; 2007, 2008; 
Collier, 2007; Karl, 2007; Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2007). Larsen, (2004:22) 
believes that “transparency, media scrutiny, rule of law, and politico-economic 
institutions prevent easy access for small coalitions to the public funds of resource 
rents”. 
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Resource transparency draws from the general concept of transparency. Hood (2006) 
suggests that an appropriate definition of the doctrine of transparency would include 
some basic characteristics such as:  
 
“…decisions governed by clearly established and published rules and 
procedures rather than by ad hoc judgements or processes; methods of 
accounting or public reporting that clarifies who gains from and who pays for 
any public measure; and governance that is intelligible and accessible to the 
‘general public’” (Hood, 2006:5). 
 
Hood’s definition is also not very different from that offered by the IMF, in its 
glossary of selected financial terms. It defines transparency as “openness, honesty and 
accountability in public and private transactions” (IMF Website4) accessed 
21/10/2008). There seems, therefore, to be a strong agreement in literature that 
transparency is “a critical component of accountability” (Zedillo and Thiam, 
2006:92).  
 
Resource transparency therefore refers to the application of transparency to the 
management of resource wealth. It implies the public disclosure of necessary, reliable 
and accessible information about all the activities and pr ocesses involved in the 
natural resource wealth management chain from discovery and e xploitation, to the 
revenue collection and expenditure. This conscious attempt to link transparency with 
the effective management of natural resource management is only recent and 
‘unexpected’ (Gillies 2008).  The agency theory offers an explanation of why 
resource transparency may be crucial in improving resource wealth management. The 
agency theory presupposes that conflict of goals and information asymmetries 
characterize the relationship between a principal and an agent (Waterman and Meier, 
                                                 
4 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/glossary/showTerm.asp#119 accessed 21/10/2008 
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1998). Therefore, the ability of the principal to both observe and influence the 
behaviour of the agent defines the intensity of the agency problem.  ( see detailed 
discussion in Chapter 3). For most resource-rich developing countries, natural 
resource wealth accounts for a portion of government revenue and GDP. Hence, 
natural resource wealth is easily susceptible to rent-seeking and corruption. This is 
made possible especially because of the information asymmetry that exists between 
the public and the few individuals who are privileged in one way or the other to act as 
custodians of natural resource wealth management. Transparency enhances the 
availability of information to interested parties and empowers them to demand a fair 
distribution and use of resources. Prat (2006: 102) notes that “available economics 
research supports the idea that full transparency should be the default option”. It is 
believed that the more information made available, the greater the chance of efficient 
allocation of resources (O’Rourke, 2004). Ascher (1999) also notes that:  
 
“The level of oil-related corruption in Nigeria would be impossible if there 
were a modicum of transparency and accountability in NNPC and oil ministry 
accounts. One factor strikingly reminiscent of the opacity of Indonesia’s 
Pertamina…is the flexibility that lack of transparency gives to the Presidency” 
(1999:185).  
 
In addition, because individuals (especially poor people) are less likely to have 
resources to gather information, it becomes necessary for a conscious effort to make 
this information available to all stakeholders. Hence, in this study we view resource 
transparency as a public good - such that when it is provided, its consumption or 
benefits are both non-excludable and non-rivalrous (see detailed discussion in Chapter 
3).  
Collier (2007) believes that resource transparency is capable of providing some 
“political restraint to the use power” necessary for ensuring the efficient management 
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of resource revenues. Essentially, Karl (2007) identifies the three key gaps that may 
lead to poor resource wealth management as - information, monitoring and 
participation gaps. She argues that any effort at addressing poor resource wealth 
management must be aimed at bridging these gaps for effectiveness. However, she 
believes that bridging the information gap through resource transparency should be 
prioritized because:  
 
“Sequence matters in this story. Greater access to information sets the 
framework for producing better monitoring, and both information and 
monitoring create incentives for the involvement of those who currently are 
(but need not be adversely) affected by petroleum exploitation” (Karl, 
2007:278). 
 
Nonetheless, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) believe that the concept of transparency is 
often not accorded the emphasis it deserves. They argue that: 
 
“The point is that information capture influences political outcome. Lack of 
transparency discourages public participation in democratic processes. Secrecy 
raises the price of information and thereby discourages voters or groups 
without special interests from participation. Interest groups might on the other 
hand lobby for their interests. Voters use available information to decide 
whether to keep the current party in power or to replace it with the opposition, 
but if, at the time of election, they are uninformed about the responsibilities 
for or consequences of current policies, they might not punish the current 
ruling party” (Kolstad and Wiig 2009:523). 
 
However, there are yet some key controversies in the resource transparency debate. 
The first is the question of where on the natural resource chain is transparency 
required most. The natural resource value chain comprises a h ost of activities 
including the discovery of resources, the decision to exploit resources, the actual 
exploitation of resources, the generation of revenue, and the spending of resource 
revenue. Hence, this controversy has led to the identification of three broad aspects of 
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resource transparency namely: contract transparency, revenue transparency, and 
expenditure transparency. Many authors tend to suggest that transparency should be 
emphasized at the point of expenditure of revenue resources. For instance, although 
Ascher (1999) identifies four basic stages where bad policies could be manifest viz: 
resource development, extraction, processing and the use of the proceeds from 
resource exploitation; he argues that the problems are created by the inability of 
resource managers to adequately convert the natural resource wealth into efficient 
investments and worthwhile consumption for the society. Ascher believes that the 
wasteful spending by state agencies of the proceeds from resource exploitation and 
the failure to make them accountable imply that resource abundance would have a 
negative effect. Interestingly, he identifies six distinct strategies by which 
governments pursue unsound policies which undermine proper management of 
natural resources. These strategies include: 
 
• Financing controversial development programmes 
• Providing economic benefits for particular groups, areas, or individuals 
• Capturing natural resource rents for the central treasury 
• Creating rent-seeking opportunities in order to gain private actor cooperation 
in pursuing other objectives 
• Capturing and maintaining discretion over the financial flows involved in 
resource exploitation, at the expense of other government or state agencies 
• Evading accountability through reliance on low-visibility resource 
manoeuvres. 
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Futhermore, Argentino (2008) emphasizes the need to focus on s pecific areas of 
control fault, such as public budget and improving organisational systems. Ogwumike 
and Ogunleye (2008) also argue that for oil wealth to induce development inhibitions 
such as corruption and lack of transparency to its use and di stribution ought to be 
removed. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of strengthening institutions, it is sometimes difficult to draw a 
line between resource revenue and expenditure especially when both are centrally 
controlled. Sometimes addressing revenue is believed to be a necessary first step, but 
a complete and sustainable effect may not be achieved if one is addressed and the 
other is not. Kolstad and Wiig, (2009) believe that a focus on revenue is “misplaced 
because while transparency has little effect on rent-seeking, patronage manifests 
mainly through expenditure.” But this is not entirely true because more often than not, 
patronage may manifest on t he entire resource chain especially in the award of 
contracts. Therefore, some authors advocate a holistic approach that covers the entire 
chain. The argument is that at each point on the value chain “there are critical 
opportunities to improve or undermine the value for the population” (Rosenblum and 
Maples, 2009:16).  
 
2.5 Challenges to Achieving Resource Transparency 
 
There are opportunities and challenges that are inherent in relying on transparency to 
address identified global issues such as the ‘resource curse’ (Florini, 1999). The first 
key challenge is that the effectiveness of resource transparency is tied to the ability of 
the citizens to utilize the information so provided to demand accountability. Hence, 
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the resource transparency agenda, especially in situations where complementary public 
institutions are lacking, could be an illusion.  For instance, Besley (2006) believes that 
such institutions as the rule of law, press freedom, freedom of information, free and 
fair elections, and the active participation of citizens in governance are necessary 
conditions for transparency to be effective. It is also believed that because resource 
revenues sometimes radically reduce the need for taxation, citizens are not sufficiently 
provoked to supply “the public good of scrutiny over how their taxes are being spent” 
(Collier, 2007:46). The implication is that even when information is made available, 
citizens may yet lack the incentive to provide the necessary follow-up hence the objective 
of accountability may be weakened or not achieved. This raises the question of whether 
the citizens and institutions in a country are properly positioned to respond to 
increased transparency in resource wealth management. Kolstad and Wiig (2009:529) 
also believe that the effectiveness of resource transparency “depends on the level of 
education of an electorate, the extent to which key stakeholders have the power to 
hold a government to account, and the private or collective nature of the goods about 
which information is provided”. 
 
Another challenge in achieving resource transparency is the difficulty in determining 
the level and amount of information disclosure considered sufficient. For instance, 
Heald (2006) acknowledges that although sunshine is essential to life, there are 
dangers in over-exposure to it. Some levels of openness and disclosure could portend 
dangers for key stakeholders. Governments might consider information disclosure in 
certain areas inimical to the public interest or critical to the effectiveness of certain 
policy instruments. There are even greater implications in involving companies and 
private sector entities in transparency arrangements because they are constantly faced 
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with the challenges of maximizing profit in the face of competition and are usually 
wary of the risks that disclosure might portend. Gupta (2008) identifies the emphasis 
on “the power of (due) process” and “empowerment through information” as the two 
basic assumptions of what she terms “governance-by-disclosure”. She argues that 
these two assumptions portend some hazards for any system if not carefully 
monitored.  
 
Kopits and Craig (1998) also argue that there are transaction costs associated with 
transparency. Effective transparency requires the establishment and maintenance of 
technical capacity and institutions to ensure an adequate information system. They 
assert that “the cost of transforming a culture of secrecy into one of transparency may 
be equally large” (1998:3). However, Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) insist that 
the cost of secrecy is staggering and cannot be compared to the transaction cost of 
transparency. They also argue that the citizens’ right to know supersedes all 
arguments against transparency. 
 
However, the challenges posed by the worsening situations in resource-rich countries 
seem to outweigh the numerous cautions expressed about resource transparency. This 
rising global risk necessitates that a concerted response is imperative. The Global 
Witness (2003) in a statement notes that: 
 
“The current status quo is a lose-lose situation for all parties. Ordinary citizens 
are dispossessed and left reliant on don or assistance. Multinational 
corporations see their legitimate revenues misappropriated and squandered, 
and are vulnerable to accusations of complicity with corruption and its 
attendant reputational risk … M oney from taxpayers in the North is then 
required in the form of aid to compensate for state failure in the South, which 
is inefficient and undermines other attempts to improve governance. The 
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international community also faces instability that in some cases may directly 
threaten the security of energy supply” (Global Witness, 2008:1)  
 
The greater challenge seems to be the question of how best could a global strategy 
towards resource transparency be organised? Some authors acknowledge that as much 
as the significance of transparency is often generally acknowledged, actualizing or 
institutionalizing it is no easy task (Florini, 1999; Mason, 2008). For instance, 
Truelove (2004: 237) acknowledges that “the need for disclosure is clear, but the 
means for implementing disclosure are not”. The challenge therefore is in determining 
the most appropriate and effective strategy for achieving resource transparency. 
 
How best can resource transparency be achieved and what factors would influence the 
effectiveness of any such strategy? A number of authors have suggested that 
collective action is the most effective means of achieving resource transparency (Karl, 
2007; Collier, 2008). This they believe is due to the fact that resource transparency 
provides different levels of opportunities and challenges to diverse stakeholders, and 
as such the collaboration of all stakeholders is essential for the achievement of 
resource transparency. The form of collective action advocated is different from the 
traditional systems such as multilateralism or voluntary codes of conduct (COCs). It is 
believed that while multilateralism does not sufficiently accommodate all the key 
actors in global governance notably business and civil society organisations (CSO), 
on the other hand business cannot be trusted to effectively regulate itself through 
COCs (Kolk and Tulder, 1999; Jenkins, 2001; Utting, 2001; Sullivan, 2003; 
Beschorner and Muller, 2007; Martens, 2007). In order to deal with the participation 
and implementation shortfalls of these strategies in the provision of resource 
transparency, the collective action of all stakeholders in a multi-stakeholder platform 
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is therefore considered most suitable for achieving resource transparency. For 
instance, Collier (2007: unpaginated) argues that what is required is “an appropriate 
combination of learning to correct past mistakes, and institutional innovation to 
correct misaligned incentives”. 
 
However, much as it has been widely advocated, this claim about the suitability of 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) for the provision of resource transparency has not 
been sufficiently examined in the literature. Empirical studies of MSIs in varied 
aspects of global governance issues may abound, but  their application to the resource 
transparency agenda is only recent and as such has not been sufficiently examined. 
Therefore, this study attempts to address this gap in knowledge by seeking answers to 
the overall research question: what factors influence the effectiveness of collective 
action for resource transparency? 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have established that the trend in the explanations for the inability 
of resource abundance to sometimes translate to economic prosperity has transcended 
the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis. There seems to be a major shift towards an emphasis 
on the role and quality of institutions in determining the outcome of abundant natural 
resources. However, there are further debates among proponents of this argument, for 
instance, on which institutions matter in the improvement of resource wealth 
management and what strategy is most appropriate? We highlighted the increasing 
focus on resource transparency as a k ey means of improving resource management 
institutions and it was noted that given the unique challenges involved in resource 
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transparency, the collective action of all stakeholders seems to be an acceptable 
strategy for its provision. 
 
The literature reviewed strongly supports the need to seek alternative strategies for 
addressing the negative outcome of resource abundance. One such strategy has been 
the assumption that resource transparency would improve the management and 
outcome of abundant resources. The literature also suggests that collective action of 
all stakeholders would be an acceptable means of achieving resource transparency due 
to its inherent characteristics. However, the understanding of how collective action 
could be effectively organised for resource transparency seems to be scant. The need 
arises to address this gap in knowledge by conducting a deeper exploration of 
collective action for the provision of resource transparency. Therefore the main 
research question that this study addresses is: what factors influence the effectiveness 
of collective action for resource transparency and how and w hy do these factors 
manifest? In the next chapter, resource transparency is further conceptualized, and the 
framework for exploring the research question posed is discussed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
EXPLORING COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR RESOURCE 
TRANSPARENCY: THE RESEARCH APPROACH, 
DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, w e established that the argument that the outcome of resource 
abundance is strongly linked with the quality of institutions seems to be quite robust. 
We also established that one key means of improving institutions for resource wealth 
management is through resource transparency, and the collective action of diverse 
stakeholders has been suggested as an effective means of achieving resource 
transparency.  However, a key question that arises from these conclusions is ‘how 
best can collective action for resource transparency be organised? What seems to be 
scant in the literature is a detailed understanding of how collective action for resource 
transparency could be effectively organised. Resource transparency, in its recent 
connotations, lacks a coherent and detailed study of its empirical application, 
particularly, the challenges to the effective use of collective action for its provision. 
This study therefore explores the key question: what factors influence the 
effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency? And also examines how 
and why these factors manifest. In addressing these questions, it is imperative to first 
determine the most appropriate form of collective action that would be suitable for the 
provision of resource transparency. 
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Meinzen-Dick et al (2004) contend that there are three major challenges that 
researchers encounter when studying collective action. These challenges include: 
 
•  conceptualising collective action; 
• developing an analytical framework for studying collective action; and 
• operationalizing the framework for empirical research (2004:200). 
 
In addition to the above challenges, collective action also seems to be issue and 
context specific. Hence, understanding the problem and the environment for which 
collective action is required seems to be imperative (Fransen and Kolk, 2007). 
Therefore, in this chapter we build an overall research strategy for the study of how 
collective action can be organised for achieving resource transparency. This chapter 
discusses a theoretical framework that would enable the conceptualization of resource 
transparency and justifies the need for collective action for its provision, and the best 
form of collective action advocated and why. As a guide for our enquiry, we derive 
from relevant theories the challenges or factors that are likely to influence the 
effectiveness of such collective action for resource transparency, and identify a 
suitable research approach and data gathering methods capable of yielding sufficient 
evidence for our analysis. 
 
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the theoretical 
framework for this study. The resource transparency debate is considered in the light 
of the agency theory and the implications for its successful provision are highlighted. 
These implications point to the need for an innovative form of collective action and 
the use of a multi-stakeholder initiative for resource transparency is discussed in 
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section 3.3. T he focus on the critical factors that influence the organisation and 
effectiveness of MSIs for resource transparency forms our point of departure for this 
study and section 3.4 identifies the holistic single case study as the chosen research 
strategy and provides a brief overview of the broad and specific aspects of the 
identified case. Section 3.5 presents the analytic framework, while the data gathering 
and analysis methods are discussed in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Collective Action for the Provision of ‘Globalised National Public 
Goods’: A Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework for this study draws from the assumption that the 
institutional problems in resource governance are predominantly principal-agent (or 
agency) problems (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Particularly, this agency problem is 
created by the information asymmetry that tends to exist between the principals 
(citizens) and the agents (public and private actors involved in resource wealth 
management). Hence, to address this agency problem, resource transparency or the 
transparent management of resource wealth is required in order to bridge the 
information gap. However, because resource transparency is considered a ‘globalised 
national public good’, it also faces the problems associated with the overall provision 
of public goods, and to mitigate these problems the collective action of all 
stakeholders would be required for its effective provision.  
 
Nevertheless, there are obstacles to effective collective action. The focus of this study 
is therefore to examine the challenges or factors that influence the effectiveness of 
collective action for resource transparency. From the assumptions of both the agency 
and collective action theories we deduce that there are key factors that are likely to 
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determine the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency. Among 
these factors are the structural environment for collective action, the characteristics of 
the component agents, the governance structure for the collective action and, the 
nature of external influence. These factors, we believe, would have specific 
implications for the type of collective action advocated for the provision of resource 
transparency, especially in the context of a typical resource-rich developing country. 
This forms the framework that would be applied to the identified case study in 
investigating how and why these factors influence collective action for resource 
transparency. The sub-sections below provide a detailed discussion of this theoretical 
framework. 
 
3.2.1 The Agency Problem in Natural Resource Governance: A Case 
for Resource Transparency 
 
The agency theory explains the problems that are likely to exist between two parties 
in a formal or informal contract where one party - the principal, hires the other – the 
agent, to perform a task (Eisenhardt, 1989; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Waterman and 
Meier, 1998). The theory presupposes that problems may arise because: 
 
• the goals of the two parties are divergent, as such there may be conflict of 
goals; 
• the agent possesses more information (both about himself and the 
environment) than the principal, and because the agent is self-interested may 
utilize this advantage to engage in opportunistic behaviour; 
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• it is not possible for the principal to completely observe the behaviour of the 
agent; 
• The principal and the agent may also have different attitudes towards risks and 
“the problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different 
actions because of the different risk preferences” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). 
 
The agency theory presupposes that conflict of goals and information asymmetries 
characterize the relationship between a principal and an agent (Waterman and Meier, 
1998). Therefore, the ability of the principal to both observe and influence the 
behaviour of the agent defines the intensity of the agency problem.  
 
The relationship that the agency theory presupposes is ubiquitous and is “one of the 
commonest and most codified modes of social interaction” (Ross, 1973:134). With 
origins in the study of insurance (Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971), the agency theory 
has been extended to numerous areas of study including the analysis and 
understanding of institutions (Weingast and Moran, 1983; Weingast, 1984; Downs 
and Rocke, 1994; Wood, 1988; Cook and Wood, 1989; Groenedijk, 1997; Miller, 
2005; Kolstad and Wiig, 20095). It is argued that “it seems reasonable to urge the 
adoption of an agency theory perspective when investigating the many problems that 
have a p rincipal-agent structure” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 70). Although, the applicability 
of the basic assumptions of the agency theory has also been frequently challenged 
(Waterman and Meier, 1998; Shapiro, 2005), we believe that the key assumptions of 
the agency theory are relevant in exploring the problems associated with resource 
                                                 
5 Kolstad and Wiig (2009) apply the agency theory in examining the linkage between corruption and 
the management of resource revenue in developing countries. 
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wealth management and in understanding the emphasis on resource transparency as a 
possible option for their resolution. 
 
The agency theory also identifies two key ways through which the problem of 
information asymmetry can manifest. The first is adverse selection which happens 
when the principal (has insufficient information) is unable to fully determine the type 
or qualities of the agent prior to the contract. The second is the problem of moral 
hazard which is a situation in which the principal is unable to fully observe or 
monitor the agent’s behaviour during the execution of the contract. However, 
underlying these two agency problems is the problem of costly verification which 
denotes that it is difficult or costly for the principal to obtain information about both 
the agent’s qualities and his behaviour (Dixit, 2002).  
 
Therefore, resource transparency is advocated as a m eans of narrowing the 
information asymmetry, reducing the cost of verification, and hence the intensity of 
the agency problem inherent in resource wealth management (Kolstad and Wiig, 
2009). This is supported by the empirical evidence that the few countries who have 
avoided the ‘resource curse’ appear to have achieved that “through prudent and 
transparent management practices” (IMF 2005:4). Lack of transparency in resource 
wealth management, especially in resource-rich developing countries, is even more 
significant because of the enormous opportunity it presents to public and private 
actors, and the consequences it has on poverty and economic development. Kolstad 
and Wiig (2009:524) argue that “secrecy is an important way in which government 
officials attempt to influence public opinion or create rents for themselves”. 
Motivated by their self-interests (Eisenhardt, 1989), government and business agents 
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maximize the rent-seeking opportunities that the institution of secrecy provides at the 
expense of the goals and aspirations of the ordinary citizens for the benefits of 
abundant resources. This negative net impact of natural resource abundance on t he 
economy and lives of people in most resource-rich developing countries reflects the 
agency problem that exists in resource wealth management. For the purpose of this 
study, resource transparency is therefore defined as the public disclosure of 
relevant and accessible information regarding the decisions and actions of public 
and private agents who are directly or indirectly involved in the overall 
management of natural resource wealth in any given environment. 
 
3.2.2 Cui Bono? Resource Transparency as a Global Public Good  
 
Can resource transparency which aims to reduce information asymmetry be in the 
interest of agents? In whose benefit is resource transparency? The agency theory 
assumes that it is  in the interest of the principal to constantly seek means (through 
incentives or coercion) of resolving the agency problem (Groenedijk, 1997; Miller, 
2005). However, as empirical evidence especially from developing countries has 
shown, the agency problem in resource wealth management often persists because the 
principals seem to lack the requisite capacity (incentives or coercion) to resolve the 
agency problem (Karl, 2007). Therefore, the question is: can agents be interested in 
resolving the agency problem? Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2001:103) argue 
that “when the agent has more information than the principal concerning certain 
important aspects of the relationship, this information will only be revealed if it is in 
the interest of the agent to do so.” 
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What conditions may therefore motivate agents towards providing resource 
transparency? Waterman and Meier (1998) suggest that contrary to the assumption 
that it is  in the principal’s interest to resolve the agency problem; agents can 
sometimes initiate solutions to the agency problem. However, this is very likely only 
in situations where the goals of both the principal and that of the agents somehow 
converge. Waterman and Meier (1998) argue that because the goals and interests of 
principals and agents are flexible, they can sometimes converge. One clear area where 
these goals seem to very often converge is in the provision of public goods.    
 
Public goods are goods that when provided, their consumption or benefits are both 
non-excludable and non-rivalrous. In other words, as opposed to private goods, it is 
difficult to exclude non-payers from the benefits or consumption of such goods, and 
the consumption of a unit of these goods does not reduce their availability. Resource 
transparency seems to belong to the category of public goods. Arguably, the benefits 
(positive externalities) of a transparent management of resource wealth are both non-
excludable and non-rival, and could transcend national borders and generations as 
well. For instance, within national boundaries, resource transparency could lead to 
better governance of natural resource wealth and thereby engender both political and 
economic stability, sustainable development and an overall better life for citizens. 
However, this could also result in reduced aid budgets for poverty reduction and save 
tax payers’ money in donor countries, improve the atmosphere for investments and 
business opportunities for multinational corporations (MNCs) and their home 
countries, stability of international prices of energy and other resources, and so on. As 
such resource transparency falls within the category of goods/ services classified as 
global public goods (GPGs) (Buchanan, 1965; Cornes and Sandler, 1996). 
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A key implication for public goods is that there are problems associated with their 
provision, and they often tend to be underprovided. It is believed that public goods 
possess unique characteristics that have implications for their provision (Sandler, 
2001; Barret, 2007). Therefore, a proper classification is essential in order to 
determine their most effective means of provision. Using Inge Kaul’s (2003) 
classification of public goods, we identify resource transparency as a ‘globalized 
national public good’.  The two key considerations that are made in classifying public 
goods are their mode of occurrence and their scope of occurrence.  
 
First, public goods can either be natural or human made depending on how they 
occur. Natural public goods include goods or services provided as a response to issues 
emanating from “the atmosphere, the geostationary orbit, the electromagnetic 
spectrum, and the high seas, most of which predate human history” (Kaul, 2003:14), 
while human made public goods are those provided to respond to problems created by 
the decisions and actions of human beings, an example is the global fight against 
poverty.  Kaul (2003:14) also believes that “it is this second class, the human-made 
global public goods, which has witnessed a rapid expansion in recent centuries -and 
especially- in recent decades, being both a driving force and result of globalization”. 
 
Second, considering the scope of occurrence, public goods are further classified as 
either national or international/transnational, depending on the geographical 
implications of their benefits or consequences of non-provision. When the benefits (or 
consequences of non-provision) of a public good manifest within the borders of a 
country, the public good is classified as a ‘national public good’. But if the provision 
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of a public good benefits all, irrespective of their geographical location, including 
future generations, and the failure to provide it puts the whole world at risk, then the 
public good is referred to as an ‘international or transnational public good’  (Sandler, 
2001; Barret, 2007).  These international public goods can also be either global or 
regional public goods, depending on the scope of their implications. Hence, regional 
public goods (RPGs) are public goods that have implications for specific continents or 
for a group of countries (who do not  necessarily share contiguous borders).  F or 
instance, Barret (2007) argues that different countries will be affected by climate 
change and in different ways. For the provision of RPGs, Sandler (2001) suggests 
that: 
“a regional network that connects nations confronting a common international 
public good (IPG) issue needs to form as in the case of river blindness ... 
Western African countries engineered a network among themselves to control 
both the parasite worm and the person-to-person contagion of the disease 
(Sandler, 2001: 24). 
 
However, Kaul (2003) argues that there is a strong tendency for national public 
goods, which should normally have local implications, to assume regional and global 
dimensions due to the effect of globalisation. Hence, they become ‘globalised national 
public goods’ such as resource transparency. Resource transparency is required to 
address the agency problem within resource-rich countries but its provision has 
become a global concern because of the rapidly spreading consequences of its non-
provision. For instance, the poor management of resource wealth in developing 
countries is often linked to the rising incidence of poverty, conflict, and violence in 
these countries, and growing threats to international business and investments. Collier 
and Venables (2009:10) contend that poor resource wealth management has 
implications “somewhat analogous to climate change”.   
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Figure 3.1 be low represents this classification of public goods in a two by three 
matrix highlighting ‘globalised national public goods’ (GNPGs) as the key focus of 
this study. 
 
Table 3.1 Classification of Public Goods  
 National Regional Global 
Natural Natural National 
PGs 
Natural Regional 
PGs 
Natural Global PGs 
(Natural Global 
Commons) 
Human made Human Made 
National PGs 
Human Made 
Regional PGs 
Human Made 
Global PGs 
(Globalised 
National Public 
Goods) 
Source: Adapted from Inge Kaul (2003). 
 
‘Globalised national public goods’ have attracted concerns because of their growing 
significance and implications to the global community coupled with the challenges 
associated with their provision. Sandler (2001) believes that the nature or class of a 
public good determines the ‘aggregation technology’ required for its provision which 
in turn informs “the manner in which individual contributions to the public good 
determine the total quantity of the good available for consumption” (2001: 16) – and 
also the institutional arrangements required for their provision. The most significant 
development in this area seems to be the detachment from the state-centric view that 
the provision of public goods falls solely within the responsibility of states (Sandler, 
2001; Kaul et al, 2003; Barret, 2007). Although the state still plays a pivotal role in 
public goods provision “it is no longer correct (if ever it was) to define public goods 
simply as state-provided goods” (Kaul, 2003: 2). The question that arises then is: what 
effective mechanism is likely to facilitate the provision of a ‘globalised national 
public good’ such as resource transparency and why? The collective action of 
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multiple actors has been strongly advocated generally for the provision of GPGs 
(Oslo, 1965; Ostrom, 2000; Anand, 2004). Anand (2004), for instance, argues that “in 
the absence of a global government with tax-raising powers, voluntary cooperation 
and collective action are the main instruments to supply GPGs” (2004:223). However, 
collective action exists in numerous forms. What form of collective action would be 
most suitable for the provision of resource transparency? In answering this question, it 
is imperative to first explore the key considerations underlying the need for collective 
action for resource transparency. 
3.2.3 Exploring Collective Action for Resource Transparency 
 
 
It is believed that the collective action of multiple actors is an effective means of 
overcoming the problems associated with the provision of public goods (Oslo, 1965; 
Sandler, 1992; Ostrom, 2000). The need for collective action for resource 
transparency appears to be even stronger. The IMF Guide to Resource Revenue 
Transparency states that “because of the magnitude of resource-related transactions, 
and because project-by-project negotiations are the general rule in many developing 
countries, issues of transparency of international companies and lenders, and 
collective action by stakeholders are also important”. (IMF, 2005:10). An author also 
acknowledges that: 
 
“GPGs can generally be understood as “commodities, resources, services—
and also systems of rules or policy regimes with substantial cross-border 
externalities—that are important for development and poverty reduction, and 
that can be produced in sufficient supply only through co-operation and 
collective action to achieve them” (Boisson de Chazournes, 2003:1). 
 
The cooperation and coordination of more than one individual is often required for the 
accomplishment of most tasks in our everyday living. Taylor and Singleton (1993) 
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acknowledge that there is hardly an area of social life from which collective action 
efforts is absent. They argue that collective action is required “where rational 
individual action by each of the members of some set of actors can lead to an 
inefficient or Pareto-inferior outcome” (Taylor and Singleton, 1993:196). The theory 
of collective action presupposes that public goods and externalities have quantity 
constraints for their provision and that “the presence of a quantity constraint can cause 
uncoordinated individual actions or decisions to reach suboptimal positions from 
which all individuals could have their well-being improved”. The collective action 
theory further predicts that “if the participants can agree to coordinate their choices so 
that the consequences of each quantity choice (e.g., voluntary contributions to a 
public good) reflect the interests of the entire group, then collective action will, even 
in the presence of public goods and externalities, provide better outcomes from the 
standpoint of the collective” (Sandler 1992:7).  
 
However, as strong as the collective action argument is for the provision of public 
goods, it is not often in the best interests of agents to “agree to coordinate”. The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game is often used to illustrate that “the pursuit of individual 
self-interest may imply an outcome for the collective that is inferior to other feasible 
outcomes” (Sandler 1992:5). Therefore, it is not often guaranteed that individual 
actors would chose to take collective action whenever they jointly benefitted. Mancur 
Olson (1965), had suggested that “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite 
small, or unless there is coercion or some other device to make individuals act in their 
common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests” (1965:2). 
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Nevertheless, the widespread use of collective action for public goods provision, 
especially in recent times appears to be contrary to Olson’s prediction that it would be 
difficult for groups to form (Ostrom, 2000). There are indications that aside the 
conditions listed by Olson, there may be other factors that motivate agents to “agree 
to coordinate”. Some of these factors include the characteristics of individual agents 
(Ostrom, 2000), the constant interaction of the agents, uncertainty (‘shadow of the 
future’) and the agents’ collective concern for transaction (and reputation) costs. The 
portrayal of agents as self-interested opportunists who have nothing to lose from the 
agency problem has also been challenged. For instance, just like agents, principals 
also sometimes have the tendency to shirk. Referring to the ‘stewardship theory’ 
Shapiro (2005: 268), argues that agents also face similar challenges as that of the 
principals and that sometimes there may be:  
 
“principal type that may lead to adverse selection by agents who may be 
unwittingly drawn to principals who shirk, cheat, and opportunistically seize 
perquisites for their own use; who deceive (e.g., about hazardous working 
conditions, opportunities for advancement, etc.); and who exploit their agents” 
(Shapiro, 2005:268).  
 
The ‘stewardship theory’ therefore argues that contrary to the assumptions of the 
agency theory, agents could be “good stewards and team players and replaces 
assumptions of opportunism and conflict of interests with those of cooperation and 
coordination” (Shapiro 2005:268). This indicates that agents sometimes have 
considerable motivation to act towards resolving the agency problem as opposed to 
the classical agency theory which portrays agents as benefitting from the problem and 
would hardly act to resolve it. Does resource transparency (or the consequences of its 
non-provision) present any such motivations for agents to “agree to coordinate”? 
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3.2.4 Why is Collective Action Considered Necessary for Resource 
Transparency? 
 
From the late 1990s, business and governments had begun to face enormous 
consequences of lack of transparency in natural resource wealth management. 
Poverty, conflict, and instability in countries such as Angola and Nigeria attracted 
widespread Civil Society campaigns against the ‘business as usual’ approach to 
natural resource wealth management. It soon became obvious that “negotiations in the 
medium term should be prompted by the desire of all concerned to avoid a worst case 
scenario of violence and disorder by accepting a “second best” option” (Karl, 
2007:277). This ‘second best’ option was also one that would require the collective 
action of all stakeholders. 
 
This need for collective action was particularly highlighted by a popular single case. 
In 2001, f ollowing mounting pressure from Civil Society campaigners for resource 
transparency, British Petroleum (BP) agreed to publicly disclose payments that it 
made to the Angolan government in respect of oil contracts. In addition to the 
mounting pressure from Civil Society, BP’s decision was made because it was “in the 
best interests of the company and its shareholders to publish this data given the 
difficult conditions in the country and its significant investments at stake.” However, 
concerned about the consequences of such disclosure, the Angolan government barred 
BP from carrying out its planned publication and threatened to terminate BP’s licence 
to operate in the country. Of course, BP backed down from its initial position in order 
to preserve its business interests in Angola (van Oranje and Parham, 2009). 
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The case described above is often believed to have influenced the global perception of 
resource transparency as a global public good that essentially requires the collective 
action of all stakeholders. It equally highlights the argument that “when choices are 
interdependent but individual decisions are made independently, a collective failure, 
as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, may arise” (Sandler 1992:7) and also that one agent 
“acting unilaterally could be at risk” (van Oranje and Parham, 2009:33). Inge Kaul 
also notes that “public goods emerge as a result of a complex interplay between not 
only numerous agents but also many types of actors and coordination mechanisms, 
including markets” (Kaul, 2003: 9). As such “a level playing field, in which all 
companies are compelled to disclose payments, is required to ensure that no s ingle 
company is at a competitive disadvantage” (van Oranje and Parham, 2009:32). 
However, it is important to note that all natural resources do not attract the same level 
of global attention. The level of attention or controversy  seems to be a function of 
how internationally tradeable each natural resource commodity is. For instance low 
unit value resource such as granite, river sand, and fresh water attract less attention 
than oil or diamond.Even though resource transparency is considered relevant to the 
management of all natural resources, the amount of global attention may differ 
according to the type of resource. 
 
It is not equally possible to expect government agents to unilaterally provide resource 
transparency, especially in resource-rich developing countries. Kolstad and Soreide 
(2009) believe that: 
“improving the institutional environment is not necessarily easy, and it is 
particularly difficult where key players benefit from dysfunctional institutions. 
It is unlikely that corrupt government officials would support or implement 
reform significantly reducing their take” (2009:218). 
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There are complex issues that are involved in achieving resource transparency. One 
major consideration is that it is not in the best self-interest of the agents to easily yield 
the advantages that information asymmetry provides to them (Haufler, 2010:58). And 
also in certain circumstances, especially in a multi-agent situation, agents are in 
competition amongst themselves and this implies that collective action, such that no 
single agent is unduly exposed or disadvantaged, becomes attractive (Bernstein and 
Cashore, 2007; Haufler, 2010).  
 
While the argument for collective action for resource transparency seems to be strong, 
the challenge is also in determining the nature and type of collective action that would 
be most effective for its provision. Collective action exists in various forms and there 
are key considerations to be made in the choice of suitable forms of collective action 
for the provision of specific types of GPGs. For instance, Groenendijk (1997) 
suggests that the following three key considerations are necessary: 
 
i. nature of the good to be provided (e.g. ‘globalised national public good’); 
ii. nature of the component agents (and the nature of their interrelationships) 
and;  
iii. nature of the internal and external environment in which collective action is 
expected to happen. 
 
These key considerations as stipulated by Groenendijk (1997) provide a suitable 
model for exploring the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency. 
However, it is  necessary to first determine what form of collective action is best 
suited for resource transparency? Available literature indicates that there are various 
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forms of collective action that exist in global governance which range from specific 
groups of  a ctors co-operating among themselves within specific environments to 
collaborations that cut across different actor types, issues and geographical locations. 
Therefore, collective action may be amongst state institutions (e.g. multilateralism), or 
amongst non-state actors, and can also be between both state and non-state actors. 
However, in more recent years, a specific form of collective action has been 
advocated and experimented with. Increasing challenges posed by the problems 
associated with the provision of GPGs have made it increasingly essential that broader 
and inclusive platforms are necessary for the effective provision of GPGs. These 
platforms, known as multi-stakeholder initiatives, have also been considered for the 
effective provision of resource transparency. What hopes does the strategy of MSIs 
have for the achievement of resource transparency in resource-rich developing 
countries? 
 
3.3 Achieving Resource Transparency through a Multi-stakeholder 
Initiative  
 
The 1990s ushered in a new dimension in global governance with increased 
experimentation with MSIs. Prior to this period, GPG provision was dominated by 
interstate cooperation. International efforts involving actors other than states were 
quite limited. However, the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 
1992 was focused on the need to create platforms that would accommodate non-state 
actors, notably business and civil society organisations, in the provision of GPGs. 
This gave impetus to the increase in what was called Type II Outcomes or MSIs 
(Martens, 2007). Furthermore, ten years later, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002, was also themed on according 
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greater significance to the use MSIs in addressing global issues. Ever since, MSIs 
have grown significantly. It is believed that globalization and its attendant 
consequences have further necessitated the active involvement of actors, other than 
states, in global governance. Specifically, the ability of states to adequately regulate 
business dwindled over the years, and business could not be entirely relied upon to 
unilaterally regulate itself through voluntary codes of conduct (Utting, 2002). Hence, 
MSIs provided a viable means of achieving the objective of creating a common 
platforms for all stakeholders to dialogue and fashion out the best possible strategies 
for jointly providing GPGs. Utting (2002) believes that the rise of MSIs  
 
“reflects changes that are occurring in the balance of social forces—notably 
the growth of NGO and consumer pressures—and notions of “good 
governance,” which emphasize the importance of collaboration and 
“partnership” (Utting, 2002:62). 
 
MSIs have largely been promoted as “critical mechanisms for narrowing the 
“governance gap” in international politics and for the effective tackling of global 
problems” (Wigell, 2008:4).  However, a coherent understanding of the concept of 
MSI is still lacking in the global governance literature. Surprisingly, very little 
attempt is made to link the concept of MSIs to the apparently much more established 
collective action theory. Much as it is popularly advocated, the literature on MSIs as a 
form of collective action for global public goods provision is only just developing. 
The result therefore is that the understanding of MSIs seems to be limited, vague and 
subject to “multiple political interpretations” (Fransen and Kolk, 2007:669). In the 
available literature, the conceptualization of MSIs is further obfuscated by the retinue 
of terms often employed to represent the process. Some of these terms include: global 
public policy networks, global partnerships, multi-stakeholder partnerships, multi-
sectoral networks, and plurilateral coalitions. For instance, MSIs also appear to be 
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similar to what is termed “Democratic Corporatism” defined as “the voluntary, 
cooperative regulation of conflicts over economic and social issues through highly 
structured and interpenetrating political relationships between business, trade unions, 
and the state” (Dixit, 1996:110 quoting Katzenstein 1985). In addition, Bernstein and 
Cashore (2007:348)  use the term ‘non-state market devices’ (NSMD) to represent 
“deliberative and adaptive governance institutions designed to embed social and 
environmental norms in the global market place that derive authority directly from 
interested audiences, including those they seek to regulate, not from sovereign states”.  
 
In effect, there does not yet seem to be a common definition of the concept of MSIs. 
Martens (2007) acknowledges that: 
 
“Aside from the multistakeholder approach which they all share, there is no 
formula which otherwise unifies the varying combinations of actors, goals and 
timescales involved in the different projects (2007:4).”  
 
Nevertheless, the concept of MSIs has been used to represent a rather wide spectrum 
of activities which ranges from: 
 
“concrete and time limited cooperation projects working towards financing 
and carrying out national or international political goals to networks to 
coordinate state and non-state actors in a p articular sector; from ad-hoc 
commissions to formulate international norms and standards to newly created 
permanent international institutions with functions as diverse as finance, 
policy making, coordination, norm-setting and decision-making” (Martens, 
2007:4). 
 
The popularity of MSIs seems to be linked to the long list of benefits often associated 
with them. Some of these benefits include that: 
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i) They inform government and business as to what is generally considered 
sensible and to gather and disseminate knowledge; 
ii) They provide a neutral objective/platform upon which reformers/ activists can 
rally and to broaden participation; 
iii) They provide a norm for the coordination of external pressure; 
iv) By identifying those stakeholders that are willing to join/comply, they reveal 
those that are not (Collier, 2007); 
v) They help to build trust among stakeholders who would normally be 
suspicious of each other eg NGOs versus business and also to facilitate 
negotiations (Wigell, 2008); 
vi) They help to correctly identify the specific needs of the stakeholders and 
global public needs through dialogue (Haufler, 2007:3); 
vii)  Their emphasis on s takeholders’ ownership of the process increases 
commitment and hence success. 
 
The acceptance of MSIs as effective means of providing global public goods has 
grown in recent years. Many writers agree that MSIs are relevant innovations in 
global governance (Reinicke and Dang, 2000; Hemmatti, 2002). Boström (2006) for 
instance, argues that when standards are developed in multi-stakeholder settings with 
involvement of various interest groups, this has the benefit of ‘inclusiveness’, 
implying that all parties relevant to a specific issue have a say in matters, thus 
increasing authority of decision making and establishing good governance (see also 
Ruggie and Kell, 1999; and Fransen and Kolk, 2007:670). Even traditional forms of 
global governance are gradually acknowledging this importance by creating platforms 
for multiple stakeholders to collaborate and participate in the provision of global 
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public goods. For instance, The United Nations (UN) established the UN Global 
Compact in 2002 t o provide opportunity for companies to “collaborate and partner 
with governments, civil society, labour and the United Nations” and with “over 8,700 
corporate participants and other stakeholders from over 130 countries, it is the largest 
voluntary corporate responsibility initiative in the world” (UN Global Compact 
Website6).  
 
However, some sceptics argue that these benefits of MSIs are merely hypothetical as 
they seldom deliver the numerous promises that their proponents claim. Their 
growing prominence notwithstanding, the role of MSIs in global governance remains 
contested. Many writers argue that the voluntary arrangements that most MSIs adopt 
and other inherent characteristics (e.g. the tendency to be hijacked by one stakeholder 
group) limit the successes that the MSIs can achieve, and there are also concerns 
about the growing influence of MSIs at the expense of other forms of collective action 
strategies such as multilateralism, especially the UN (Ottaway, 2001; Utting and 
Zammitt, 2006). Some other authors also raise concerns about the sustainability of 
MSIs. For instance, Biermann et al (2007) argue that the promise that MSIs can 
effectively fill the governance gaps in global governance does not seem to hold.  
 
The scepticism about the effectiveness of MSIs notwithstanding, global governance is 
replete with a growing number of MSIs in a wide variety of issue areas. MSIs have 
grown from only 50 in the 1980s to about 400 i n 2007 ( Martens, 2007) and they 
perform a number of functions including dialogue or forum, institution building, rule-
setting, rule implementation, and rule monitoring (Koechlin and Calland, 2009). 
                                                 
6 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC.html. Accessed 28/06/2010 
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There are a number of factors often attributed to the growth of MSIs. Many writers 
believe that the choice of MSIs is strongly linked to the benefits that they offer to 
multiple stakeholders groups. For business, Mares (2003) argues that 
 
“Some gains stem from increased efficiency, such as cost savings by avoiding 
disruptions of operations caused by unrest in surrounding communities, or 
from adopting more efficient and environment-friendly technologies that save 
raw materials or minimize waste. Some other will be reputational gains 
associated with being perceived as good corporate citizens” (2003: xx) 
 
 It is believed that the advantages that MSIs offer in the midst of diminishing 
alternatives, especially its inclusiveness plays a key role (Martens, 2007). Haufler 
(2002:4) also argues that: 
 
“The value of the multi-stakeholder partnership should not be measured only 
in terms of concrete projects and outcomes, but in terms of the more 
ephemeral value of sustaining partnership among a diverse group of interests.” 
 
However, there seems to be a convergence on the fact that the successful organisation 
and effectiveness of MSIs would depend on c ertain key factors (Keochlin and 
Calland, 2009). In the sub-sections that follow, we attempt to highlight these 
fundamental factors that are likely to influence the organisation and effectiveness of a 
MSI designed for achieving resource transparency. 
 
3.3.1 Organising MSIs for Resource Transparency: The Critical 
Factors 
 
The effectiveness of MSIs for resource transparency would be determined by some 
key factors. In this sub-section, we attempt to identify the critical factors that are 
54 
 
likely to influence the organisation and effectiveness of MSIs designed for natural 
resource transparency. By so doing, we derive the key research questions that guide 
the rest of this study. To achieve this objective, we rely on the suggestions gleaned 
from key collective action theorists on t he challenges to collective action. For 
instance, Olson (1965) suggests that achieving collective action would be influenced 
by how well ‘selective incentives’ and ‘institutional structures’ are designed towards 
overcoming collective action problems. There seems to be a convergence that:  
 
“Variables such as relations between identity groups, the level and dynamics 
of socio-economic development, the design and functioning of public and state 
institutions, behavioural patterns of elites, political parties, the military and 
civil society – not forgetting the regional and global setting - have to be 
scrutinised carefully when studying resource- related problems in any 
country” (Basedau, 2005:23). 
 
MSIs seem to have transformed from merely platforms for dialogue among diverse 
stakeholders to become effective global standard setting organisations, and more 
recently there have been efforts at mainstreaming MSIs’ strategies in domestic 
governance processes (UNDP, 2006). It becomes imperative therefore to investigate 
further the key factors that influence their effectiveness. The use of MSIs for resource 
transparency offers an opportunity to test their viability for diverse global governance 
issues. What unique challenges would issues such as resource transparency present for 
the organisation and effectiveness of MSI? Using the key considerations highlighted 
by Groenendijk (1997) (see page 48 above), we have grouped the factors   i nto the 
following four broad categories:  
 
1. The Structural Environment: This refers to the issue area and the 
environment for which the MSI is required. It is believed that some issues 
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areas are more amenable to success than others (Koechlin and Calland, 2009). 
There is need therefore to consider the inherent factors and challenges within 
the environment for which collective action for resource transparency is 
required. For instance, it is argued that the presence or absence of 
complementary institutions that allow or support public participation would 
determine the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency 
(Gardiner and Le Goulven, 2002).  In this study, we explore the extent to 
which contextual factors create incentives or disincentives that influence the 
effectiveness of MSIs for resource transparency and also examine how and 
why.    
Research Question 1: How and why does the structural environment 
influence collective action for the provision of resource transparency? 
 
2. The Component Agents: The component agents to collective action also 
constitute the key determinants to its success and effectiveness. It is believed 
that “the form(s) of the agents’ utility function, and “the strategic assumption 
(ie how agents expect others to react to their choices)” Sandler (1992:7); and 
the “characteristics of the individuals involved” (Groenendijk, 1997:223), 
would influence the outcome of collective action. Therefore, the second 
research question for this study is stated thus:  
 
Research Question 2: How and why do the characteristics of the component 
agents, and the nature of the relationship between and amongst them, 
influence the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency? 
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3. The Governance Structure for Collective Action: The design processes, and 
institutions of collective action can constitute both a solution and a challenge 
to the problems of collective action (Ostrom, 2000).  C ollective action for 
resource transparency would require a governance structure that would be 
suitable for “partners who can gain from mutual dependence but need to 
control the risks of opportunism” (Menard 2004: 368). The governance 
structure and institutions are often designed to mitigate collective action 
problems such as free-riding (Olson, 1965). Therefore, the third research 
question explores the nature of the governance structure that emerges for 
collective action for resource transparency.  
 
Research Question 3: How and why does the governance structure of 
collective action for the provision of resource transparency influence its 
effectiveness? 
 
4. External Influence: The fourth set of factors reflects the global nature of the 
need for resource transparency. We examine the level and nature of factors 
outside the domestic environment on t he collective action for resource 
transparency. This is in recognition of the argument that MSIs are often driven 
by certain “drivers” who also strive not only to establish the process but also 
to sustain the momentum. The extent and nature of the role that these “drivers” 
play are also likely to influence the organisation and outcome of the MSI. 
 
Research Question 4: How and why does external influence on collective 
action for resource transparency influence its implementation and outcome? 
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As MSIs are fairly recent, an in-depth examination of their operability and hence 
effectiveness along the factors identified above appears to be lacking in the literature. 
A quick review of a few popular MSIs shows that the above factors have often 
contributed to their functionality and effectiveness. For instance, the following three 
popular examples of MSIs address three different issue areas respectively: 
1. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC): The FSC was established in 1993 to 
promote the responsible management of the world’s forests as a response to 
global concerns over deforestation. The FSC operates as a global MSI with the 
objective of defining environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and 
economically viable forest management systems (FSC Website7). 
2. The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC): Inspired by the FSC, the MSC is a 
MSI which was established in 1997 t o establish credible standards for 
sustainable fishing and seafood management systems (Gulbrandsen, 2009). 
3. The UN Global Compact: The UN Global compact applies the MSI approach 
to mainstreaming ten (10) universally accepted principles in the areas human 
rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption into business practices. 
Established in 2000, i t is the largest MSI in the world with over 8,700 
participants from 130 countries.8 
These earlier MSIs have recorded some suceeses in the areas they address hence the 
impetus to scale up the use of MSIs. This formed the core theme of the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in 2002. The table below 
shows how three global initiatives popularly identified as MSIs compare on the four 
identified factors.  
                                                 
7 http://www.fsc.org/about-fsc.html accessed 11/05/2012. 
8 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
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Table 3.2 Comparing Selected MSIs  
S/No Factors MSI Examples/ Year of Establishment 
Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) - 1993 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council (MSC) 
- 1997 
UN Global 
Compact - 2000 
1 Issue/Structural 
Environment 
To address concerns 
over global 
deforestation and the 
responsible 
management of 
world’s forests/ global 
and local. 
Enforce 
standards for 
sustainable 
fishing and 
seafood 
traceability/glob
al and local 
Align business 
operations and 
strategies with 10 
agreed principles 
covering human 
rights, labour, 
environment and 
anti-corruption. 
Global and local 
2 Stakeholders Civil society, industry, 
and indigenous people 
Industry and 
civil society 
UN (Governments), 
industry and civil 
society 
3 Governance 
Structure/Enforce
ment mechanism 
Globally governed but 
nationally represented 
in more than 50 
countries. Minimal 
involvement of 
national 
governments/Certifica
tion 
Centrally 
governed 
through a Board 
of Trustees, a 
Technical 
Advisory 
Committee, and 
a Stakeholders 
Council but has 
11 regional 
offices around 
the world/ 
Certification 
Multi-centric 
governance based on 
local networks with 
minimal or no 
government 
involvement at the 
national level/ 
Communication on 
Progress (CoP) 
4 External 
Influence/Drivers 
External influence is 
minimal as initiative 
is globally governed 
There is no 
national 
implementation 
Affiliated to the UN 
and as such is 
considerably 
influenced by the 
UN and its agencies 
Sources: Hemmati (2002); Fransen and Kolk, 2007 
 
Table 3.2 above shows that while MSIs may share a common structure in terms of the 
types of stakeholders involved, the issues they address differ widely, and so are their 
governance structures and the level and forms of external influence. MSIs also take 
different forms or shapes depending on the degree they are influenced by the factors 
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listed in section 3.3.1 above. However, on t he face of it, it is not possible to fully 
understand the extent to which these factors have contributed to the organisation and 
effectiveness of these MSIs.  
 
The diversity amongst MSIs contributes to the difficulty in achieving a coherent 
theory of MSIs and makes detailed studies of specific MSIs valuable. Hemmati 
(2002) in a study involving fifty (50) MSIs acknowledges the difficulty in achieving 
an appropriate cross analysis of MSIs. Hence, a deeper investigation of individual 
MSIs to determine how the identified factors influence their operation, especially for 
one designed to achieve resource transparency in a resource-rich developing country.  
How would the provision of resource transparency be influenced by these factors?  
  
The research questions posed in section 3.3.1 above constitute the focus of this study 
and will each contribute towards the understanding of the overall challenges and 
factors that influence the effectiveness of using a M SI to achieve resource 
transparency. This framework provides a guide for this study but at the same time 
allows some flexibility in order to explore the extent to which these factors influence 
collective action and also discover other possible challenges not adequately covered 
within the identified categories of factors. The challenge therefore is in identifying an 
appropriate research strategy capable of facilitating the exploration of these factors 
that influence the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency. 
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3.4 Research Strategy: The Holistic Single Case Study Approach 
 
The nature of the research questions posed in this study suggests the use of the case 
study approach. Robert Yin (1989, 2003, and 2009) provides detailed descriptions and 
arguments for the use of a case study method. He defines a case study as: 
 
“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident. The case study inquiry copes with the 
technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of 
interest than data points, and as one result relies on m ultiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in triangulating fashion, and as 
another result, benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analysis’ (Yin 2003, p.13-14). 
 
This study meets the three criteria suggested by Yin (2009:8) in determining the 
suitability of the case study method. The first is the type of research questions posed; 
the second is the extent of control an investigator has over behavioural events; and the 
third is the degree of focus on c ontemporary as opposed to historical events. In 
exploring the challenges to collective action for resource transparency, the how and 
why questions are considered paramount, the researcher has no control over the 
behaviour of actors and the outcome of events, and collective action for resource 
transparency is a contemporary phenomenon.  
 
The case study approach is common in the social sciences especially because of its 
capability of facilitating an in-depth exploratory research on a  contemporary 
phenomenon as it unfolds, and within its real life context (Yin, 2009). The case study 
method is often preferred because of its tendency to enhance depth of analysis, be 
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realistic, pay attention to context, and allow the consideration of an extensive range of 
variables (Yin, 2009).  
 
However, like most other alternative research strategies, there are limitations and 
shortcomings associated with the use of the case study method. It is argued that the 
case study method has the tendency to allow the researcher’s observational and 
interpretation bias, and also produces research outcomes that “provide little basis for 
scientific generalization” (Yin, 2009:15). A key challenge in using the case study 
approach is often in the ability to mitigate the concerns often expressed about the case 
study method, and in striking a balance between its advantages and disadvantages. 
 
One way of addressing the potential shortfalls of the case study method is to ensure 
that the four criteria commonly used for judging the quality of a case study are fairly 
satisfied in the research design, data collection and analysis. These criteria include: 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Kidder and Judd, 
1986; Yin, 2009). So far, some of these criteria have been addressed in the preceding 
sections. This study was guided by the theoretical framework discussed in this 
chapter, and the findings of this study are intended to be generalizable only to the 
theories employed. However, the table below indicates the efforts made in this study 
towards achieving each the above criteria for measuring research quality. 
 
62 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Techniques for Quality of the Case Study Approach  
Criteria Techniques 
Construct Validity Use of multiple sources of evidence and 
the establishment of a chain of evidence 
External Validity Reliance on relevant theories for 
guidance 
Internal Validity Data analysis involves pattern matching, 
explanation building and consideration of 
rival explanations 
Reliability Established a case study database 
Source: Yin 2009, p41. 
 
Furthermore, this study adopts the holistic single case study approach. It focuses on 
exploring the factors that influence the effectiveness of collective action for resource 
transparency using one identified single case. This enables a detailed examination of 
the identified case and facilitates an in-depth examination of the challenges and 
factors that influence its effectiveness. This study seeks a deeper understanding of the 
challenges to effective collective action for resource transparency using a u nique 
country example. By implication, it goes beyond the identification of these 
challenges, and respective degrees of influence, to explore how the challenges 
manifest, and why. The unit of analysis therefore is the identified collective action 
effort (multi-stakeholder initiative) for resource transparency in the chosen country.   
 
The challenge, however, is in identifying a typical and unique case that would yield 
sufficient evidence for our analysis, given the resource limitations of the study. 
Incidentally, while collective action efforts for global public goods provision abound, 
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there are not many empirical cases of collective action exclusively for resource 
transparency.  A s earlier mentioned (see section 3.2.5), there are numerous global 
multi-stakeholder initiatives addressing such issues as combating climate change, 
labour and human rights, poverty and sustainable development. But the few MSIs in 
the area of natural resource management, such as the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), tend to focus on renewable natural 
resources. The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and the Voluntary 
Principles are perhaps among the few MSIs that address the governance of non-
renewable natural resources. However, none of the two exclusively address resource 
transparency as while the former aims at eradicating the trade of conflict diamonds, 
the latter addresses issues of security and human rights in the extractives sector. 
  
Therefore, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) seems to provide a 
suitable case study for our enquiry. The EITI is a global MSI that exclusively seeks to 
improve resource wealth management in resource-rich countries through greater 
transparency. Hence, the EITI incorporates the two key objectives of collective action 
and resource transparency. In the following sub-sections we provide a brief overview 
of the EITI. It should be noted that the EITI is a global initiative that adopts a country-
by-country design. Therefore, we also further identify the Nigerian EITI as our 
specific country case. 
 
3.4.1 The EITI: A Brief Overview 
 
The EITI is a global voluntary initiative that seeks to improve the management of 
resource wealth in resource-rich countries through resource revenue transparency. Its 
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introduction was essentially facilitated by the British Government under Prime 
Minister Tony Blair. It was first introduced in 2002 and was launched effectively at 
its inaugural global conference held in London in 2003. The initiative kicked off with 
four pilot countries in 2004 and has so far attracted 33 resource-rich countries as at 
December, 2010, which are at different stages of implementation. In this sub-section, 
we briefly describe the global EITI design as a prelude to the specific country case 
chosen for this study.  
 
3.4.1.1 The EITI Design and Implementation 
 
The UK Government under Tony Blair had an enormous influence on the creation of 
the EITI9. In fact, the initiative has in the past sometimes been referred to as the 
“Tony Blair initiative”, “British Government initiative” or “DFID initiative”10.  The 
initiative is described as “an effort to make natural resources benefit all; a coalition of 
governments, companies, and civil society and a standard for companies to publish 
what they pay and for governments to disclose what they receive” (EITI Website, 
http://www.eitransparency.org/). 
 
The EITI is explicitly focused on the extractives sector which includes oil, gas, and 
mining. Countries whose extractives industry contributes up to 25% of its GDP are 
encouraged to adopt this initiative. In addition, it is believed that the extractives 
sector, along with construction, is most prone to corruption due to the very large 
                                                 
9 Although there has been concerted efforts in recent times, by the EITI leadership, to diminish this 
claim of a heavy influence of the British government due to emerging evidence of the ‘not so 
transparent’ credentials of the UK Government, especially under Prime Minister Tony Blair (Peter 
Eigen, EITI Chairman, in BBC News Hardtalk interview 05/11/2009, see also Henriech Böll 
Foundation (ed.); and van Oranje and Parham, 2009).  
10 The EITI was managed by the DFID from inception until 2007 when it (EITI) established its 
secretariat in Oslo, Norway. 
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amount of investments involved (Collier, 2007). It is voluntary for governments to 
sign up t o the EITI, but mandatory for all companies and agencies within an 
implementing country to participate in the initiative. The EITI design is guided by 
twelve (12) principles and six (6) criteria (see Appendices I and II) agreed and 
endorsed by participants from government, business and civil society at its second 
global conference held in London in 2005. These principles and criteria outline the 
basic assumptions that underlie the initiative. Implementing countries are required to 
adhere to the EITI Principles and Criteria, but are also encouraged to “go beyond 
these minimum requirements where possible” (EITI, 2005:7). 
 
Upon signing up, t he local implementation of the initiative must follow certain key 
guidelines set by the global EITI. Initial stage of implementation usually involves four 
key steps. First is the issuance of an unequivocal public statement of intent, by the 
government, to implement the initiative; the second is a commitment to work with 
civil society and companies on the implementation of the initiative; the third is to 
appoint a senior individual to lead the implementation of the initiative; and the fourth 
is to publish a work plan “with measurable targets and an implementation timetable 
that has been agreed to by key stakeholders” (World Bank, 2008:10). 
 
The second stage of implementation involves the periodic auditing and publishing of 
government receipts from the extractives industry, and companies’ payments. The 
audits are designed to, among other things, achieve the following objectives; 
 
• Provide information on the payments and receipts figures to the public, 
and; 
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• Identify discrepancies which would suggest irregularities in the 
management of revenue payments and receipts for possible remediation. 
 
The audit is a key instrument in pursuing the EITI objective of revenue transparency 
and is therefore a mandatory requirement for the local implementation of the 
initiative. 
 
The third stage of implementation of the EITI is the validation exercise. This is the 
quality assurance mechanism that the global initiative uses to ensure that local 
implementation is carried out in accordance with agreed guidelines.  A  successful 
validation exercise completes a f ull cycle of implementation (see figure 3.1 below) 
and confers a ‘compliant’ status on a n implementing country, which will also be 
reviewed periodically. 
 
Figure 3. 1 The EITI Implementation Cycle 
 
 
 
 
     Regularization 
    
Source: Adapted from the EITI Source Book (EITI, 2005) 
 
However, underlying the EITI implementation are the two key objectives of resource 
revenue transparency and the use of a multi-stakeholder framework. The strengths 
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(and weaknesses) of the initiative seem to also lie in these two fundamental objectives 
of the initiative. We consider these objectives under the following sub-section. 
3.4.1.2 The EITI focus on Resource Revenue Transparency 
 
It is believed that there are three key types of resource transparency covering the 
entire natural resource value chain. They are: contract transparency, revenue 
transparency, and expenditure transparency.  Rosenblum and Maples (2009:16) argue 
that:  
 
“At each point in the chain—from the decision to exploit the resources to the 
exploration and exploitation, revenue collection, and eventual state 
expenditure of the revenues—there are critical opportunities to improve or 
undermine the value for the population.” 
 
However, the EITI identifies and focuses on natural resource revenue transparency as 
a ‘necessary first step’ in achieving overall resource transparency (shaded portion in 
figure 3.2 below). Proponents consider this narrow focus to be one of the key success 
factors of the EITI. Nevertheless, this focus on revenue transparency has attracted a 
lot of criticism, and there seems to be a raging debate on how best these aspects of 
resource transparency should be prioritized (Karl, 2007; Goldwyn, 2008; Rosenbum 
and maples, 2009). For instance, Goldwyn (2008:24) acknowledges that: 
 
“Unless and until there is an examination of the underlying transactions that 
produce the figures being reconciled, these payments and revenues are 
vulnerable to errors in calculation, manipulation, or corruption.”  
 
However, beyond the ‘necessary first step’ argument often adduced by the proponents 
of the EITI, some observers believe that there are indications that in the deliberations 
leading to the EITI formation, revenue transparency may have been favoured as the 
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‘best alternative to no agreement’ (BATNA). This is because while contract 
transparency seems to portend enormous implications for business, government actors 
also have concerns about expenditure transparency. Hence, the focus on revenue 
transparency was adopted because it appears to have a relatively lower risk for the 
two key actors involved in resource wealth management (Durnev and Guriev, 2009). 
Figure 3.2 Resource Transparency (Value) Chain 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Rosenblum and Maples (2009) 
3.4.1.3 The EITI as a Multi-stakeholder Initiative (MSI) 
 
The second key success factor which is highlighted by the proponents of the EITI is 
the initiative’s emphasis  on t he involvement of all key stakeholders in natural 
resource management in the implementation process. The EITI operates as a m ulti 
stakeholder initiative (MSI), bringing all the stakeholders to the extractives industry 
together on a common platform. The key stakeholders identified by the initiative 
include: governments; oil, gas and mining companies; and the civil society. Figure 3.3 
(below) represents the EITI multi-stakeholder framework illustrating the various roles 
of the key EITI stakeholders.  
 
The multi stakeholder framework is apparently of significance to the implementation 
of the initiative especially in resource-rich developing countries. In effect, “the private 
sector and civil society organisations both play significant roles in how the initiative 
is implemented”(EITI and IBLF, 2008:8). More importantly, “in contrast to Poverty 
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Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) or Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), the 
EITI process requires that civil society not only be consulted, but given a seat at the 
table and a vote in critical decisions” (Goldwyn, 2008: 9-10). It offers a rare 
opportunity for all stakeholders to deliberate on the issue of resource revenue 
transparency. A civil society leader from the Republic of Congo, in the statement 
below, acknowledges this significance thus:  
 
“In my country, the Republic of Congo, it was unthinkable even just a decade 
ago that my civil society compatriots and I would ever be in a position to sit at 
the same table in the same room as our country’s leaders and powerful 
business interests, let alone use the words ‘corruption’ and ‘oil’ in the same 
sentence” (Christian Muenzo, in van Oranje and Parham, 2009:9). 
 
At the global level, the EITI is governed by a board made up of representatives from 
governments, business and civil society organisations from participating countries, 
supporting countries, and international organisations.  
Figure 3.3 The EITI Multi-Stakeholder Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from the EITI Source Book, 2005 
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the EITI has made considerable progress as is evident in the following statement by 
its global Chairman:  
 
“We are starting to do business in a different way. Slowly a culture of 
transparency and consultation is taking root. Slowly it is becoming accepted 
that the citizens of a country should easily be able to find out what their 
government gets when their natural resources are sold off.” (Eigen in EITI, 
2009). 
 
The Chairman’s claim above may appear too sweeping, but the potential of the EITI 
to enhance resource transparency seems evident.  M any stakeholders accept that 
“there is now extensive international awareness that transparency of oil, gas and 
mining revenues is vital to preventing corruption in countries that depend on resource 
revenues, and to ensure that these revenues are used to promote growth and 
development” (Save the Children, UK and Global Witness, 2009:1).  
 
However, while the EITI seems to be making steady progress in advancing the global 
resource transparency campaign, evidence from many implementing countries suggest 
that the core objectives of stimulating accountability and genuine institution 
strengthening are at best marginal (Kolstad and Wiig, 2008; Olcer, 2009). Hilson and 
Maconachie (in Richards ed., 2009) also argue that the EITI on its own “is incapable 
of facilitating reduced corruption, prudent management of mineral and/or petroleum 
revenues, or mobilizing citizens to hold corrupt government officials accountable for 
embezzling profits from extractive industry operations.” What is scant however is a 
coherent and detailed understanding and exploration of the fundamental factors that 
influence the implementation of such an initiative. This understanding could improve 
the potentials of the initiative in achieving the desired objectives.  
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However, a fact that is scarcely considered is that the EITI is a global initiative that 
only finds practical expression in individual implementing countries. Therefore any 
evaluation of the EITI at the global level would be of little import because what 
matters more is what happens in the individual implementing countries, which 
apparently would differ from country to country. Henry Parham, the Co-ordinator of 
the global Publish What You Pay Campaign admits that the EITI “is taking a country-
by- country approach so the question of how the process will evolve is too difficult to 
predict on an international level” (in Schumacher, 2004:7). Therefore, for the purpose 
of this study, the Nigerian EITI is further identified as the country case. The sub-
section below provides some justifications for this choice. 
3.4.2 The Nigerian EITI (NEITI) 
 
Crude oil was discovered in Nigeria at a place in the Niger Delta called Oloibiri in 
1956. Ever since crude oil production has advanced from a mere 5,100 barrels per day 
in 1958 t o over 2 m illion barrels per day in 2010, making Nigeria the largest oil 
producer in Africa. Crude oil has been an enormous source of government revenue  
and it is estimated that Nigeria has about 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as 
at 2010 ( US Energy Information Administration, 2010)11. However, the enormous 
resource wealth has failed to translate into economic prosperity as  majority of the 
population still remain poor, and economic development is very slow. Nigeria is often 
a typical illustration of the negative effects of natural resource abundance. 
 
Nigeria’s enormous resource wealth and very high corruption profile both combine to 
make it one of the most appropriate candidates for the EITI. Lack of transparency has 
                                                 
11 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Nigeria/Oil.html  
72 
 
facilitated the misappropriation and mismanagement of resource wealth. It is 
estimated that over $380 billion of oil revenue have been misappropriated since 
independence in 1960. At the return to civil rule in 1999, after 25 years of military 
rule, the Obasanjo administration was faced with a number of daunting tasks. 
Paramount among these tasks was the challenge to improve Nigeria’s image in the 
international community which had been eroded by very high corruption profile. 
President Olusegun Obasanjo’s first tenure in office from 1999-2003 was largely 
dedicated to the introduction of institutional reforms mostly targeted at fighting 
corruption. Among these reforms were the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the 
Due Process Mechanism (for public procurements) and the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 
which were very popular both within and outside the country for their landmark 
efforts in the fight against corruption. For the first time in the history of the country, 
the Ministry of Finance, under Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (now Managing Director of 
the World Bank), published revenue allocation figures made to all the levels of 
government, in national newspapers. Commitment to these reforms would eventually 
become a boost to securing $18 bi llion dollars foreign debt write-off which enabled 
the country to extricate itself from the debt overhang that had lingered for several 
years.   
 
Therefore, the EITI with its focus on resource transparency seemed attractive to the 
political leadership at the time, especially President Obasanjo, who himself belonged 
to the global civil society organisation, the Transparency International (TI)12. In 
addition, the Nigerian government saw in EITI an opportunity to demonstrate to the 
                                                 
12 President Obasanjo in fact chose the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Transparency 
International to publicly announce Nigeria’s signing up to the EITI. 
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world its eagerness to change the situation and image of the country in the 
international community and especially in the eyes of foreign investors. Okonjo-
Iweala (2008) notes that:  
 
“The oil-price-based fiscal rule and the adoption of the EITI both underscored 
Nigeria’s determination to take a clean break with the past by fighting 
corruption and improving governance. In a revolutionary move, Nigeria went 
beyond the petroleum sector by publishing revenues from all sources at all 
tiers of government. The credibility boost facilitated Nigeria’s debt 
cancellation by the Paris Club and lifted its profile in the eyes of investors. 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings assigned Nigeria a s overeign credit 
rating of BB– for 2007, affirming earlier results. Nigeria’s rating peers at the 
time included Indonesia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The 
improved rating led to sizable increases in foreign direct investment in both 
the oil sector (about $6 billion a year) and non-oil sectors (about $3 billion a 
year)”. (Okonjo-Iweala, in Finance and Development, December, 2008:43) 
  
However, as the largest oil producing country in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria’s 
participation in the EITI was considered strategic to the overall global resource 
transparency campaign. Nigeria therefore signed up t o the EITI in February 2004 
establishing the Nigerian EITI (NEITI).  
 
Why is NEITI considered unique for this study? 
Nigeria signed up t o the EITI in February, 2004 to become one of the four pilot 
countries of the initiative and made rapid progress in the first few years of 
implementation. NEITI was for some time adjudged a typical model for the country 
implementation of the EITI. An observer noted at the time that “the NEITI process, 
launched in 2004, is the most comprehensive transparency program ever attempted 
under EITI auspices” (Goldwyn, 2006: unpaginated). At a time when the format of 
the EITI audits was still being deliberated, Nigeria conducted its first audits for the 
period 1999 – 2004 which was published in 2006. The audits were widely considered 
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very comprehensive as they not only contained disaggregated financial audits but also 
covered physical and process audits of the extractives industry. So far, two additional 
audits have been conducted covering the periods 2005, and 2006 – 2008 respectively. 
 
More so, to demonstrate commitment to the objectives of the EITI in 2007, Nigeria 
became the first country to back the local implementation of the initiative with an 
enacted law. The NEITI Law seeks to institutionalize the implementation of the 
initiative in Nigeria and addresses fears that the NEITI implementation may not stand 
the test of time. In addition, while the EITI is voluntary at the global level, 
participation in NEITI implementation is mandatory especially for all IOCs operating 
in Nigeria, and the law also stipulates penalties for non-co-operation (Asobie, 2009). 
 
Nigeria has also sought to expand the scope of the EITI. Implementers in Nigeria 
often argue that strictly following the narrow focus of the global EITI on resource 
revenue transparency would not yield maximum impact for the country. An official of 
NEITI notes that: 
 
“EITI as it is  currently implemented internationally is very limited. Revenue 
transparency is necessary but not sufficient for conflict management and 
poverty reduction, especially in the Niger Delta region. We need to dig deeper. 
The NEITI Act 2007 offers us an opportunity to expand the initiative in line 
with sub-national realities and context” (Igwe 2010:1) 
 
NEITI implementation extends beyond resource revenue transparency to cover 
expenditure transparency and the solid minerals sub-sector. NEITI’s mandate also 
includes “eliminating all forms of corrupt practices in the determination, payments, 
receipts and posting of revenue accruing to the Federal Government from extractive 
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industry companies” (Asobie, 2009:6). Nigeria has taken the EITI implementation to 
areas not yet contemplated by the global EITI. An EITI expert testifies that:  
 
“The goals of NEITI far exceed the criteria mandated by EITI. Nigeria has 
taken the transparency initiative to a new level by expanding the program to 
audit the physical flow of hydrocarbons and by taking a holistic approach to 
examining the energy sector, investigating government agencies in addition to 
private and state owned companies” (Goldwyn, 2006: unpaginated). 
 
However, NEITI’s global acclaim has come under heavy scrutiny lately. Determining 
the impact of NEITI is by no means an easy task. Shaxson notes that “it is also hard 
to demonstrate that better transparency has led to better developmental outcomes” 
(2009:44). NEITI’s impact and awareness at the local level seems to be very low. 
There also seems to be a very low progress with the key objective of improving 
resource transparency and accountability in resource wealth management. 
 
NEITI’s global popularity has equally begun to wane in recent times. As at the time of 
writing this report NEITI has yet to attain the coveted ‘compliant’ status set by the 
global EITI as a mark of successful implementation of the initiative. Five countries, 
including Azherbaijan, Liberia, Ghana, Timor Leste, and Mongolia have attained 
compliant status ahead of Nigeria. The EITI is a relatively new initiative therefore it is 
imperative to select from the countries with the largest experience in terms of number 
years of implementation. Nigeria and the Kyrgyz Republic are the only pilot countries 
yet to attain compliant status as at the time of writing this report. Attaining compliant 
status is an indication of successful implementation of the EITI (at least as set by the 
initiative). This is partly an indication that the Nigerian or Kyrgyz Republic 
experience is likely to showcase more interesting and unique challenges that the local 
implementation of the EITI faces.  
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However, a key consideration in the research design for this study has been the need 
to balance quality of outcome of research with the practicability of the approach, 
given resource limitations, and the ability to satisfactorily address the research 
questions. Nigeria was also favoured for this study because it is the researcher’s home 
country. The researcher’s knowledge of the local environment and access to key 
informants and sources of relevant data was fully maximized. For instance, the 
researcher has had a prior relationship with the current Chairman of NEITI, Prof. 
Assisi Asobie, as a former student. This prior relationship was utilized in facilitating 
access to key informants and relevant materials. 
 
Therefore, this study focuses on NEITI as the identified unit of analysis and seeks to 
explore how and why the identified four factors namely: the structural environment, 
the character of the stakeholders, the governance structure, and external influence, 
shape the effectiveness of NEITI. Section 3.5 below presents the details of the 
analytic framework that guided the data collection and analysis towards answering the 
overall research questions. 
3.5 The Analytic Framework 
 
The analytic framework attempts to summarize the discussions in this chapter so far. 
It applies the theoretical framework to the identified case study and unit of analysis in 
order to develop the specific research questions, and indicate the nature of data 
required. The framework is essentially based on the four factors inferred from theory, 
on which the research questions are equally based. The relevant theories have 
indicated that these four factors are likely to influence the effectiveness of collective 
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action for resource transparency, such as NEITI. We therefore examine how and why 
these factors influence NEITI implementation and effectiveness by exploring the 
various aspects of the NEITI implementation. 
 
The first question explores how and why the structural environment influences the 
implementation and outcome of NEITI. We first identify the aspects of the Nigerian 
structural environment that have implications for NEITI implementation. We explore 
such areas as the Nigerian political economy, the nature and structure of the Nigeria 
extractive industry, and the nature of complementary institutions necessary for NEITI 
implementation. 
 
The second research question investigates the characteristics of the stakeholders to 
NEITI. In considering the impact of the component agents we seek answers to a host 
of key questions. We explore such questions as: who are the identified stakeholders to 
NEITI implementation? How are they identified? And are there gaps in the 
identification of stakeholders to the NEITI, and if so how do t he gaps affect 
implementation? What are their specific characteristics and their implications for 
collective action for resource transparency? What is the nature of the relationship 
between and amongst the various stakeholders and how does it affect NEITI 
implementation?  Are there indications of dominance of any set of agents, and if so, 
how does the dominance manifest?  
 
The third research question focuses on e xploring the nature of the governance 
structure for NEITI and how it influences the effectiveness of the initiative. First, the 
key task is in identifying the nature of the governance structure, and then exploring 
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how this governance emerged, and how it affects implementation. For instance, are 
there indications or evidence of control or capture by any group of stakeholders? 
 
The fourth research question investigates the nature of external influence on NEITI 
implementation and how and why it manifests. The key task is also in first identifying 
the form and level of external influence to NEITI. Such questions as what are the 
assumptions or explanations underlying external influence to NEITI are also explored. 
We also examine the impact of external support to stakeholders such as civil society 
organisations involved in NEITI implementation. 
 
Fig 3.4 ( below) represents the overall model adopted in this study. The resultant 
analytic framework takes the shape of a simple input-output model. However, these 
factors do not appear to be in isolation as they are somewhat also interlinked such that 
one shapes the other and vice versa. The pattern of interaction between these factors is 
also explored in order to determine its influence on the effectiveness of NEITI. Within 
each box (of factors) there are also interactions and linkages which all contribute to 
the overall effect of each of the factors on the initiative. The task is to first identify 
these specific factors and then determine how and why they influence the 
implementation and outcome of NEITI. Furthermore, the outcome of NEITI 
implementation also feeds back into these factors to create a continuous chain of 
interrelationships between input, processing and output. In all, it contributes to the 
argument that the effectiveness of NEITI in producing the desired output (resource 
transparency and accountability) would be largely dependent on t he input factors. 
However, note that external influence appears detached from the rest of the factors in 
the inputs box. This is because the prevailing argument is that external influence is 
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supposed to be a catalyst and as such not entirely part of the overall system. This is 
however, one of the notions challenged by this study because if resource transparency 
is viewed rightly as a ‘globalised national public good’, whose implications are both 
local and global, external influence could be viewed as part of the process and not just 
as a catalyst (see Chapter 7). 
Figure 3.4 The Analytic Framework  
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order to strengthen the construct validity of the research outcome (Yin, 2009). The 
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observations were predominantly used. In seeking answers to the research questions, 
data gathering was focused on the NEITI - its implementation, and the environment 
within which it operates. Many of the data for this study was gathered during a field 
work conducted in Nigeria in the first half of 2009 (February to June). 
 
3.6.1 The Field Work and Post Field work Experience 
 
The field work was conducted in Nigeria for a period of five (5) months from 
February to June, 2009. Returning to Nigeria for field research presented both 
opportunities and challenges. Although the NEITI Secretariat is situated in Abuja, the 
capital city, the researcher was based in Enugu, in the South Eastern part of Nigeria, 
for much of the period of the field work. Interviews and meeting appointments were 
arranged through phone calls and emails before trips to Abuja were undertaken from 
time to time. The choice of Enugu was influenced by three key factors: (a) free 
accommodation was available and the Enugu State Government was also kind to 
provide some office facilities, with access to the internet; (b) staying in Enugu also 
offered the opportunity to travel and observe events in the Niger Delta, which is 
closer to Enugu; (c) it offered the opportunity to observe events outside Abuja 
especially the effect of the over-concentration of NEITI activities at the centre on the 
overall impact of the initiative in Nigeria. 
 
A pilot study that was conducted in Enugu was also helpful for providing direction for 
the rest of the field work. Much of the prior design for this study had been influenced 
by the overwhelming positive recommendation of NEITI by observers outside 
Nigeria. The pilot study conducted in the first month in Nigeria revealed the extent of 
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the low public awareness of NEITI and its activities and also provided the hunch that 
the initiative lacked depth and faced fundamental challenges that inhibited its 
effectiveness. And this also meant that exploring how and why these challenges 
manifest could be mostly achieved through identifying and focusing on ke y 
individuals who had direct involvement and knowledge of NEITI and its activities for 
the semi-structured interviews. 
 
- In-depth Semi-structured interviews: A total of 45 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted. Interviewees were purposively selected to cover the broad 
categories of key stakeholders in the Nigerian extractives industry. Interviewees 
were grouped into five (5) broad categories, reflecting the key stakeholders to the 
implementation of NEITI. Table 3.4 be low contains a summary of the 
interviewees while Appendix III is a detailed list of all the interviewees. The full 
names and details of the interviewees have been withheld in accordance with the 
ethical requirements guiding this research and  as requested by a majority of the 
interviewees as a condition for participating in this research.  
Table 3.4: Summary of List of Interviewees 
Category of Stakeholders Gender Total 
Male Female 
Government 9 1 10 
Civil Society (NGOs and 
Media) 
14 2 16 
Company/Private Sector 4 3 7 
Donor/ International 
Community 
5 2 7 
NEITI Staff 5 0 5 
Total 37 8 45 
 
- The interviews lasted an average of one hour each and were guided by pre-
arranged questions designed to identify and probe the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of NEITI (see Appendix IV for a list of selected questions). The 
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Chairman and key members (current and former) of the National Stakeholders 
Working Group (NSWG), the apex body responsible for NEITI implementation, 
and leaders of key CSOs, were among those interviewed. Some key staff of the 
NEITI Secretariat, consultants to NEITI, researchers, and leaders of Community 
Based Organisations (CBOs), involved with NEITI implementation, were also 
interviewed. Interviews generally took the shape of formal discussions guided by 
the open-ended questions that required descriptive responses from the 
interviewees, and follow-up questions that sought explanations and their personal 
opinions. Only a few interviewees allowed the recording of the interviews, 
majority declined for personal reasons. Notes were taken during the interviews 
and a detailed report was written as soon as possible after each interview session. 
Interviews were mostly held at interviewees’ offices, but a few were held in such 
informal environments like hotel lobbies, and visitors’ waiting rooms. However, 
on these few occasions, the environment was adjudged conducive to both the 
researcher and the interviewee for the interview to hold. 
 
The Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign in Nigeria, the largest coalition of 
NGOs pioneering the civil society participation in the NEITI implementation in 
Nigeria, was a key point of contact during the field work. Prior contacts were 
established with the leadership of the organisation, and on arrival in Nigeria, key 
officials of the organisation were interviewed and also the organisation helped to 
identify key civil society participants in the NEITI implementation. The 
researcher was also fortunate to be permitted to attend and observe the 
organisation’s donor conference which attracted representatives of major donors 
in Nigeria such as DFID and USAID.  
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However, beyond the field work period, a number of interviews were conducted in 
the UK, and there were follow-up interviews especially with the Chairman of the 
NEITI via telephone calls and emails.  
 
Documents: The field visit to Nigeria also yielded a vast array of documents 
from both NEITI and the relevant government institutions and NGOs that were 
visited. There were newspaper and magazine publications retrieved from the 
libraries and archives of key institutions such as the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC). The websites of 
both EITI and NEITI also contain key documents and publications that are very 
relevant to this enquiry. Relevant documents were also found on the websites of 
local and international CSOs, and that of international oil companies operating in 
Nigeria. For instance, the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) 
conducts periodic workshops and seminars on the implementation of NEITI and 
the communiqués issued after such events are published on t he organisation’s 
website. The PWYP Coalition and the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) also 
maintain up to date online portals of research reports and publications centred on 
the global and country implementation of the EITI. Most of these documents 
provided sources of evidence to support data from the semi-structured interviews 
and personal observations. 
 
- Direct observation: The field work also presented an opportunity to personally 
observe the day-to-day implementation of NEITI. A number of remarkable events 
relevant to the NEITI implementation also took place during the period of the 
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field research. Notably, preparations for the first EITI Validation of NEITI were 
going on during the period of the fieldwork. Also a number of seminars and 
workshops aimed at creating awareness of the NEITI and its activities were held 
in strategic locations around the country. These events offered opportunities to 
make observations that were significant to this study. The researcher attended  two 
(2) workshops organised by the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Coalition and 
CISLAC respectively. Both workshops were organised in collaboration with 
NEITI. The researcher was able to take notes of the proceedings of the workshops 
and observed interactions and perceptions of participants and key stakeholders on 
the implementation of NEITI. The researcher was also privileged to be invited to 
some events that were not open to public participation. For instance, the PWYP 
Nigeria donor conference (earlier mentioned) was an excellent opportunity to 
observe the strategy of donor support towards civil society participation in the 
implementation of NEITI as portrayed by the various representatives of the donor 
community in attendance. In addition, the report of a comprehensive study of the 
Nigerian extractives industry, titled “An Evaluation of the Nature and Character 
of the Nigerian Extractives Industries” (Coalition for Change, 2010) the first of its 
kind, was presented in a high profile event during the period of the field visit. This 
report was presented in two volumes: Volume 1 covers the Oil and gas sector 
while Volume 2 c overs the Solid Minerals Sector. The report which was 
commissioned by a DFID-funded project called Coalition for Change (C4C) 
chronicles the prospects and challenges within the Nigerian extractives sector. 
Each volume contains an analysis of existing regulatory framework and an up-to 
date resource on  the respective sectors. The launch of the report which was held 
in Abuja attracted a wide range of key stakeholders in the Nigerian extractives 
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industries some of whom delivered speeches and presentations during the event. 
The researcher utilized the opportunity presented by this event to sample views of 
some participants on the subject of this study. 
 
- Other Sources: This study also benefitted from evidence found in published 
reports and journal articles relevant to our analysis. In addition, there were 
television and radio programmes that covered issues relevant to this study 
broadcast both during and after the field work period. For instance, the African 
Independent Television (AIT)13 on its magazine programme, Kaakaaki, featured 
live and recorded interviews with civil society activists, legislators and ex- Niger 
Delta militants during which such issues as the relevance and impact of resource 
transparency in Nigeria and the NEITI implementation were discussed. 
 
3.6.2 Field work Challenges and Limitations 
 
Gathering data from the multiple sources enumerated above cannot be without some 
risks and challenges. Much as the field work provided some excitement, the 
researcher also encountered some challenges some of which constitute considerable 
limitations to this study. These challenges are discussed under the following 
subheadings.Sensitivity of the Subject of Inquiry and Ethical Considerations 
 
The oil and gas industry in Nigeria is considered to be highly sensitive, and 
transparency is usually not a popular topic of discussions especially among public 
officials.  Government stakeholders particularly found it difficult to grant interviews 
                                                 
13 The AIT, a privately owned Nigerian television channel, is also broadcast in the United Kingdom on 
Sky.  
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for this study. For instance, efforts made at the Department for Petroleum Resources 
(DPR) to interview identified key stakeholders were unsuccessful. Some key officials 
would rather delegate their subordinates (though some of whom, as it turned out, had 
sufficient information relevant to the study). Effort has been made in this thesis to 
protect the identities of the interviewees as much as possible. Interviewees have only 
been identified where necessary and in circumstances clearly devoid of any potential 
risk or harm. 
 
However, in order to protect the interviewees from undue risk and exposure that 
might arise due to their involvement in this study, the researcher has adhered strictly 
to the ethical guidelines for the conduct of studies of this nature14  The researcher 
acknowledges that adhering to the ethical guidelines is particularly important for this 
study considering the sensitivity of the subject of enquiry and especially because 
interviewees were often required to disclose personal opinions that they would rather 
want to keep confidential. Reporting those private opinions in a public domain such as 
in this thesis raises ethical concerns. Hence, it is important to protect interviewees by 
adhering to agreed ethical guidelines (Holloway, 1997). 
 
As a necessary first step, the researcher ensured that interviewees fully understood the 
purpose of the research before granting their consent to be interviewed. All the 
interviewees for this study gave information willingly and all had the option to 
decline responding to questions that they were not comfortable with. However, in all 
cases consent of interviwees were obtained verbally. 
 
                                                 
14 http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/university/legal/research.pdf 
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Access to some key informants and interviewees 
 
Access to key industry stakeholders was among the greatest challenges that the 
researcher had in the field. However, the researcher was able to interview a couple of 
senior officers of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) who gave 
valuable information on the relationship between the company and government and 
how the NEITI has affected their operations in recent years. A few private but local 
operators in the oil, gas and mining industry were also interviewed. 
 
However, the field work did not yield sufficient data from any of the International Oil 
Companies (IOCs) in Nigeria. Most of the companies that the researcher approached 
could not grant an interview. The reasons they gave ranged from lack of time to the 
unavailability of the appropriate personnel who could be interviewed. The researcher 
was sometimes referred to head offices outside Nigeria. Fortunately, the researcher 
attended the World Oil Forum held in London on the 14th of July, 2009, upon return 
to the UK from the field visit. This event attracted a number of key players in the Oil 
and Gas Industry. The researcher was able to interact with a few of the delegates who 
represented companies with interests in Nigeria. Some of them willingly gave their 
views on t he overall EITI implementation and on NEITI.  H owever, some relevant 
documents found on t he websites of many of the IOCs operating in Nigeria 
supplemented the data gathered on industry participation in the NEITI 
implementation. 
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Security and Safety Considerations 
 
Security and safety issues were heightened in Nigeria during the period of the field 
work. This was due to the incessant violent activities of the Niger Delta militants. For 
instance, although the researcher was allowed access to the NNPC library and some 
staff agreed to be interviewed, access to certain areas and key informants was 
restricted. At one time during the researcher’s visit, the NNPC building, which also 
houses three key federal government ministries including the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources, received major terror threats from a notorious militant movement from the 
Niger Delta. New security directives that barred visitors from the building during this 
period meant that certain key informants could not be accessed. Also the general 
atmosphere of insecurity during the period also meant that the researcher applied a lot 
of caution during the few visits made to the Niger Delta area. 
 
However, despite these limitations, the field work and post field work period yielded 
an enormous collection of data. These numerous sources of data also yielded an 
assemblage of evidence the analysis of which tended to be time consuming. It was 
necessary to properly analyse every piece of evidence in order to certify not just their 
relevance but also their validity. It was equally important to establish a “chain of 
evidence” in the application of the data collected towards answering the research 
questions, and this reflects the strength of the data analysis technique employed. 
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3.6.3 Data Analysis and Structure of the thesis 
 
The strength of the case study approach also lies in the ability to adopt a data analysis 
technique that would address the research challenges and also ensure that the evidence 
and conclusions are reported as fairly as possible (Yin, 2003). The data analysis for 
this study follows the theoretical propositions established in section 3.2. The evidence 
gathered for the study is arranged such that they show what factors influence the 
effectiveness of NEITI, and then how and why. Every piece of evidence is studied and 
two key levels of decision are made: first is to determine which of the four categories 
of factors that a piece of evidence contributes to; and next is to determine if it answers 
a what, how or why question. Each relevant piece of evidence is analysed in this way 
and the pattern that emerges is further studied to collate them into the key arguments 
of the research under the four categories of factors influencing the effectiveness of 
collective action for resource revenue transparency. Claims made by respondents are 
compared across the categories of stakeholders and with data gathered from other 
sources of evidence to ensure consistency and validity. 
 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 are devoted to the detailed analysis of data towards addressing 
each of the research questions. Each chapter contains highlights of the key findings 
and a section dedicated to the analysis of the pattern of evidence that emerges. Each 
chapter demonstrates how and why the identified four factors influence the 
effectiveness of NEITI and a linkage to the overall research question of the study. 
Although the focus of the study is on t he impact of the four factors on NEITI but 
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where available evidence strongly suggests other influencing factors they are also 
highlighted.  
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a detailed description of the research design and approach 
used for this study. The entire study hinges on the theoretical propositions that there 
are key factors that determine the effectiveness of a multi-stakeholder initiative 
designed to achieve resource transparency. Among these factors are: the structural 
environment for the collective action; the characteristics of the component agents; the 
governance structure of the MSI; and the nature of external influence on the collective 
action process. 
 
Based on these theoretical propositions, this study seeks to explore how and why each 
of these factors manifests. Therefore, the Nigeria EITI, a country sub set of the global 
EITI, is identified as the specific unit of analysis in a ‘holistic case study’ approach 
adopted for this study. Since the study is mainly of an exploratory nature, the field 
work conducted in Nigeria was focused on gathering qualitative data from multiple 
sources including semi-structured interviews, documents, and personal observations. 
These sources of data yielded substantial evidence on how  and why the identified 
factors above influence the organisation and effectiveness of the NEITI. The data is 
collated and analysed and the following four chapters of this thesis present the report 
of the analyses of the findings.   
 
However, much as it has aided our enquiry, the researcher acknowledges that the 
research design, as described in this chapter, is not without some limitations. For 
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instance, while a s ingle case study design may guarantee an in-depth study, we 
recognize that a multiple case study involving at least one additional EITI country 
case could facilitate a cross-country comparison of the initiative. In this study, 
involving an additional country case was not possible due to the limitations of time 
and resources available for this study. Nevertheless, given the gap in the state of 
knowledge about the use of MSIs for resource transparency, it was also imperative to 
opt for depth of analysis rather than breadth of analysis, since such collective action 
efforts for resource transparency (such as EITI) tend to be essentially country-
specific. However, where necessary, events and examples from other countries 
implementing the EITI have also been utilized. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CONTEXT MATTERS: NEITI AND THE NIGERIAN 
STRUCTURAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
“Transparency promises a bright future for Nigeria, so long as it is willing to 
let in the sunshine.” (Quarterman, 2005:37) 
 
“Transparency is the provision of enough information to satisfy the need of 
each stakeholder.” (Interview no. 7). 
 
“You cannot tell everybody what’s going on” (Interview no. 43). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the structural environment within which the Nigerian 
Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) operates. What are the 
implications of the Nigerian structural environment for both the organisation of a 
MSI, and for the objective of achieving resource transparency? The objective is to 
first determine the key aspects of the Nigerian structural environment that have the 
most implications for the implementation of the NEITI, and further explore how and 
why they influence the effectiveness of the initiative. Available evidence strongly 
supports the overall argument that the structural environment is among the key 
determinants of the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency.  
 
It is strongly believed that in Nigeria “the actions of individuals and organisations … 
however well intentioned, genuine and important in raising political consciousness are 
critically constrained by Nigeria’s structural environment” (Hyemans and Pycroft, 
2003: ii). Several factors are often responsible for this negative influence of the 
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Nigerian structural context on meaningful institutional development. However, the 
findings in this chapter seem to suggest that the Nigeria political economy, the 
structure of the Nigerian extractives sector, and the nature of complementary 
institutions for transparency and accountability, are among the contextual factors that 
have the greatest influence on the implementation and effectiveness of NEITI. 
 
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows: section 4.2 e xamines the Nigerian 
political economy and its implications for NEITI effectiveness, while section 4.3 
discusses the structure of the Nigerian extractives industry. Section 4.4 explores the 
nature of existing complementary institutions to NEITI, and section 4.5 examines the 
implications of the findings on the overall provision of resource transparency through 
a multi-stakeholder initiative and section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 NEITI and the Nigerian Political Economy 
 
The structure of the Nigerian political economy as well as its implications for various 
aspects of the country’s development is well documented (Zartman, 1983; Ihonvbere 
and Shaw, 1988; Asiodu, 1993; Khan, 1994; Utomi, 2000; Ariweriokuma, 2008). 
However, most of these authors tend to converge on the common conclusion that the 
discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in 1956 considerably defines the 
structure of the Nigerian economy. Oil has been crucial in financing economic growth 
and development over the years. The overwhelming emphasis on oi l extraction has 
also engendered a political economy that has constantly presented more threats than 
opportunities for the country’s development. Some authors opine that: 
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“Nigeria presents a daunting combination of development challenges rooted in 
problems of political economy. Its development is of enormous importance to 
the wider prospects for Africa’s economic and political recovery, yet 
shortcomings in domestic political processes have meant that its potential has 
been unfulfilled” (Utomi, Duncan and Williams, 2007:5). 
 
Nevertheless, the literature on Nigeria’s political economy scantily addresses the 
direct impact it h as on the organisation of such institutions as MSIs for resource 
transparency. How then does the nature of the Nigerian political economy influence 
the organisation and implementation of NEITI? A university lecturer and a researcher 
on the politics of Nigeria’s extractive industry interviewed for this study believes that:  
 
“NEITI is a product of this political economy and is meant to both influence 
and be influenced by it” (Interview no. 39). 
 
Available evidence strongly suggests that the Nigerian political economy has 
enormous influence on t he effectiveness of NEITI. However, the Nigerian political 
economy manifests in various ways. In this sub-section, we discuss the influence of 
the Nigerian political economy on NEITI under the following broad categories. 
 
4.2.1 Weak Public Demand for Transparency and Accountability 
 
A key consequence of the Nigerian political economy, like most rentier states, is the 
weak governance capacity which it creates. In Nigeria, crude oil production 
contributes about 80% of government revenue, over 90% of total exports and over 
40% of the GDP. A key implication of Government’s reliance on oil revenue for 
almost all its revenue is that there is little or no need to tax the citizens. Therefore, the 
bond that taxation creates between government and citizens is lacking or at best very 
weak. Taxation is considered necessary for creating a “fiscal social contract” between 
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the government and the governed, which is in turn considered a prerequisite for the 
effectiveness of resource revenue transparency and accountability (Karl, 1987, 1997 
and 200715; Moore, 2004). Some analysts of the Nigerian situation note that:  
 
“A sense of social contract, where government is viewed as being responsible 
for using taxpayers’ money to provide public goods and social services, is 
lacking in Nigeria. This has led to very low public expectations of 
government, and very little pressure on gove rnment to improve its 
performance” (Utomi, Duncan and Williams 2007:14). 
 
Hence, the citizens lack the strong incentive to demand accountability from 
government. This trend also tends to persist because of the comfort and flexibility it 
allows those in power to pursue selfish interests with minimal scrutiny or resistance 
from the citizens. Even when oil revenues drop, as is often the case, “rentier 
borrowing” against future oil production is preferred, rather than resort to taxation, to 
fill the public financing gap (Karl, 2007).  
 
A strong “social contract” such that taxation engenders is necessary for the 
effectiveness of NEITI. The ultimate objective of NEITI – to stimulate demand for 
accountability - is essentially dependent on a  conscious and alert body of citizens 
capable of utilizing the information so provided. A survey jointly conducted by the 
Environmental Rights Action (ERA) and Friends of the Earth Nigeria (FoEN) 
(2008:19) showed that majority of the Nigerian population seem to appreciate the 
benefits of transparency and accountability (ERA and FoEN, 2008:19). This finding is 
also corroborated by the views of the majority of the interviewees for this study. What 
appear to be lacking are the incentives to effectively demand accountability. Karl 
(2007) believes that: 
                                                 
15 In Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz eds. (2007). 
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“Because petrodollars are not “their” money, citizens are not motivated to 
ensure that state revenues are well spent; they are not engaged; and they 
seldom demand better monitoring of the utilization of revenues. Like their 
leaders, they too often become addicted to their share of oil rents even as a 
type of permanent disconnect between the state and its subjects sets in” 
(2007:264). 
 
A general sense of apathy pervades the Nigerian polity. There seems to be popular 
disbelief in most efforts towards institutional strengthening, including the NEITI 
implementation. The joint ERA and FoEN survey referred to above also found that 
“majority of the citizens are uncertain about whether the initiative (NEITI) will work” 
(2008:19). Many interviewees for this study also shared this same feeling about the 
effectiveness of NEITI. For instance, the question sometimes retorted is “what 
difference does transparency make anyway?”  (Interview no. 4 0). Public 
disenchantment is considered as one of the greatest challenges facing the NEITI 
implementation because effective implementation depends not just on the provision of 
information on t he extractive industry transactions and processes, but also on t he 
ability of the population to effectively process and act upon information so provided. 
The Chairman of the NEITI Board acknowledges this challenge saying that: 
 
“One of the greatest challenges that NEITI implementation faces is the lack of 
consciousness and leadership from the Nigerian public” (Interview no. 1). 
 
Lack of public consciousness is partly reflected in NEITI’s seeming lack of depth of 
implementation. After six (6) years of implementation, and the publication of two 
audits covering the periods 1999 -2005, the awareness and impact of the initiative in 
Nigeria is still considered very low (Shaxson, 2009; Muller, 2010). This observation 
further highlights the argument that a strong public demand for transparency is 
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essential for the success of a multi-stakeholder initiative aimed at achieving resource 
transparency and accountability. 
 
4.2.2 Distorted Chain of Accountability 
 
In the absence of a strong public demand for accountability,  the situation is such that 
‘vertical accountability’ - from political leaders to the electorate - is replaced with a 
form of ‘horizontal accountability’16 whereby public officials tend to be accountable 
to their fellows, groups or individuals who facilitated their election or appointment 
into office (Smith, 2007).  The political economy encourages intense struggle for 
power which tends to create strong networks that are sustained through patronage 
politics. Sharp ethnic and religious divisions are easily manipulated in pursuit of 
political agendas with often grave consequences. Some observers note that public 
officials see themselves as:  
 
“‘representatives’ of their villages, towns, states, or ethnic groups, with a 
single mission to “get their fair share of the national cake” by whatever 
means” (Ikpeze, Soludo, and Elekwa in Soludo, et al eds., 2004:345). 
 
The key consequence of this form of ‘horizontal accountability’ is that it promotes a 
value system of corruption and opportunism (Smith, 2007). This notion of “national 
cake” mentioned in the quotation above refers to the the practice of viewing 
government revenues or resources as a common pool available to those who have the 
means and power to grab as much as they can. Therefore, access to power invariably 
                                                 
16 This is perhaps a negative form of John Ackerman’s definition of ‘horizontal accountability’as 
accountability relationships between two actors of equal authority (Ackerman, 2005:5). 
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means access to the “national cake”. Some authors argue that the prevalent value 
system in Nigeria has engendered a situation such that: 
 
“opportunism and corruption have flourished; patronage and nepotism are 
considered normal; winner-takes-all political competition persists; institution-
building is discouraged, as are the types of investment with longer-term 
payoffs” (Utomi, Duncan, and Williams 2007:16). 
 
The distorted chain of accountability and the prevailing value system present huge 
challenges to the NEITI because there seems to be very little premium attached to the 
objectives of transparency and vertical accountability. An interviewee believes that 
the prevailing feeling is that “those who complain are those who are not getting any or 
enough share of the national cake” (Interview no. 19). However, some interviewees 
contend that, due to the effect of some recent reforms, there are indications that the 
challenge posed by the value system seems to be on t he decline. For instance, one 
interviewee contends that: 
 
“The value system is a huge challenge but the trend has started to change, 
especially in the extractives sector. You only have to look at the examples of 
EFCC (the Economic and F inancial Crimes Commission) and Due Process 
(Public Procurement Act). We never knew that so much could be achieved in 
so little period of time. In this country anything is possible” (Interview, no. 
25).  
4.2.3 Defective Federal System of Government  
 
The Nigerian political economy has also created, and is perpetuated through the aid of 
a faulty federal system of government. Nigeria operates a federal system with three 
99 
 
tiers of government: the Federal, States (36 States and the Federal Capital Territory) 
and Local Governments (LG) Councils (774 LGs)17. This system was favoured after 
an initial attempt at a unitary system failed to cope with the challenges of a highly 
diverse country culminating in a 3-year civil war that ended in 1970 (Garuba, 2008). 
Subsequently, state creation exercises have transformed the country from a federation 
of four regions to the current structure with 36 states. While this structure has 
managed to keep the country united and also aided in development administration, it 
has equally created some challenges. The practice in Nigeria is far from true 
federalism and the prolonged period of military rule apparently hampered its 
development. Although the federal structure was retained during military rule, the 
military often favoured a unitary system of government whereby power and control 
were concentrated at the centre for convenience (Obasanjo, 2010). The impact of 
military rule seems to have lingered well into the return to civil rule. It is believed 
that: 
 
“The weakness of state-society relations is also explained by the repeated 
periods of military rule since independence, which has prevented the 
development of strong tradition of democracy, public accountability and civil 
society engagement in politics” (Utomi, Duncan, and Williams, 2007:14-15). 
 
However, federalism as it is practiced in Nigeria has considerable implications for the 
implementation and effectiveness of NEITI. These implications are discussed under 
the following sub-headings. 
 
Concentration of NEITI on the Central Government  
                                                 
17 For a detailed discussion of Nigeria’s federal system of government please see Dauda Garuba, 2008. 
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The Nigerian constitution (specifically, the Land Use Act of 1978) vests the control of 
all lands and territorial waters (and the resources therein) on the federal government. 
The federal government therefore solely controls the exploitation of natural resources. 
All revenues from natural resource extraction accrue to the Federal Government who 
in turn disburses an agreed part of it to the states and local governments according to 
the Revenue Allocation Formula18. Amidst controversies, the revenue allocation 
formulae over the years have ensured that the central government received at least 
50% of total revenue. Incessant reviews of the revenue formula have also meant that 
there is little public knowledge of the exact formula. The statement below captures the 
prevailing public opinion on the revenue allocation formula:  
 
“I do not know what the exact revenue sharing formula is. In fact it is hard to 
know what it is because they (political leaders) are always changing it, and 
they also keep it secret sometimes to avoid public reactions. But I know that 
the Federal Government always takes the largest share” (Interviewee no. 15). 
 
The implication of the prevailing revenue allocation formula is the tendency for the 
struggle for access to power at the centre to be intensified and because the 
opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking seem to be greater than they are at the 
sub-national levels. This also creates the tendency for key institutional reform efforts 
to be concentrated at the centre while institutional weaknesses at sub-national levels 
remain ill-addressed (Utomi, Duncan, and Williams, 2007). Obiageli Ezekwesili, the 
inaugural Chairperson of NEITI, refers to this tendency as the ‘decentralization of 
corruption’ “where the Centre … is getting increasingly cleaner while the States and 
the Local governments are scaling up in corrupt and inefficient use of resources” 
(Ezekwesili, undated: 23).  
                                                 
18 The revenue allocation formula has always been a subject of heated controversy and conflict with the 
oil-rich Niger Delta continuously agitating for a larger share of the oil revenue. 
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Accordingly, NEITI implementation is focused on t he Federal Government. This 
implies that the states and local governments are at liberty whether or not to initiate 
their own resource transparency initiatives. And there are little or no i ncentives for 
politicians at the lower levels to embrace transparency. Although, there are strong 
claims that “the implementation of EITI has begun to stimulate sub-national structures 
at the state levels employing the multi-stakeholder approach” (Igwe, 2010:1). The 
example often cited to support this claim is the Bayelsa Expenditure and Income 
Transparency Initiative (BEITI) which is an effort by the Bayelsa State Government, 
(with the support of the American-based Revenue Watch Institute (RWI)), to establish 
a similar initiative to the NEITI at the state level. It is believed that efforts such as the 
BEITI “are capable of complementing national level EITI and by so doing 
overcoming the constitutional constraints of NEITI as a federal institution” (Igwe, 
2010:1). However, as at the time of this study, the expectation that the BEITI example 
would be emulated by other states or local governments has not yet materialised. For 
instance, in Enugu State, though a non-oil producing state but which has the largest 
deposit of coal and where also a regional office of the Department for Petroleum 
Resources for the entire South East geopolitical zone is located, a very low level of 
awareness of the NEITI and its activities was recorded among senior public officials 
approached for this study.  
 
It is believed that, to a large extent, the effectiveness of NEITI is hindered by the 
inability to fully incorporate states and local governments in the implementation of 
the initiative (Interview no. 13). The success achieved with the Nigerian Economic 
Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), Nigeria’s Poverty Reduction 
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Strategy Paper (PRSP) is believed to be because all levels of government were 
adequately incorporated in the programme through the State Economic Empowerment 
Development Strategy (SEEDs) Local Economic Empowerment Development 
Strategy (LEEDs) for states and local governments respectively (Interview no. 13). 
Therefore, the chance of deepening the NEITI through states is yet to be fully utilised 
due to the over-concentration of the initiative at the centre.  
 
As an alternative to the use of states and local governments, NEITI implementation is 
therefore mostly carried out along the geopolitical zones. A criterion on geopolitical 
representation on the NEITI governing board was seemingly introduced to address the 
issue of regional imbalance in the composition of the National Stakeholders Working 
Group (NSWG). However, the concept of geopolitical zones in Nigeria only emerged 
in 1999 as a creation of the leading People’s Democratic Party (PDP) purely for the 
purposes of political engineering and ensuring a balanced distribution of key political 
positions in the federal government. Geopolitical zones have become popular ever 
since but it is important to note that there are no existing administrative structures to 
support these six (6) geopolitical zones. The states and local governments remain the 
only recognised administrative structures outside the central government. The 
implication is that the representation made on the basis of geopolitical zones has little 
or no effect on the implementation of the NEITI because there are no recognised 
constituencies based on geopolitical zones. And in fact, the NEITI Chairman, in an 
interview for this study, admitted that the geo-political zones representation is only 
implied because the letters of appointment given to the NSWG members who are 
assumed to be representing their geopolitical zones do not  specify that they are 
representing geopolitical zones (Interview no. 1).  
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Dominance of the Executive Arm of Government 
 
Effective democratic governance thrives on t he ability of the three arms of 
government, namely: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, to act as checks 
and balances on one another. However, the executive arm of government in Nigeria 
seems to be considerably more developed than the other arms of government. The 
situation is such that: 
 
“The political system in Nigeria is characterised by the concentration of power 
in the executive, and in particular the President and State governors. Other 
institutions of government, including the legislature, judiciary and civil 
service, have limited influence and capacity” (Utomi, Duncan and Williams 
2007:16). 
 
The executive domination of governance also permeates all tiers of government. 
Although the return to democratic rule has offered the opportunity for the legislature 
to be reinvigorated and possibly create a balance, some observers maintain that:  
 
“the Presidency has retained its dominant position in the policy process. State 
Governors with their constitutionally-defined powers are important sources of 
patronage, and in practice are relatively unconstrained by checks and 
balances” (Utomi, Duncan and Williams 2007:16). 
 
There is the tendency for policy making to bypass traditional institutions. Political 
decision-making is concentrated in the hands of a few ‘trusted’ individuals who often 
act as advisers, and sometimes take part in implementation to ensure success. Some 
observers acknowledge that there may have been little alternative for the political 
leadership at the return to democratic rule given the inherent weaknesses of the 
Nigerian civil service system (Interviews nos. 31 and 38 ). As a result “many policy 
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decisions are taken personally by the President” because  “w eak capacity and 
corruption in the civil service has meant that policies are often inadequately prepared 
and inconsistently implemented” (Utomi, Duncan and Williams, 2007:5). Hence, the 
Obasanjo administration relied heavily on filling key positions with individuals who 
have:  
 
“credibility and technical competence, international experience and 
recognition, clean image, determination to achieve results, and toughness in 
spite of their relative inexperience in politics.” (Utomi, Buncan and Williams, 
2007:22). 
  
NEITI implementation arguably benefitted from this administrative strategy. At 
inception, President Obasanjo entrusted the implementation of NEITI in the hands of 
close allies and technocrats led by Obiageli Ezekwesili who was a Special Adviser to 
the President at the time. The success achieved with NEITI implementation in its first 
few years of implementation attests to the qualities and competence of these 
individuals. However, the implication is that the NEITI implementation seemed to 
struggle after they left office. The loss of momentum of the initiative after 2007 is 
partly attributable to the departure from office of both President Obasanjo and the key 
officials of NEITI. Therefore, while the strategy (of relying on few trusted individuals 
rather than established channels of administration) achieved quick wins, it was not 
sufficient to deepen and sustain the implementation of NEITI. 
 
The dominance of the executive arm of government also implies that other arms of 
government, especially the legislature, have limited involvement in the 
implementation of NEITI. As at the time of this study there was no special committee 
of the National Assembly that supervised the NEITI implementation. The NEITI Law 
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(see chapter six) also has limited constitutional provisions for the role of the 
legislature.  
 
4.2.4 The Niger Delta Crisis 
 
The Nigerian political economy is also linked to the lingering crisis in the Niger 
Delta, where most of the oil exploration and production in Nigeria takes place.  
 
“The production of oil and gas in Nigeria is carried out amidst social and 
armed conflict arising from the way in which the Nigerian state, with its heavy 
dependence on oil, is constituted” (Asobie, 2009:17).  
 
The people of the Niger Delta have constantly protested the apparent lack of 
development and backwardness of the area despite the huge resource wealth it 
generates for both government and international oil companies (IOCs) (International 
Crisis Group, 2006). However, these agitations assumed greater domestic and 
international dimensions after the execution in 1995 of nine (9) Ogoni activists 
including Ken Saro Wiwa, by the General Sani Abacha led military government.19 
Ever since, sustained violence and militant activities in the Niger Delta have created 
new forces in the political economy of Nigeria and currently constitute the greatest 
challenge to oil production in Nigeria. Militant youths engage in a whole range of 
activities from hostage taking of IOCs staff to vandalization of oil production 
facilities, all aimed at stalling oil production to press home their demands for greater 
control of their resources, and a better environment. A Niger Delta chief laments that: 
 
                                                 
19In 2009, Shell was found guilty of complicity in the killing of the nine Ogoni activists by the Abacha 
government in 1995, and had to pay the sum USD16 million as compensation to the families of the 
activists. 
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“As a major stakeholder in the production of hydrocarbon, the host communities 
have demonstrated that they resent the age-long economic exploitation of the past 
50 years, and resorted to taking laws into their hands to demand for better deal in 
what has culminated into environmental decadence and neglect even though they 
contribute over 90 pe r cent to the federation account. The result is the 
development of other geo-political regions and major cities of the federation with 
little for host communities.”(Chief B.O.B Nabena, Chairman of Host Communities 
of Nigeria Producing Oil and Gas (HOSCOM) in the Daily Sun Tuesday, October 
05, 2010). 
 
The Niger Delta crisis presents both opportunities and challenges for the NEITI. The 
grievances fuelling the crisis are partly associated with lack of transparency and 
accountability in the management of the extractives sector (Muller, 2010). For 
instance, the NEITI audits reveal gaps in the metering infrastructure operational in the 
oil production process (see details in Chapter 6.). This revelation supports claims of a 
vibrant trade in stolen oil otherwise known as ‘oil bunkering’. There are further 
claims that oil bunkering provides a significant source of funding for militant 
activities in the Niger Delta.  The NEITI Civil Society Liaison Officer observes that: 
 
“…it is obvious that the conflict in the Niger Delta is a resource conflict and 
so the route through which these thousands of barrels of oil leave every day is 
the same route through which sophisticated small arms and light weapons find 
their way into the Niger Delta. … T he vested beneficiaries of the so-called 
bunkering are the same group of persons who want the crisis to continue 
perpetually. The NEITI audit reports recommend the installation of precision 
meters at flow stations and terminals so that the real amount of crude produced 
and lost can be determined and so that oil theft fuelling the crisis can be 
brought to an end” (Igwe, 2010:1). 
 
However, the opportunities that the Niger Delta crisis creates for NEITI are connected 
with the belief that the crisis “can also help to shift incentives in pro-reform 
directions” (Utomi et al, 2007:18). The crisis appears to have heightened government 
and business interests in improving governance of the extractives sector. For instance, 
the government of late President Yar’ Adua initiated an Amnesty Programme which 
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encourages the militants to cease violence and surrender their weapons in return for 
unconditional pardon and some welfare packages (several newspaper reports). 
Furthermore, the late President also acceded that in addition to the 13 pe r cent 
resource derivation revenue allocated to oil producing states, a further 10 per cent of 
total oil revenue would be set aside for development projects in the Niger Delta. 
These initiatives have managed to placate some factions of the militants, and violence 
has considerably reduced in the area (several newspaper reports). However, militant 
activities have continued to hamper oil production and a general atmosphere of 
insecurity still pervades the Niger Delta, as it appears that a section of the militants 
did not embrace the Amnesty Programme. In December 2010, Chevron was forced to 
shut down one of its oil production facilities after it was bombed by one of the leading 
militant groups (Vanguard News Online, 21/12/2010). There is therefore an increased 
interest of all stakeholders in seeking flexible and more inclusive strategies for 
addressing the Niger Delta problem. NEITI with the multi-stakeholder platform that it 
promises seems to offer an opportunity. 
 
However, violence and militant activities in the Niger Delta also mean that NEITI 
activities in the region are carried out with great caution. Hence, the advantages that 
NEITI offers in addressing the Niger Delta problem seems to be limited by the overall 
insecurity in the area. Asobie (2009:19) admits that the Niger Delta crisis makes it 
difficult for the implementation of development projects “in a meaningful and 
sustained manner”. 
 
In summary, the Nigerian political economy presents huge challenges to the 
implementation and effectiveness of NEITI. These challenges manifest through the 
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weak public demand for transparency and accountability, a distorted chain of 
accountability, lack of true federalism, and the Niger Delta crisis. These factors 
contribute towards undermining NEITI’s ability to achieve resource transparency and 
accountability in Nigeria. 
 
4.3 NEITI and the Structure of the Nigeria Extractive Industry  
 
Several decades of operating an opaque and complex extractives sector has 
engendered a structure that makes it e xtremely challenging for NEITI to make 
meaningful impact. The Nigerian extractives industry is constituted of two sub-
sectors: (a) the Oil and Gas sub-sector, and (b) the Solid Minerals and Mining sub-
sector. Apparently, the Oil and Gas sub-sector dominates the industry, despite the 
considerable potential in the solid minerals sector. NEITI activities so far are largely 
concentrated on t he Oil and Gas sector, but have gradually begun to extend to the 
solid minerals sector which is believed to have worse opacity than that which exists in 
the oil and gas sector (Coalition for Change, 2010). This section provides a brief 
overview of the two sub-sectors and examines the challenges within them for NEITI 
implementation and effectiveness.  
4.3.1 The Oil and Gas Sector 
 
Crude oil was discovered in Nigeria at Oloibiri, a town in the Niger Delta region in 
1956. Two years later, Shell British Petroleum (now Royal Dutch Shell) commenced 
commercial production of crude oil, and ever since the Oil and Gas sector has been on 
a steady growth with many more discoveries both on and off the shores of the Niger 
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Delta region of Nigeria (Turner, 1977; Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1988; Frynas, 2000)20. 
As at 2010, Nigeria’s proven crude oil reserves were estimated at 37.2 billion barrels 
which makes it the 10th largest in the world, and estimated gas reserves of 180 trillion 
cubic feet, though largely unexploited (NNPC, 2009).  The global quest for alternative 
sources of crude oil supplies (other than the middle east) has implied that Nigeria has 
become of increased strategic importance to the rest of the world especially the US 
and Europe who jointly are the destination of about 70% of current production21. The 
United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that “disruptions to 
Nigeria’s oil production impact trading patterns and refinery operations in North 
America and often affect world oil market prices”. Equally, Asian countries, notably 
China and South Korea, faced with the challenges of sustaining their growing demand 
for energy, are also increasing their stakes in the Nigerian oil and gas industry22. Also 
of significance is the quality of the Nigeria bonny light sweet crude which is adjudged 
very high because of its low sulphur content. It is believed that:   
 
“the significance of Nigeria’s oil did not lie so much in the actual oil 
production but rather in its potential for future expansion.” (Fryans 2000:14) 
 
The sector, being highly capital intensive, has attracted a huge inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and technology to the country. Therefore, from a sector largely 
dominated by just one company (Shell)23, it has grown to become the mainstay of 
Nigeria’s economy, contributing about 97% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings, 
and about 80% of government revenues (Amnesty International, 2009). However, oil 
                                                 
20  Turner (1977), Ihonvbere and Shaw (1988), Frynas (2000) contain detailed accounts of the Nigerian 
Oil and Gas industry. 
21  From US Energy Information Administration http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Nigeria/Oil.html 
accessed 10/02/2010 
22 The Guardian, June 18, 2009,  page 17 
23 Shell still visibly dominates the Oil and Gas sector, especially the onshore production where it 
controls over 31,000 square kilometres in the Niger Delta region (Amnesty International Report, 2009) 
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and gas production is dominated by six (6) major IOCs who control over 70 per cent 
of production through their various Joint Ventures with the government. The ‘big six’ 
includes: Royal Dutch Shell, Mobil, ChevronTexaco, NAOC/Phillips, Elf, and Pan 
Ocean (Asobie, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the oil and gas sector has provided as much 
opportunities for growth and development as it has presented challenges for the 
country (Ogunleye, 2008). The discovery of oil coincided with a period when Nigeria 
attained political independence from British colonial rule and an indigenous ruling 
class took over the leadership of the country. Soon, the potentials of the newly 
discovered oil industry attracted the interests of both the indigenous politicians and 
international oil companies (IOCs). The politicians fully exploited the rent-seeking 
opportunity which seemed to align with the desire of the IOCs to expand their 
businesses. These two separate groups of actors, each pursuing their egocentric 
objectives, contributed to institutionalising a system that makes it d ifficult for the 
positive effects of the benefits of oil to fully manifest on the lives of the people and on 
sustainable development (Interview no. 15). 
 
The oil and gas industry in Nigeria is perceived as the most ‘lucrative’ sector by 
political leaders and public officials. This is because of the enormous amount of 
money that flows within this sector (Interview no. 17). The oil and gas sector attracts 
the greatest amount of interests, and appointments into offices are often used for 
political settlements, rather than based on merit. Garuba (2008:5) notes that although 
many of the people who work in the ministries and agencies that oversee the oil and 
gas industry have the requisite qualifications for their positions, “the criteria for their 
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appointments are largely dependent on pol itical affiliation”. As a result, there are 
numerous agencies and offices created by government with sometimes unclear and 
overlapping roles. Many interviewees for this study believe that the complexity of the 
sector is a deliberate strategy to facilitate the corrupt practices and underhand dealings 
that take place within the sector. Making the oil and gas sector complex and less 
understandable to the ordinary citizens would ensure that the sector is not easily open 
to scrutiny (Interviews nos.14, 20, 24, 39 ). Of great concern therefore is the need to 
demystify the oil and gas sector in order to improve its effectiveness, and also 
improve the understanding of the public through the opportunity that NEITI 
implementation provides. 
4.3.2 The Solid Minerals Sub-sector 
 
Apparently, the oil and gas sector dominates discussions on N igeria’s extractives 
industry due to its impact on the economy. However, Nigeria has a relatively vibrant 
solid minerals sector which predates the discovery of crude oil. A growing need for 
the diversification of the Nigerian economy has brought the mining sector back into 
the limelight and some enthusiasts believe that solid minerals in Nigeria have the 
potential of generating more revenue than oil and gas if properly harnessed (CISLAC, 
2006). Bright Okogu, a former Secretary to the NEITI, acknowledges that the mining 
sector “has stronger potentials than the oil sector in terms of job creation.” And 
because solid mineral deposits are more widely distributed across the country he 
argues that the sector could have more positive impact on the political economy of the 
country than crude oil which is rather concentrated in the Niger Delta. This supports 
the argument made in the literature that point source resources are more likely to 
create “resource curse” type problems than diffuse sources (Leite and Weidman, 
1999; Kolstad and Soreide 2009: 218).  Okogu (2006: unpaginated) believes that: 
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“politically, if all states have something to contribute to the national treasury, 
the clamour for resource control will be less vociferous and everyone will 
show more sympathy for the cry for better environmental management of the 
fallouts from mining activities since every state will be directly exposed to this 
hazard.” 
 
Nigeria has the largest deposit of iron ore in West Africa. There are about 33 different 
solid mineral deposits, which include large deposits of coal, iron ore, tin, gold and 
uranium, in 400 l ocations in the country. Yet the mining sector is largely 
underdeveloped, contributing only about 1% of the GDP (This Day Newspaper Vol. 
13 No. 4757 April 30, 2008). However, the Nigerian government is only just reviving 
the solid minerals sector, especially with the establishment of a dedicated Ministry of 
Solid Minerals Development in 1995, to oversee the development of the sector.  
 
Challenges in the solid minerals sector for NEITI are no less than those in the oil and 
gas sub-sector. A recent comprehensive study of Nigeria’s extractives industry found 
that:  
 
“the opacity that besets the oil and gas sector is even worse in the solid 
minerals sector. It is not only that there is lack of accurate record-keeping, 
equally important, there is in the sub-sector, a dominance of illegal miners; 
and corruption is pervasive as well; and among the factors responsible for this 
is weak monitoring, supervision and enforcement of the laws and regulations” 
(Asobie in Coalition for Change, 2010: xvi). 
 
Overall, available evidence suggests that the key challenges that emanate from the 
structure of the Nigerian extractives industry for the NEITI implication include: the 
regulatory and management framework for the industry, poor capacity of government 
agencies, and oil bunkering and illegal mining, which are further discussed in the 
following sub-sections. 
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4.3.3 How does the nature of the Nigerian Extractives Sector 
Influence NEITI Implementation? 
 
4.3.3.1 The Regulatory Framework for the Nigerian Extractives Industry 
 
The discovery of crude oil in Nigeria roughly coincided with the attainment of 
independence in 1960 from the British colonial government. Hence, it seems the 
indigenous government at the time was rather preoccupied with consolidating power 
and was unable to respond adequately to developments in the new extractives 
industry. The first conscious effort at properly developing a clear regulatory 
framework for the industry came about eight (8) years after independence. An 
observer notes that:  
 
“Though the search for oil started in Nigeria in 1907, it was only in 1968 that 
the Federal Government made the first spirited attempt to become a m ajor 
player in the sector through the promulgation of the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA). This law forced all companies to be incorporated in the 
country and provided government access to their accounts”.24  
 
Bold as it seemed, the CAMA ushered in a regulatory regime that was insufficient to 
effectively cope with the challenges of the rapidly expanding extractives industry 
(Asobie, 2009). Subsequently, laws and regulations were made to respond to 
situations as they arose. A senior official of the Ministry of Petroleum interviewed for 
this study confirmed that some of the laws and policies that govern the extractives 
industry were hurriedly made to respond to emergency situations and as such were 
poorly researched (Interview no. 11). Laura Hosman (2009) believes that contrary to 
the prediction that developing countries tend to progress along a learning curve in the 
                                                 
24 Thisday Newspaper, Vol. 13, No. 5007, January 6, 2009 p33 
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management of their extractive industries, Nigeria seems to be different as an initial 
progression was reversed in the mid-70s to 80s through concessions and policies that 
undermined local entrepreneurial development in the industry. This has given rise to a 
weak regulatory system that is prone to manipulation by both public and private 
agents. For instance, generous incentives were often offered to foreign investors in a 
bid to attract and sustain foreign investment in the oil and gas sector. Decisions about 
these incentives do not  often follow due processes and are shrouded in secrecy. 
Frynas (2002:22) notes that the Nigerian extractives industry was considered very 
favourable to IOCs because of the “...various concessions, waivers and exemptions 
from the provisions of Nigerian Law, including a tax holiday of up to 10 years starting 
from the first day of production.” These were common in the early years of oil 
discovery and sometimes during periods of global decline in oil production. The IOCs 
often exploited these opportunities as these incentives were far too attractive and were 
not renegotiated when situations changed in the global market (Amnesty 
International, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, it is believed that some of the existing laws and regulations are either 
ambiguous or obsolete creating challenges for their effective implementation (Asobie, 
2009). This supports the argument of Avinash Dixit (2002:713) that sometimes: 
 
“Many dimensions of goals are left so vague that the agency and its political 
superiors alike would find it difficult to say what constitutes their fulfilment, 
whether before or after the fact…Ambiguity exists even in economic 
agencies.”  
 
Kolstad and Soreide (2009:219) also argues that: 
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“The more blurred this allocation of authority is and the wider the room for 
discretion, the more difficult it is to place responsibility and hence corruption 
becomes less risky for those involved.” 
 
Some of the laws also contain “omnibus clauses that allow the operators not to be 
transparent in the information on their activities” (CISLAC, 2006:9). These laws are 
not also frequently reviewed to reflect changing circumstances in the domestic and 
international markets. Apparently, this is because they are beneficial to some key 
stakeholders, notably the IOCs. This follows the argument that “since regulations are 
an attempt to restrict privately beneficial options, private agents may want to 
undermine their effectiveness” (Kolstad and Soreide, 2009:221). There is ample 
evidence to suggest that IOCs greatly influence the regulatory framework of the 
Nigerian extractive industry. Some interviewees believe strongly that the IOCs in 
Nigeria have a firm control on the regulatory framework of the oil and gas industry 
(Interview nos. 14, 20, 21, 23, 24). The Amnesty International report referred to above 
also alleges that IOCs are sometimes involved in conducting studies and researches 
that form the basis of making laws and regulations for the extractives industry in 
Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2009: 47).  
 
4.3.3.2 The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 
 
In order to address the apparent deficiencies in the oil and gas industry, the Oil and 
Gas Implementation Committee (OGIC) was set up in 2006. This committee was 
charged with the responsibility of reviewing the regulatory framework of the industry 
and making recommendation on how to update it to international best practice. The 
outcome of the work of this committee was the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which 
seeks to introduce a new and comprehensive regulatory regime that will introduce 
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fundamental changes to the management of the oil and gas sector. It is expected that 
this law, when established, will address the numerous problems of the poor regulatory 
framework especially of the oil and gas industry. Asobie (2009:14) acknowledges 
that: 
 
“The energy sector in Nigeria is undergoing a radical transformation. The oil 
and gas reform bill currently being processed for passage into law at the 
Nigerian national legislature embodies far reaching changes that are likely to 
provide a completely new playing ground for exploration, exploitation and 
production of oil and gas and refined petroleum products.” 
 
There is an overwhelming optimism about the effectiveness of the provisions of the 
bill. “The PIB combines 16 different Nigerian petroleum laws in a single transparent 
and coherent document. This is the first time that such a large scale consolidation has 
happened anywhere in the world” (Lukman, 2009:3). More significantly, the PIB 
acknowledges the NEITI and attempts to give the resource transparency campaign in 
Nigeria a greater push. It seeks to eliminate the confidentiality of licenses, leases, 
contracts, government receipts and company payments, geological and geophysical, 
and well data, approved budgets of JVs and PSCs, production and lifting data. The 
bill also seeks to institutionalise an open and competitive bidding process, uniform 
but flexible royalty and tax terms that apply to all, equal conditions to regulated 
installations through open access rules, clear guidelines for the revocation of licenses 
and leases (Interview no. 1). Asobie (2009:15) further acknowledges that: 
 
“The overall and fundamental objective of the reform was to infuse the 
principles of transparency and accountability, as well as an orientation of 
professionalism in the governance of the petroleum industry. … T he PIB 
sought to establish a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework, 
clarifying jurisdictional boundaries between institutions or regulatory 
authorities and creating new ones for the industry.”  
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However, the optimism over the PIB notwithstanding, the passage of this bill into law 
has been stalled due to formidable opposition especially from the IOCs. The delay in 
the passage of the PIB into law is a source of concern to stakeholders to the Nigerian 
extractives industry.  This delay further illustrates the extent of the challenge that the 
Nigeria structural environment poses to genuine institutional reform efforts such as 
the NEITI implementation. Despite the hopes that the PIB holds for the oil and gas 
industry, many interviewees believe that its passage into law by the legislators has 
been stalled because it is believed to be a challenge to the interests of certain key 
stakeholders who are benefitting from the status quo (Interview nos. 14 -27).  
 
 
However, there is equally a widespread belief that the weakness of the regulatory 
framework notwithstanding, the management system for the extractives industry also 
constitutes a challenge. It is argued that the inability of government to regulate the 
industry “has not been for want of laws or statutes on t he books” (Amnesty 
International, 2009: 40). This emphasis on appropriate implementation is also 
reflected in the statement below: 
 
“As the country is now faced with an opportunity of reasserting control over 
its oil resources through the enactment of a Petroleum Industry Act, it is  an 
opportune time to state that though legislation is cardinal in the pursuit of 
national aspirations, it is  not sufficient that we have well thought out 
legislation that provides for ideal situations without the stakeholders not 
making adequate efforts to implement the policy directions stipulated in these 
laws. We express fear that so long as those who find themselves in the 
corridors of power continue to align their selfish interests with the somewhat 
predatory attitude of the multinational oil firms that have over the decades 
found refuge in the environment of compromise and policy ambivalence 
created by successive governments, Nigeria and Nigerians would remain 
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strangers in the control and fortunes of the country's oil wealth” (Business Day 
Online,  Tuesday, 13 October 200925) 
 
There seems to be a general agreement however, that regardless of the amount and 
quality of the laws, the capacity and political will that are required for proper 
implementation are sometimes lacking. This highlights the significance of an effective 
management structure of the extractive industry as discussed in the following sub-
section. 
 
4.3.3.3 The Management Structure of the Extractives Industry 
 
The Federal Government carries out its management functions of the extractives 
industry through three key ministries: the Ministry of Petroleum Resources oversees 
the oil and gas sector and supervises the agencies and government-owned companies 
that operate within it; the Ministry of Solid Minerals oversees the solid minerals sub-
sector; while the Ministry of Finance supervises the agencies that are responsible for 
the collection and management of revenues from the extractives sector. However, it is 
believed that five government agencies play crucial roles that are vital to the 
implementation and effectiveness of NEITI. 
 
First, the Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR) is the government agency that 
regulates and monitors the oil and gas sector. The role of the DPR specifically 
includes: 
 
“…overall responsibility for regulating the oil industry …monitors and 
collects royalties; …compiles production data used in calculating royalty and 
                                                 
25 www.businessdayonline.com/ARCHIVE accessed 23/11/2009 
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petroleum profit tax; ...approves exploration licenses, drilling programmes, 
development and production activity and capital equipment imports” (Asobie, 
2009:12).  
 
Second, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) is the state-owned 
petroleum company. The NNPC plays a key role in the management of the oil and gas 
sector. The NNPC comprises of subunits with dedicated functions that include a 
mixture of regulatory and purely commercial functions. However, the role of the 
NNPC in the oil and gas sector is considered as one of the greatest challenges to 
achieving transparency in the sector. Through the NNPC, the government is directly 
involved in the business of oil production in Nigeria.  
 
Third, the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) is the government agency 
responsible for the determination and collection of revenue (especially taxes) accruing 
to the federal government from the extractives sector. The FIRS is responsible for 
assessing and enforcing taxes paid by the companies. It performs this function 
through its Petroleum and International Tax Department (PITD) which assesses and 
collects PPT and other direct taxes from the Joint Ventures and Production Sharing 
Contracts. (NEITI, 2005).  
 
The fourth key agency is the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The CBN acts as a 
depository for all revenues accruing to the federal government. It is believed that the 
dual role of  receiving oil revenue on behalf of government, and the record keeping of 
same, which the CBN plays “creates important issues of transparency and 
accountability” (CISLAC, 200726). 
                                                 
26 Contained in a Communiqué issued by CISLAC after a Workshop on NEITI implementation in 
December, 2007 
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The fifth is the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF). The 
OAGF is constitutionally the managers of government’s accounts and is expected to 
“exercise control over information pertaining to revenue flows and to anticipate 
problems or shortfalls” (Asobie 2009:12). However, in reality, the OAGF merely 
“plays a reactive role because revenue collecting agencies bypass it” (Interview no. 6). 
 
The Ministry of Solid Minerals is also a key player in the Nigeria’s extractive 
industry. However, as discussed in section 5.2.2, t he mining sector is still largely 
underdeveloped and as such its contribution to the NEITI implementation is 
tangential. However, in anticipation of its future role and under pressure from Civil 
Society (Interview no. 1 4) the NEITI has included the Solid Minerals sector in its 
agenda and has carried out some activities geared towards sensitizing the sector for 
revenue transparency (Interview nos. 1 and 20). 
 
However, the problems associated with the management of the Nigeria extractives 
industry and the challenges they create for NEITI are adequately highlighted in the 
various reports of the NEITI Audits. In this subsection, we highlight some of the key 
challenges to the NEITI that arise from the management structure of the extractives 
industry under the following sub-headings.  
 
Role of Government and Domination of IOCs 
The key challenges within the Nigerian extractive sector for NEITI implementation 
are often linked with the role of government in the sector. Through the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the state-owned oil company, government 
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is both a partner in, and regulator of the oil and gas industry. This has given ample 
room for large scale corruption and mismanagement and the sustenance of a v ery 
weak and inadequate regulatory framework for the industry.  
The weak capacity of government regulatory agencies such as the Department for 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) has also allowed the IOCs to easily manipulate the 
system to maximize their advantage. The result is a very complex industry that makes 
transparency extremely difficult (Asobie, 2009). Contracts and agreements are kept 
secret and tightly guarded with “omnibus clauses” because they often contain the 
most unfavourable terms for the country, sometimes masked with the argument of 
“the need to attract investment” (CISLAC, 2006). 
Poor Capacity of Government Agencies  
 
By implication the ineffectiveness of the DPR especially results in enormous loss of 
revenue for the government. Prof. Asisi Asobie, the Chairman of NEITI notes that: 
 
“The auditors reported serious anomalies in the royalty regime. It was found, 
for instance, that some oil companies, notably Shell, based their royalties on 
export figures rather than production figures as required by law, while others 
based theirs on p roduction. It was reported, too, that the assessment, by the 
DPR, of royalties to be paid differed significantly from those of oil companies 
that produced the oil. The differences arose from the manner in which each 
agency or company factored quality, production and price into their 
calculations” (Asobie, 2009:12). 
 
Many believe that majority of the problems within the oil and gas industry in Nigeria 
is created by the structure and ineffectiveness of both the DPR and the NNPC. The 
Oil and Gas Implementation Committee (OGIC) which was set up i n 2006 b y the 
President Olusegun Obasanjo concluded in their final report that: 
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“The Ministry of Petroleum remains essentially a civil service outfit that is ill-
equipped to conceive and formulate the required policies for such a complex 
and sophisticated industry. The regulatory body, the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) is, by and large, similarly constrained being a body tucked 
away within the Ministry. The most problematic, however, remains the 
National Oil Company, the NNPC. It is simply a typical Nigerian state 
institution that operates as a huge amorphous cost centre with little or no 
sensitivity to the bottom line” (OGIC Report, 2008:5). 
 
However, as the NEITI Audit Reports show, the major challenge that these agencies 
pose to resource revenue management in Nigeria is that of inadequate record keeping 
(NEITI, 2007; 2009). Asobie (2009) notes that: 
 
“…the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) … was found to be inefficient 
and incompetent. Its record keeping was found to be incomplete in the sense 
that it failed to record all company data on taxes sent to the CBN. And it did 
not use double-entry book-keeping or maintain a cash book or  ledger. 
Moreover, the FIRS was unable to develop and enforce a PPT [petroleum 
profits tax] regime on the companies. Consequently, the PPT regime for the 
period covered “amounted to ‘unregulated self-assessment’ by the companies” 
themselves. The inefficiency and incompetence of the FIRS created room for 
potential loss of petroleum tax revenue by Nigeria. One evidence of this loss 
was that the operating costs reported by the joint venture companies for PPT 
differed significantly from the costs stated in their audited financial statements 
(Asobie 2009:12). 
 
In addition to the deficiencies of the various government agencies, there is a concern 
about the lack of coordination between and amongst them. In an interview, the 
Special Business Adviser to the Minister of Petroleum resources acknowledged that 
the effective management of resource revenue is greatly impeded by this lack of 
collaboration between the agencies. An adequate system for sharing information 
across the agencies is lacking. 
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Oil Bunkering and Illegal Mining 
 
The weakness of the management structure and lack of adequate monitoring facilities 
have also given ample room for a substantial and thriving international trade in stolen 
crude oil otherwise known as oil bunkering. Oil bunkering is “the use of siphoning to 
steal and then transport large volumes of fuel in the Niger Delta” (RWI, 2007:4). This 
constitutes significant challenges to NEITI as much as for the entire country. A top 
official of NEITI laments that: 
 
“Nigeria loses 100-500 thousand barrels per day to oil theft. We are a bleeding 
nation! Oil theft is a transnational crime and indeed a crime against humanity. 
It is the key cause of the problem in the Niger delta today. Shall we continue 
to ignore this as a global movement focusing on revenue?” (Igwe, 2009:4). 
 
It is difficult to estimate the amount of revenue lost through oil bunkering. In 2007, 
the amount of crude oil lost through oil bunkering was estimated to range between  
70,000 to 300,000 barrels per day (RWI, 2007), while in 2009, some observers close 
to the Niger Delta believed that it had risen to between 100,000 to 500,000 barrels per 
day (Igwe, 2009). Hence, it is estimated that Nigeria loses over 1.6billion dollars 
annually through oil bunkering. 
 
The challenge in addressing oil bunkering seems to be the strength and depth of the 
network that supports and sustains the trade in stolen oil. It is alleged that there is the 
involvement and connivance of top security agency officials who are supposed to 
fight against the practice. It is reported that “some top naval officers, serving and 
retired, have private pipelines that run from the Port Harcourt area to Eket and that 
these pipes serve as conduits through which they siphon crude oil, load unto vessels 
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and ship to refineries in other shores including South Africa” (ERA, 2009:8). Another 
illustration is a popular incidence in 2003 involving the MT African Pride, a Nigerian 
oil tanker vessel that was intercepted by the Nigerian Navy on suspicion of carrying 
about 11,000 barrels of stolen crude oil:  
 
“It had on boa rd 13 R ussian crewmembers that were equally arrested by 
officers of the Nigerian Navy. By August 2004 it was suddenly found that the 
MT African Pride had slipped out unnoticed from custody. When it was 
tracked down it was found that its cargo of 11,000 barrels of crude oil had 
been transferred to another vessel while its hulk was loaded with seawater”. 
(Environmental Rights Action, 2009:3). 
 
Hence, oil bunkering in Nigeria demonstrates two key points that are of immense 
significance to the effective implementation of NEITI. First is the extent of the 
weakness of the monitoring and management system in place especially for the oil 
and gas sector. The second is that it demonstrates the strength of the network of 
vested interests especially the high profile of local and international players who are 
directly and indirectly linked with oil bunkering. Some interviewees were pessimistic 
on how well NEITI can fare in the face of the challenges presented by oil bunkering 
(Interview nos. 15, 16 and 17). 
 
A similar challenge faces the NEITI implementation in the solid minerals sector. 
Activities in the sector are predominantly informal and illegal mining is quite 
common. An interviewee for this study with ample experience in the mining sector 
believes that it w ill be difficult for NEITI to make any meaningful impact in the 
sector given the complex nature of activities within it (Interview no. 14). 
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In summary, the structure of the Nigerian extractives industry presents a challenge to 
NEITI implementation. Bogus and incoherent regulatory regimes, low capacity of 
regulatory agencies, corruption, direct government involvement in business, and 
criminal activities are all major threats to NEITI implementation and effectiveness. 
The Nigerian extractives industry is such that a strong network of vested interests has 
been created over the years which will take time and unprecedented political will to 
dismantle. A whole lot of reorganisation is required and the existing network is quite 
large and powerful (extending beyond the country in some cases) that this may be a 
very daunting task. In fact, a senior staff of the CBN interviewed for this study 
admitted that “NEITI needs to tread carefully to avoid sparking off upheavals in the 
industry” (Interview no. 7). 
 
4.4 NEITI and the Strength of Complementary Institutions 
 
Achieving the objectives of transparency and accountability depend heavily on t he 
existence of institutions that allow and promote the free flow of information and 
popular participation in governance (Besley, 2006). Available evidence also suggests 
that the effectiveness of NEITI also depends on the existence and strength of certain 
key complementary institutions. However, as earlier mentioned, a long period of 
military rule in Nigeria has meant that key channels of transparency and 
accountability, as well as means of popular participation in governance are either 
completely lacking or very weak (Idemudia, 2009). These key complementary 
institutions are identified along two broad categories as channels of transparency and 
channels of accountability and are discussed in the following sub-sections.  
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4.4.1 Channels of Transparency 
  
NEITI aims to achieve its key objectives through the provision of information on the 
management of the extractives industry to the public. NEITI makes publications and 
organises public events as a m eans of disseminating information on its activities, 
especially the Audit reports. Prolonged military dictatorship negatively affected the 
development of strong and effective channels of transparency (Idemudia, 2009). Some 
laws that inhibit the free flow of information and public disclosure or demand for 
information were inherited from the military era. Examples of such provisions that 
“forbid the disclosure of information” include Section 108 of  the Evidence Act, 
Section 2 of the Federal Commission (Privileges and Immunities) Act, Section 13 of 
the Statistics Act, the Secrets Act, and Section 97 (1) of the Criminal Code 
(Osemwigie, 2005, i n PWYP Nigeria, 2005:18). Since the return to democratic 
governance in 1999 there has been some progress made towards a gradual review of 
some of these laws and the enactment of new laws that are in tandem with the 
principles of democratic governance. However, available evidence suggests that there 
are gaps in two key areas which constitute challenges to the implementation and 
effectiveness of NEITI. These areas are discussed below.  
 
The Media  
 
The role of the media in the implementation of NEITI is considered crucial, hence the 
close involvement of the media in the implementation of the initiative in Nigeria. The 
media is properly recognised as a key stakeholder in NEITI and as such is represented 
in the governing board of NEITI.   
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However, two journalists interviewed for this study share the opinion that although 
press freedom might have improved since the return to democratic rule, but what 
seems to persist is government’s control of the media, especially the electronic media 
(Interview 26 and 27 ). Most radio and television outfits are government-owned, 
which reduces the chances of information deemed unfavourable to government having 
a wide public coverage. Research shows that the electronic media in Nigeria achieve 
the widest reach in terms of information dissemination in the country (ERA, 2008). 
Some civil society activists acknowledge that the communication strategy adopted for 
NEITI is crucial towards its effectiveness stating that: 
 
“This (revenue transparency) campaign is a worthwhile task that should not 
end as mere media hype. There is also the need to understand that Nigerians 
don't like reading and as such, information packaged by the extractive 
industries may be meaningless to the ordinary man. Their level of education is 
a problem and as such taking action may be problematic, unless the CSOs and 
CBOs break them down to understandable messages” (PWYP, 2005:15). 
 
However, NEITI audit reports and activities are covered more in the print media. 
Although the print media may be more vibrant and less controlled by government, its 
reach is considerably lower than that of the electronic media and this limits the 
chances of NEITI’s activities and reports reaching a wider audience. Despite its 
potential for achieving a wider coverage, the electronic media has been rarely used for 
NEITI activities or programmes as at the time of this study (Interview no. 5). 
 
Nevertheless, NEITI also maintains a website which is regularly updated with 
relevant information, reports, and publications. The challenge however is that NEITI 
is yet to fully utilise the opportunity presented by digital and social media to reach out 
to a wider and diverse audience, given the rapidly growing internet penetration of the 
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Nigerian population. Believed to be only about 0.1% in 2000, internet penetration in 
Nigeria has grown to about 28.9% in 201027.  
 
Freedom of Information Law 
 
Another setback to NEITI implementation is the lack of a Freedom of Information 
(FoI) Law. The growing significance of transparency has generated a g lobal 
acceptance of the importance of this regulation. Over 70 c ountries have already 
established the FoI law (Gillies, 2010). A bill to establish this law in Nigeria has been 
pending with the National Assembly since June, 1999 when it was first presented to 
the legislature. Despite considerable public demand for the FoI Law, its passage has 
been stalled. The FoI Law is considered crucial to NEITI’s implementation because:  
 
“The link between NEITI, the budget and The Freedom of Information Bill is 
like a three folded cord that must not be broken. Recognizing this link and 
showing commitment to the trio is the only way NEITI will not be recorded in 
future as another failed attempt to achieve better result while doing things the 
same way” (Environmental Rights Action, 2008:49). 
 
According to Prof. Pat Utomi, a renowned politician and university lecturer, the FoI 
Law is necessary in Nigeria because of the:  
 
 “... need to lift the veil of silence that enables people, whether in or out of 
government to manipulate the machinery of government and make a mockery 
of the judiciary and the legislature in order to achieve their Machiavellian ends 
of using the system to target the very people the system is meant to protect” 
(Utomi, 2010:128)  
 
                                                 
27  http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm   accessed 20/11/2010 
28 http://www.utomifornigeria.com/component/content/article/1-blog/29-foi) 
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It is believed that the legislators and the indeed the political leaders are reluctant to 
support the passage of the FoI bill because of the exposure the bill might portend. For 
instance, an observer notes that: 
“It appears, the honourable men have confined the FOI Bill to the 
mortuary because it is likely to work against the self-perpetuation bid 
of a great many of them who are bent on f oisting themselves on t he 
masses” (Idumange, in Vanguard Online, 29/07/ 2010 a ccessed 
10/12/2010). 
 
Many interviewees for this study also acknowledge the significance of the FoI law to 
the implementation and effectiveness of NEITI. Although NEITI provides 
information to the public through the periodic audit reports, it is believed that the FoI 
could empower the public to demand for information beyond what the audits make 
available. An observer notes that: 
“Government officials may want to argue that even without legislation 
on the freedom of information, interested person can still have access 
to government information. There may be a plethora 
of publications sent out to depository libraries, rains of press releases, 
reports and statements from government officials, and piles of rules 
and opinions and orders and manuals that are made available through 
various government agencies, but without FOI legislation, access 
would be limited to 
what government officials are willing to release” (Idumange, 2010, 
Vanguard online 29/07/2010, accessed 14/08/2010). 
 
Therefore, the enactment of the FoI law is yet another test of key stakeholders’ 
commitment to the overall resource transparency campaign. The current delay to the 
passage of the bill is considered a hindrance to the effective implementation of the 
NEITI29.  
                                                 
29 The FoI Bill was eventually signed into law in 2011.  
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4.4.2 Channels of Accountability 
  
Beyond the provision of information, what options are available for citizens to 
effectively hold political leaders and public office holders to account? One 
interviewee thinks that the problem in Nigeria tends to be “more of accountability 
than transparency” (Interview no. 21 ). The objectives of NEITI would not be 
satisfactorily achieved if transparency does not transform to the accountability of key 
stakeholders especially government stakeholders. A civil society activist in Nigeria 
acknowledges that “revenue transparency and an accountable government must 
always go together. Where one is absent the other cannot be present” (von Kemedi in 
PWYP Nigeria, 2005:33). The nature of the following key channels of accountability 
is therefore examined in the following sub-headings.  
 
Lack of Effective Checks and Balances 
For adequate checks and balances, the legislature and the judiciary are expected to 
play vital roles in governance, especially as it concerns transparency and 
accountability. However, as earlier noted in section 4.2.3, r esource management in 
Nigeria is dominated by the executive arm of government, with the legislature and 
judiciary playing minimal roles. Again, this is often explained by the long period of 
military rule during which the executive arm became more developed than the other 
arms which were virtually inactive during military rule (Idemudia, 2009). Since the 
return to civil rule in 1999, there have been considerable efforts at strengthening the 
capacity of the legislature to adequately play its role. The National Assembly 
comprises the Senate (the Upper House) and the House of Representatives (the Lower 
House). Many observers believe that the National Assembly can be an adequate tool 
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for democratic governance in Nigeria. For instance, the National Assembly is 
designed such that: 
 
“The Senate has 109 seats with three elected members from each of the 36 
states of the federation and one from the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), 
Abuja, all under principal officers headed by the Senate President. The House 
of Representative is a 360-member House headed by a Speaker. The number 
of seats per state in the House of Representatives is determined by population. 
Election into the National Assembly is by popular votes of a maximum of 
four-year term, which could be renewed for another legislative term of four 
years. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives of Nigeria make laws 
with which the country is governed” (Garuba 2008: 4-5). 
 
The National Assembly, by its structure, presents an adequate platform to further the 
implementation of the NEITI. Law makers who represent local people at the National 
Assembly could be utilized to sensitize their constituencies on revenue transparency 
(Interview no. 14 ). However, in a communiqué issued at the end of a civil society 
workshop, it was noted that: 
“…there is a lack of an existing formalised and coordinated structure by the 
NEITI secretariat in building the capacity of the legislature and relevant 
committee staff of the National Assembly on the NEITI process to carry out 
its legislative oversight functions on the process.”30  
This suggests that even in the NEITI implementation, the legislature is not yet fully 
incorporated. An interviewee for this study whose organisation has taken up t he 
challenge of updating the law makers on NEITI implementation insists that having a 
few lawmakers on the NSWG Board is insufficient and suggests that there should be: 
“a committee with oversight responsibility of the NEITI process in the 
National Assembly and the process is too important to be an addendum to the 
roles and responsibilities of any committee in the National Assembly” 
(Interview no. 14).  
                                                 
30 CISLAC Communique, July 25, 2008 
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Another interviewee, a journalist who covers events at the National Assembly for one 
of the leading media houses in Nigeria, also agrees that: 
“There is a need for the NEITI Secretariat as part of its structuring process to 
put in place an adequate institutionalised mechanism for building the capacity 
of the legislature around issues of the NEITI process” (Interview no. 27). 
 
The Judiciary is also an important arm of government that is not yet properly 
incorporated in the NEITI process considering the crucial role it plays. The judiciary 
is often involved in the settlement of disputes between stakeholders in the Nigeria 
extractives industry. The judicial system in Nigeria also suffers from the effect of 
prolonged military rule and there are strong feelings that presently it is not completely 
independent and this also presents some challenges to resource management. The 
result of a survey carried out by Frynas (2000) “indicates that the judiciary and the 
legal process may be more biased in favour of oil companies than the opposing 
litigants in oil-related litigation” (2000:7). The case below illustrates how the 
judiciary in Nigeria influences the outcome of events in the Nigeria extractives 
industry: 
 
On 14 N ovember 2005, the Federal High Court of Nigeria ruled that gas 
flaring was a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed rights to life and 
dignity, and ordered that flaring end in Iwerekan. On 10 A pril 2006 the 
Federal High Court granted a conditional stay of execution of the court order. 
Three conditions were attached, including that Shell and NNPC stop gas-
flaring activities in Nigeria by 30 April 2007. The court also told SPDC 
[Shell] to produce a detailed plan of action, showing how they would stop gas 
flaring in Iwerekan. Jonah Gbemre's legal representative attended the court on 
30 April 2007. He discovered that, not only had no d etailed scheme for 
stopping the flaring had been submitted, but that the judge had been 
transferred to another court district and the court file was not available. No 
representatives of the company or government turned up. SPDC subsequently 
obtained a further stay of the court order, with no known conditions attached. 
As of May 2009, two years after the expiry of the original deadline, gas flaring 
continues in Iwerekan (Amnesty International, 2009:77). 
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It is acknowledged that this lack of dependability on the judicial system in Nigeria as 
an effective means of seeking redress for social injustice often “leaves the oppressed 
with little option than to resort to anomie” (Asobie, 2009:17). 
 
Weak Electoral System 
 
Of greater significance to the overall objective of accountability is the weak electoral 
system which has been a subject of controversy over the years in Nigeria. The 
electoral system in operation is believed to be responsible for the poor conduct and 
controversial outcomes of elections in Nigeria. The implication is that elections fail to 
be a reliable tool for voters to demonstrate disapproval of unsatisfactory political 
agents, political parties or policies. Many believe that the existing electoral system 
cannot guarantee a free and fair election in Nigeria. As at the time of conducting this 
study, reform of the electoral system is also being debated at the National Assembly. 
The effectiveness of NEITI also hinges on a  successful reform of the existing 
electoral policy to ensure that elections become a valid tool for holding public 
officials to account. Presently, the situation is such that: 
 
“Nigerian politicians have no compelling reason to genuinely struggle to 
secure the mandate of the people; democratic legitimacy is not on their 
agenda. On the contrary, they use the revenue accruing from oil to, among 
other things, placate the leaders of various groups or to purchase coercive 
instruments to beat them into line” (Asobie, 2009:17). 
 
Groenedijk (1997) argues that the voters in a resource-rich country are the principal, 
while the government is the agent and democracy is the contract between the parties. 
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Hence, elections are considered very vital means for the voters to demand 
accountability from political leaders. Dimeari von Kemedi further believes that: 
 
“The other leg of accountable governance of course is legitimate, free and fair 
elections without which governments can neither be truly representative or 
accountable. Where the votes of the people do not determine what government 
comes into power, as appears to be the case in Nigeria today, revenue 
transparency is a tall dream. An expectation of self-regulation may not entirely 
be realistic” (PWYP Nigeria, 2005:33). 
 
4.5 The Implications of the Nigerian Structural Environment for the 
NEITI implementation and Effectiveness: Revisiting the Research 
Question 
 
In this chapter, we explored answers to the research question: how and why does the 
structural environment influence collective action for the provision of resource 
transparency? In the foregoing, sections we have examined the aspects of the 
Nigerian structural environment that have key implications for the implementation 
and effectiveness of NEITI.. This section summarises these findings with emphasis on 
how and why these factors manifest on the NEITI outcome. The overall argument in 
this chapter so far seems to be captured in the statement below that the objectives of 
NEITI: 
 “while going a long way in establishing transparency and accountability may 
in itself be a d ead end when the chain of values expected to bring about 
genuine national development is circumscribed by structural deficiencies” 
(CISLAC, 2008).  
 
Specifically, evidence analysed in this chapter suggests that there are key 
interconnected factors within the structural environment that have implications for the 
effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency. These factors include the 
135 
 
prevailing political economy, the structure of the industry and the strength of 
complementary institutions. In the NEITI example, these factors present challenges to 
achieving the two key objectives of collective action and resource transparency. The 
findings in this chapter seem to be consistent with many studies conducted on t he 
Nigerian structural context. For example, Idemudia (2009:18) argues that “it is the 
governance-failure complex that informs the lack of an enabling environment for the 
emergence of a d evelopmental state that can equitably redistribute and efficiently 
utilize natural resources revenue”. The Nigerian structural environment overall seems 
to evoke a feeling of pessimism about the ability of NEITI to achieve the objectives of 
resource transparency and accountability. NEITI, as a result of the inherent structural 
problems in the Nigerian environment, is often viewed as a “little drop in an ocean” 
(Interview no. 17). This feeling of pessimism in itself also constitutes a challenge for 
the implementation of NEITI as the current NEITI Chairman acknowledges in the 
following statement during the inauguration of the current governing board of the 
initiative: 
“Our leadership shall be transformational, rather than transactional. We shall 
work to effect a fundamental shift in the deep orientation of all stakeholders in 
the extractive industries, in the way they see the world and the way they define 
the future and what is possible” (Asobie, 2008:2).  
At the same time the expectations from NEITI seem to be too high. The effect is that 
the NEITI implementation is therefore unable to stick to the narrow focus of the 
global EITI strictly as an initiative for information disclosure on r esource revenue 
only. The expectations of many interviewees and observers is that the NEITI 
implementation should reflect the complexities and realities of the Nigerian structural 
environment by including such areas as contract and expenditure transparency, solid 
minerals, and expansion to sub-national levels. In trying to cope with these 
expectations, the resources available for the NEITI implementation appears 
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apparently stretched. The initiative tends to lack focus hence weakening its 
effectiveness. 
However, even though it seems apparent, the significance of some of the contextual 
factors highlighted above seem not to have attracted due considerations in the NEITI 
implementation. For instance, the fact that the complementary institutions necessary 
for NEITI effectiveness are lacking seems to be taken for granted. There are strong 
suggestions from the foregoing that government’s level of commitment towards 
overall governance institutions building seems to be key to the effectiveness of 
NEITI. Hence, NEITI can hardly achieve higher than the ambitions of the government 
of the day. And the ambitions of the government agents in Nigeria are strongly shaped 
by the structure of incentives occasioned by the factors within the structural context. 
In fact, the NEITI objectives seem to be a threat to vested interests in the existing 
incentives structure. Overallthe evidence discussed in this chapter strongly supports 
the argument that the local context is crucial in determining the effectiveness of 
collective action for resource transparency.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The key aspects of the Nigerian structural environment that have significant 
implications for the implementation and effectiveness of NEITI have been discussed 
in this chapter. The main argument is that the Nigerian political economy, the 
structure of the Nigerian extractives industry, and the nature of existing 
complementary institutions to NEITI are among the significant determinants of the 
effectiveness of NEITI in achieving the objectives of resource transparency and 
accountability. These factors combine to engender an incentives structure that runs 
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contrary to the objectives of NEITI. Therefore, any chance of NEITI making any 
meaningful impact depends on the ability of the initiative to alter the existing 
incentives structure. 
 
Furthermore, these contextual factors also inhibit NEITI’s ability to successfully 
restructure the incentives structure.  T he evidence analysed in this chapter strongly 
supports the view that NEITI’s effectiveness is strongly tied to complementary efforts 
at improving other requisite governance institutions, such as the electoral system and 
the Freedom of Information Law. However, because improving these complementary 
institutions and removing the obstacles to NEITI implementation present some level 
of threats to some key stakeholders, a lot would depend on t he perceptions and 
commitment of these key stakeholders. This highlights the strength of the incentives 
structure in the domestic environment towards determining the outcome of a MSI 
aimed at strengthening institutions at the domestic level. The overall design of the 
EITI gives little consideration to these domestic and structural factors yet the 
effectiveness of the country implementation is essentially determined by the structural 
factors. What this demonstrates is that resource transparency as desired by the 
proponents of the EITI will hardly be achieved, and even if it is, its impact would be 
limited by the structure of the local context. However, the local context also includes 
the stakeholders who also shape the process and outcome of the MSI. The next 
chapter explores the nature and characteristics of the stakeholders to NEITI and how 
they also influence the effectiveness of the initiative.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
NEITI AND THE STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Our operational philosophy shall be informed by the assumption that the 
“answer lies within”, that each one of us is the decisive element in whether we 
succeed or fail. It is our personal approaches that will create the climate and 
shape the environment within which we will operate. I believe that, 
individually and c ollectively, we possess the tremendous power to make life 
joyous or miserable for our people. We have a choice to be a tool of torture or 
an instrument of inspiration for Nigerian people.  - Prof. Assisi Asobie, NEITI 
Chairman, during the inauguration of the second National Stakeholders 
Working Group (NSWG) on the 29th of January, 2008. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the second research question of this study which explores how 
and why the characteristics of the component agents to collective action, and the 
relationship between and amongst them, influence the effectiveness of collective 
action for resource transparency. Particularly, this chapter examines the character of 
the stakeholders to NEITI, their interrelationships and how and why these influence 
the implementation and effectiveness of NEITI. It is strongly believed that the 
effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency would be influenced by 
both the character of the component agents, and the nature of the relationship between 
and amongst them (Hemmati, 2002). This is mainly because while the characters of 
the stakeholders define their disposition and commitment to collective action, the 
nature of their interrelationships prior and during collective action also reflects in the 
balance necessary for the success and effectiveness of collective action. Thus, the 
EITI draws its strength from the multi-stakeholder framework which has the potential 
of bringing all stakeholders to a common platform for a ch ance to harmonize their 
139 
 
diverse interests (Hemmati, 2002). However, achieving a truly multi-stakeholder 
platform remains a challenge to the implementation of EITI in Nigeria.  
 
The key argument is that the diverse and sometimes competing interests of agents 
together with the disparity in their relative capacity of influence on o ne another, 
would constitute challenges to collective action (Bandiera et al, 2005; Shapiro, 
2005:267). Stakeholders’ commitment and contribution to the provision of resource 
transparency tend to be influenced by their perception of the benefits and costs that 
resource transparency presents (Kolstad and Soreide, 2009).  Kolstad and Soreide 
particularly believe that “an analysis of agents and their incentives in the natural 
resource sectors are [sic] important to understand how rules and institutions should be 
designed to reduce the risk of corruption” (2009:223). 
 
The greatest strength of the EITI may well lie in its multi-stakeholder framework, but 
what conditions are necessary for its effectiveness? While a balanced composition of 
all key stakeholders is considered a critical success factor for MSIs (Hematti, 2002, 
Biermann et al 2007), identifying and engaging the right stakeholders could constitute 
challenges (Wood and Gray, 1991). This chapter therefore explores the character of 
the NEITI stakeholders and the relationship amongst the identified stakeholders. 
However, evidence also suggests that there are challenges also emanating from the 
identification of stakeholders to the NEITI. Therefore, how are the NEITI 
stakeholders identified and are there challenges posed by any gaps in identification? 
 
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows: In section 5.2, w e discuss the three 
broad categories of stakeholders who constitute the NEITI ‘key’ stakeholders. Section 
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5.3 examines the nature of the relationships between the ‘key’ stakeholder categories 
and the implications for the implementation of NEITI while section 5.4 considers the 
possible gaps in the identification of ‘key’ stakeholders to the NEITI and the 
implications for the implementation and effectiveness of the initiative. Section 5.5 
concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Identifying NEITI Stakeholders: Key or Wider Stakeholders? 
 
The concept of ‘multi-stakeholder initiative’ tends to conjure an image of a village 
square setting involving all parties affected by an issue, perhaps in a f ace to face 
round table discussion. Of course, in reality, this is scarcely obtainable. The challenge 
therefore is in achieving a truly representative platform capable of accommodating the 
interests of as many stakeholders as possible (Hemmati, 2002). Apparently, a first 
step in this direction would involve a proper definition of the stakeholders to the issue 
requiring collective action. First, the conceptualization of the term ‘stakeholder’ and 
deciding “who really counts” is considered critical to the effective organisation of 
collective action. (Rowley, 1997). This is to ensure that the resultant platform is as 
inclusive as possible, and hence reduce the chances of possible free-riding.  
 
Freeman (1984:46) defines the term ‘stakeholder’ as “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives”. Similarly, 
Clarkson (1995) views a stakeholder as having something to lose or gain, depending 
on the behaviour of an organisation.  H owever, the global EITI in its sourcebook 
defines a ‘stakeholder’ as “an individual, community, group or organisation with an 
interest in the outcome of the EITI, including both those who are affected by it 
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(positively or negatively) and those who are able to influence it (in a positive or 
negative way)” (EITI, 2005:5). As earlier noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, resource 
transparency and accountability have varied implications for a wide range of 
stakeholders. Hence, the global EITI further acknowledges that stakeholders would be 
classified into “key” and “wider” stakeholders according to their “level of interest” 
and “degree of influence” (EITI, 2005: 5-6). Therefore, the EITI emphasizes that the 
key stakeholders to the initiative are essentially the government, industry, and civil 
society. Expectedly, the NEITI implementation tends to follow this recommendation 
and in the sub-sections below we explore each of these categories of stakeholders in 
the case of NEITI. 
 
5.2.1 Government Stakeholders to NEITI 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the role of government in any effort to provide globalised 
national public goods such as resource transparency is very vital. Among other things, 
it is essential because governance reforms and regulations are required for the effort 
to be effective and sustainable. In Nigeria, government is not only the regulator of the 
extractives industry but is also directly involved, through the state oil company, in 
every stage of crude oil production. Therefore, the government stakeholders to NEITI 
include all the government ministries, departments and agencies that are directly or 
indirectly involved in the extractive industries in Nigeria. However, in practice, only a 
few of these entities are actively involved in the NEITI implementation process. They 
include: the Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR) – the regulatory agency; the 
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) – the revenue agency; and the Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) – the government’s funds repository.  
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Overall, government involvement in NEITI implementation reflects the dominance of 
the executive arm of government (discussed in Chapter 4) as the other arms of 
government are marginally involved. For instance, the role of the legislature, as 
elected representatives of the citizens, is not fully recognised. In the current multi-
stakeholder governing board of NEITI, for instance, there is no m ember of the 
legislature, nor is there a dedicated committee in the National Assembly overseeing 
the activities of NEITI. However, the stakeholders who control and determine 
government interests in NEITI are the top level politicians and technocrats to whom 
the outcome of NEITI in terms of accountability may have larger implications. The 
arrangement is such that any major impact that NEITI would have on the structure of 
the agencies above would need to be sanctioned by the “higher” authorities, which 
again would depend on their disposition and political will towards the objectives of 
NEITI. The NEITI audit reports for instance have made a number of revelations about 
the improper functioning of the DPR, but remediation of these findings have been 
slow because they seem to touch on “vested interests”. A senior staff of the CBN, 
who has also served on the governing board of NEITI, acknowledged that 
“government needs to be genuinely interested in transparency for NEITI to succeed. 
NEITI alone cannot achieve so much” (Interview no. 24). 
 
The successful implementation and effectiveness of NEITI is therefore strongly linked 
to the role of government in the initiative. A considerable amount of political will and 
government buy-in is hence required for the initiative to achieve any meaningful 
progress. Available evidence indicates that this enormous reliance on government, 
particularly on the disposition of key political actors, creates both opportunities and 
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challenges for NEITI. Government actors are often motivated by their perceived 
incentives from the outcome of NEITI. NEITI benefitted immensely at inception by 
the positive disposition of some key government officials. It is believed that such key 
government official such as Ngozi Okonjo Iweala, the former Finance Minister 
(currently President of the World Bank), and Obiageli Ezekwesili, the former minister 
for solid minerals development, and inaugural chairperson of NEITI, influenced the 
resource transparency movement in Nigeria. 
 
For instance, it is  also believed that the revenue transparency reform apparently 
started under the former finance minister. Her initiation of the publication of revenue 
allocations made to all tiers of government in major national newspapers attracted 
positive public reactions and created a lot of discomfort to political leaders especially 
at the states and local governments. She also introduced the Fiscal Policy that gave 
rise to the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) which initiated the stabilisation of excess 
crude oil proceeds. Specifically, and of considerable significance to the NEITI 
implementation, she established the Oil and Gas Accounting Unit (OGAU) in 2004 to 
boost the role of the ministry of finance in monitoring government revenue from the 
oil and gas sector.  An interviewee for this study, a policy and financial analyst and a 
former staff of the OGAU, acknowledged that the work of the unit provided key 
technical support for the NEITI implementation which was crucial to the initial 
success recorded (Interview no. 25). The functions of the OGAU, among other things 
included: 
 
• Review of petroleum profit tax and royalties paid by oil companies; 
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• Monitoring of revenue flows to government – a model was specifically 
designed for this purpose; 
• review of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between government and 
companies – this review revealed that the letters of the agreements were not 
strictly adhered to, especially by the IOCs, leading to a shortfall in government 
revenue of up to $326 million in 2004 alone (Shaxson, 2009); and 
• Development of models that can explain the operations of the oil and gas 
industry. 
 
While the foregoing represents an example of commitment to transparency from 
government agents, available evidence suggests that it may be an aberration rather 
than the norm. Predominantly in Nigeria, government agents are rarely interested or 
committed to resource transparency. This became quite apparent when some of these 
key officials departed office, as the resource transparency drive appeared to lose the 
momentum achieved by the key officials. This highlights the argument that the 
characteristics of the government agents and their perception of resource transparency 
influence the implementation and effectiveness NEITI. 
 
5.2.2 Industry Stakeholders to NEITI 
 
Key industry stakeholders to NEITI include all the public and private companies who 
operate within the Nigerian extractives industry. These companies are also both local 
oil companies (LOCs) and IOCs. However, the Oil and Gas industry is dominated by 
the IOCs, especially by the big six IOCs: Royal Dutch Shell (Shell), Mobil, 
ChevronTexaco, NAOC/Phillips, Elf, and PanOcean. These big six IOCs, through 
145 
 
their Joint Venture (JVs) Agreements with the NNPC, control over 70% of oil and gas 
production in Nigeria. There are also about 19 other oil and gas companies who 
operate Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) with the NNPC on be half of the 
Nigerian government (Asobie 2009). With the expansion of NEITI to the solid 
minerals sub-sector, mining companies are becoming gradually concerned with the 
implementation of NEITI, but there overall contribution and involvement is still 
marginal (Interview no. 1). 
 
It is widely believed that the basic interest of industry stakeholders in resource 
transparency is the hope that it would contribute towards engendering a favourable 
environment for their activities (Morrison and Wilde, 2007). Oil and gas companies in 
Nigeria have often been direct victims of the agitations from aggrieved citizens and 
civil society activists, especially in the Niger Delta. There are claims that the IOCs 
play a part in the mismanagement of Nigeria’s resource wealth. This claim is also 
supported by emerging facts about allegations of corruption, bribery, and collusion 
with government, involving major IOCs operating in the country (Shaxson, 2009). As 
a result, the IOCs’ face incessant violent attacks on their personnel and investments 
that not only disrupt their production but also threaten their continued operation in 
Nigeria. The need to redress this situation and perhaps clear the ‘wrong’ perception of 
the public seems to provide a strong incentive for the IOCs commitment and 
participation in the NEITI implementation.  
 
Therefore, the NEITI appears to be a test of how companies value their reputation and 
public perception. Some IOCs in Nigeria have shown strong support for NEITI and 
have followed up on their commitments to the implementation of the initiative. Many 
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have used their websites and other available means to declare their support for the 
NEITI and the overall resource transparency. For instance, Shell is often cited as one 
of the companies at the forefront of the resource transparency campaign. Shell was the 
first to independently publish its payments to the Nigerian government. Although it 
appears that Shell’s efforts towards resource transparency in Nigeria are yet to 
produce the desired effects as it has recorded the highest number of militant attacks in 
recent times (Interview no. 34). It is believed that this may be due to the fact that Shell 
controls a large share of onshore exploration in Nigeria and as such most of its 
facilities are easily within the reach of protesters and militants. Shell is the most 
visible oil company in the Niger Delta.  
 
Similarly, ExxonMobil have also been supporting resource transparency and have 
been involved with the implementation of NEITI and in other countries such as 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar and Chad. On the 
company’s website they declare that: 
“As part of our commitment to honest and ethical behaviour, ExxonMobil 
constructively participates in transparency and anti-corruption programs. We 
offer our assistance to countries seeking to implement greater transparency in 
order to increase disclosure of financial information, which is fundamental to 
good governance. This can help stabilize the investment climate of a country, 
which is critical for attracting the large-scale investments necessary for 
meeting the world’s growing energy demands” (ExxonMobil website, 
accessed 03/10/2008). 
 
However, what seems to be evident from the IOCs’ commitment to resource 
transparency in Nigeria is that it usually is limited to what is considered acceptable 
within the extractives industry in Nigeria. IOCs are still ultimately driven by their 
desire to advance their businesses and guarantee returns on i nvestments for their 
shareholders and investors which “can be reduced to a single or scalar bottom line like 
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quarterly profit or share price”  (Dixit, 2002: 712). Some interviewees believe that the 
commitment of the IOCs can only be minimal considering that they are often more 
concerned about their global reputation where their significant markets are than they 
are for their reputation within the country (Interviews nos. 4 and 32 ). Despite their 
global declarations of support for transparency, many of the IOCs in Nigeria still 
engage in practices that fall short of the international standards which they claim to 
subscribe to. A report on the operations of Statoil, a Norwegian IOC, notes that:  
 
“Many consider Statoil to be in front among the oil companies when it comes 
to financial transparency. To us, the company does not seem to have any 
problems fulfilling the requirements of the Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Initiative. The fact that Statoil follows what seems to be the general Nigerian 
modus and does not make the Environmental Impact Assessments for their 
Nigerian operations publicly available, to environmental organizations or any 
other stakeholders apart from the Nigerian Department of Petroleum 
Resources, weakens Statoil’s image of transparency, however. It thus seems 
clear that Statoil runs on double standards from its country of origin, where it 
would be unacceptable not to disclose such environmental information of 
public interest” (Amadi, Germison and Henrikson, 2006:3). 
 
Moreover, the NEITI chairman revealed that while some IOCs have shown genuine 
commitment to the NEITI implementation, apparently the story is not the same for all 
the industry stakeholders in Nigeria. Some IOCs have had to be cajoled to as much as 
meet the minimum requirements of the NEITI implementation. The NEITI auditors 
also report that their job is sometimes hindered by the failure of some companies to 
promptly submit information necessary for the NEITI periodic audit exercises (EITI, 
2006 and 2009). This also supports the argument that commitment would sometimes 
depend on s takeholders’ judgment of the benefits and costs of participation in 
collective action. Although the NEITI law makes it mandatory for all companies to 
participate fully in the implementation of the initiative and also stipulates penalties for 
non-participation, no company has yet been punished. So far the greatest motivation 
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has been from companies’ perception of the potential incentives that the NEITI offers. 
Therefore, while the bigger companies who have bigger reputational and investment 
risks in Nigeria appear to be more committed to the NEITI implementation, the 
relatively smaller companies do not seem to show serious commitment. This supports 
the argument that individual firms commitment and contribution to collective action 
for global standards of good practice is usually influenced by their judgment of the 
benefit and cost implications because sometimes “the high cost of changing practices 
to meet a system’s requirements acts as a deterrent” (Bernstein and Cashore 2007: 
356). It is believed that IOCs are also not unmindful of the consequence of 
information disclosure. The International Crisis Group in one of its reports on t he 
Niger Delta notes that: 
 
  “Out of fear of having their position publicly undermined by activists, 
criminals or corporate competitors, companies hesitate to disclose information, 
particularly on f unding and security but also on the environmental impact 
assessments they are legally obliged to make” (International Crisis Group, 
2006:24). 
 
A gap also exists in the coverage of the oil and gas industry by the NEITI 
implementation as there appears to be little attention paid to the local oil companies 
(LOCs). With the emphasis on IOCs there is the tendency that LOCs are overlooked, 
yet they influence resource revenue in no mean way. The 2005 NEITI audit report 
revealed that most of the LOCs do not pay tax at all (NEITI, 2009). Moreover, with 
government emphasis on growing local content (see section 5.4) in the extractives 
industry, it becomes a great concern because LOCs are not yet fully incorporated in 
the NEITI implementation (Interview no. 11).  
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5.2.3 Civil Society Stakeholders 
 
The global EITI recommends that it is essential that civil society drives the local 
implementation of the initiative and in fact one of its criteria is that civil society must 
be “actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring and evaluation of this 
process and contributes towards public debate.”31 However, this element of the 
initiative is arguably one of the greatest challenges to the local implementation of the 
EITI as the capacity of the civil society in many of the implementing countries is a 
source of concern. This is important because involvement is usually not sufficient to 
guarantee that representation is adequate. Edmund and Wollernburg (2001: 245) 
argue that “securing an invitation to the negotiation table does not mean such groups 
will have their issues heard by other stakeholders.”  
 
The NEITI has adhered to this criterion, at least to the satisfaction of the global EITI 
monitors, and the initiative is also quite popular among the civil society community in 
Nigeria. The civil society in Nigeria is a broad name that includes Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), Trade Unions, the media, and Community and Faith Based 
Organisations (CBOs and FBOs). However, the recognised CSOs participating in the 
NEITI implementation are mostly NGOs who are formally registered with 
government and who claim to have objectives and activities that are connected with 
resource transparency (Interview no. 11). Many CSOs claim to operate within the area 
of resource transparency but very few are actively involved in the implementation of 
NEITI (Interview no. 18). In addition, it was observed that the few CSOs involved 
with the NEITI implementation do not  devote their resources to the resource 
transparency campaign. The reasons range from their need to attract funding from 
                                                 
31 Global EITI website http://eitransparency.org/eiti/principles accessed 25/02/2010 
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other activities since relying on resource transparency alone may not guarantee all 
their funding needs. During the field visit to Nigeria, it was difficult to identify any 
CSO solely dedicated to the implementation of NEITI.  
 
For instance, the Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ) is 
among the CSOs at the forefront of the NEITI implementation. ANEEJ has carried 
out numerous activities and made a handful of publications on t he NEITI 
implementation and the overall resource transparency campaign in Nigeria. However, 
it states on i ts website that its focus is “sustainable development, the alleviation of 
poverty and economic empowerment” (ANEEJ Website32). Similarly, the Civil 
Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) has also done a great deal of work on 
the NEITI and in partnership with the NEITI but its major objective is on legislative 
advocacy (CISLAC, 2008). However, the Publish What You Pay Coalition (PWYP) 
in Nigeria is believed to be the lead civil society movement which anchors civil 
society participation in the NEITI implementation. But the PWYP, with a 
membership of over 150 CSOs in Nigeria, appears to be a weak coalition bedevilled 
with funding and organisational problems.  
 
Therefore, a n umber of challenges have been identified as inhibiting the effective 
participation of civil society in the implementation of NEITI, hence weakening the 
effectiveness of the initiative. The foremost challenge seems to be the apparent low 
level of capacity development of the civil society in Nigeria. It is believed that many 
of the CSOs in Nigeria lack the requisite funding and expertise to actively engage 
with the other stakeholders in the Nigerian extractives industry, especially the IOCs. 
                                                 
32 www.aneej.org, accessed 28/03/2009 
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Civil society activism in Nigeria seems to be only just developing. Many 
organisations that exist as CSOs today transformed from pro-democracy groups who 
fought against military dictatorship (Igwe, 2009). Hence there are very few CSOs 
with an established track record of resource transparency advocacy. The strongest 
CSOs in Nigeria seem to be the local branches of global CSOs such as Transparency 
International (TI). Although there are a few strong CSOs in Nigeria who seem to 
focus on campaign and advocacy on environmental, gender or human rights issues, 
especially in the Niger Delta. But the activities of such organisations sometimes 
include agitations for resource control which does not seem to be truly representative 
of the overall agenda of resource transparency in Nigeria (Interview no. 18).  
 
In addition to the apparent lack of capacity, there is also the problem of “assumed 
representation” which is considered insufficient to effectively mobilise wider public 
participation (Rosenau, 2000; Gulbrandsen 2008; Houtzager and Lavalle, 2009). In 
fact, Rosenau (2000: 192) believes that involving NGOs in governance would always 
create accountability issues because “it is not clear to whom these organizations are 
responsible or answerable.” Many of the CSOs engaged with the NEITI, are barely in 
touch with the constituencies they claim to represent, and in fact some have no clear 
mechanism for communicating with them. The few that are very active concentrate 
efforts on what an interviewee called ‘elitist sensitization’ with efforts concentrated at 
major cities in the country (Interview no. 6). Therefore, apart from there apparent lack 
of capacity in driving the NEITI, the CSO body in Nigeria, as presently constituted, 
cannot be relied upon as representing the key civil society stakeholders. There appears 
to be: 
“two main groups of people: first, a cluster in the Niger Delta and especially 
Port Harcourt – activists who are actively engaged, often heroic – and second, 
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Abuja people, who spend their time whispering sweet nothings into donors’ 
ears. There are one or two people somewhere in between. One question with 
civil society is the question of representation – who is representing whom – 
when do you hit bedrock?” (Shaxson 2009:26) 
 
Another hindrance to effective civil society participation in the NEITI process is the 
internal division within the civil society community in Nigeria. An interviewee, a civil 
society leader, laments that the civil society: 
 
 “do not seem to be with a collective voice… There is a lot of unnecessary 
competition for leadership. There is a lot of individualism in us, which we 
need to purge if we must succeed… We need committed and dedicated critical 
mass of action, lest government form their NGOs to be countering us” 
(Interview no. 5) 
 
Many interviewees acknowledged this lack of unity within the civil society 
community as a challenge to NEITI implementation. The civil society leaders seize 
every opportunity to highlight the magnitude of this problem. A part of an address by 
another civil society leader and pioneer member of the NEITI governing board, to a 
civil society gathering reads thus:  
 
“we are here to share ideas, improve on our  works and campaigns. Let us 
desist from “side talks” and “complaints” and rather come up w ith useful 
suggestions on how to improve the work of the coalition” (Ugolor, in PWYP 
Nigeria 2005:66). 
 
Prof. Asobie, the NEITI Chairman, who himself has been a representative of the civil 
society since the inception of NEITI, also recalled that a certain dispute within the 
civil society body regarding who would represent them on the NSWG board meant 
that they could not meet for a while and as such could not make adequate input into 
the draft of the NEITI law (Interview no. 9). 
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However, there are also suggestions that effective civil society participation in NEITI 
is also hindered by the belief that the general feeling of insecurity that characterised 
the military era still persists. An observer comments that: 
 
“People don't want to commit themselves to such actions (resource 
transparency campaigns) because there is insecurity in the land. If the oil 
companies or government know you to be the leader of such campaign, there 
is the likelihood of their coming after you” (PWYP Nigeria 2005:16). 
 
Due to the need to attract external funding, the CSOs often structure there 
programmes to reflect the yearnings of donors, who in turn have specific guiding 
principles. The CSOs are also engaged in an intense competition for funding amongst 
themselves. In addition, because these funding opportunities are limited, the CSOs are 
also limited in the strategies for deepening the NEITI that they can adopt hence their 
effectiveness is equally limited. Most of the civil society stakeholders interviewed 
confirmed that their activities are limited to organising workshops, seminars and 
conferences, and town hall meetings (which are often times ill-attended) and making 
publications (leaflets and fliers) about the NEITI and the NEITI audit reports. This 
finding is also corroborated in a recent report on the NEITI by Marie Muller of the 
BICC who found that:  
 
“Some interviewees were sceptical about the political strength of most of these 
NGOs, arguing that they were mainly interested in ‘eating and surviving’. 
(Muller, 2010:36) 
 
Again, this also emphasizes the role of incentives in the overall implementation and 
effectiveness of the NEITI. Bernstein and Cashore argue that: 
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“Like firms, environmental and social groups ... make choices driven by 
strategic calculations that fit their own core values and organizational self-
interest.” (Bernstein and Cashore 2007:357).  
 
How does the NEITI address the challenges associated with civil society 
participation? 
 
Despite its importance, the evidence that civil society participation in the NEITI is 
weak and sub-optimal is quite robust. NEITI implementation and effectiveness is 
considerably impaired by the low level of capacity of the civil society. For instance, at 
the launch of NEITI in February 2004, civil society was not adequately represented. 
The PWYP Coalition in Nigeria was initiated just two days before the inaugural 
conference of the NEITI in Abuja (PWYP Nigeria, 2005:3). The implication is that 
the civil society was not properly involved in the designing phase of NEITI. It has 
been recognised that the adequate involvement of all stakeholders in the designing 
phase of collective action is crucial to its implementation (Hemmati 2002). In the 
book Drilling Down, edited by David Goldwyn (2008) it is noted that: 
 
“Many of the most important decisions pertinent to a country’s EITI 
stakeholders are made in the very early stages of deployment, when civil 
society groups are weakest in terms of understanding the EITI and least 
equipped to participate in key decisions that will determine the usefulness of 
the EITI process” (2008:22). 
 
However, in order to ensure that the NEITI implementation at least satisfies the 
minimum requirements regarding civil society participation, it b ecame necessary to 
set up a Civil Society Steering Committee “which is the platform through which the 
various organisations can effectively participate and contribute to the achievements of 
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the NEITI objectives (NEITI, 200633).” A Memorandum of Understanding to this 
effect was signed between the NEITI governing board and civil society participants in 
February, 2006 (NEITI, 2009). The MOU, among other things, further established the 
importance of effective civil society participation in the NEITI implementation 
process, and also established the portfolio of a Civil Society Liaison Officer in the 
NEITI Secretariat, whose role is to act as a link between the governing board and the 
civil society community.  
 
However, many interviewees contend that while these efforts have helped to bolster 
civil society participation in the initiative, the quality of the impact of civil society is 
still undermined by the overall governance structure of the NEITI (Interview nos. 2, 3, 
5,6,11, 18, 22 ) (please see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion).  Out of the 15 
members of the governing board only three represent the civil society and this 
sometimes means that the civil society has little influence on the outcome of decisions 
(Muller, 2010).  
 
In summary, evidence shows that what often determines the commitment of 
stakeholders to the NEITI implementation is their various perceptions of the 
incentives and costs that are involved in the process.  
 
5.3 The Nature of the Relationship between and amongst the 
Identified Stakeholders 
 
What is perhaps more significant for NEITI implementation is the nature of the 
interrelationships between the key stakeholders (Fransen and Kolk, 2007). Since the 
                                                 
33 Minutes of  NSWG Board meeting held on  15th February,  2006, page 3 
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stakeholders have not just divergent goals and interests, they also have different levels 
of power and influence and these have implications for the outcome of 
implementation (Hemmati 2002). Fransen and Kolk (2007) believe that: 
 
“Multi-stakeholder standards’ development is not only affected by the quality 
and nature of the stakeholders, but also by the specifics of the interaction 
between stakeholders and companies.” (Fransen and Kolk, 2007:670) 
 
Achieving harmony among diverse stakeholders is believed to be the greatest 
challenge to MSIs. This is often influenced by the nature of the interrelationships 
between stakeholders both prior and during the collective action. Minu Hemmati 
(2002) further argues that achieving consensus: 
 
“can represent an enormous challenge since many multi-stakeholder 
partnerships bring together stakeholders of very different perspectives and 
power – such as local or indigenous communities and transnational 
corporations. To do j ustice to the various points of view and interests, 
participants need to treat each other as equals…This requires tolerance, mutual 
respect, the willingness to find consensus and a strong sense of justice. It is 
equity in practice. (2002: 47) 
 
In the following sub-sections we explore the nature of the interrelationships between 
the stakeholders to the NEITI, highlighting how and why it influences the 
implementation and effectiveness of NEITI. 
5.3.1 Government and Industry (IOCs): A ‘Marriage of 
Convenience’ 
 
The constant interaction between the IOCs and the public officials tends to provide 
substantial scope for collusion and corruption (Kolstad and Soreide, 2009:219). In the 
relationship between the Nigerian government and the companies, especially the 
IOCs, there are three key issues that are clearly evident. First, the government 
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agencies responsible for regulating and managing the extractives industry, especially 
the Department for Petroleum Resource (DPR) lack the requisite capacity to 
effectively regulate and monitor the IOCs. This situation many believe gives the IOCs 
undue advantage to manipulate the system, and thereby hampers resource 
transparency. The level of the capacity of the DPR, the agency that regulates the oil 
and gas industry, is no match to the sophistication of both the technology and 
processes of the IOCs (Interview nos. 2, 7,11, 34, 42). 
 
The second is that the government is not only the regulator of the EI but also a partner 
in EI projects (Asobie, 2009). This relationship manifests especially in the JV 
agreements that the government has with the IOCs. As partners in business, the oil 
companies and government are locked in a mutually beneficial relationship or what 
Karl (2007) describes as a ‘marriage of convenience’ and as such are less likely to 
pursue divergent objectives. It is widely believed that in implementing the JVs, the 
companies have a greater advantage over the government especially since they control 
the technology, expertise and sometimes financing necessary for oil extraction and 
production (Interview no.  34). For instance, an observer notes that: 
 
“Before the revenue is shared between the oil companies and the Nigerian 
state, the production cost of the oil is deducted. And the oil field operators, the 
oil companies, determine that production cost. The production cost includes 
everything from the food the company workers eat, the cars in the company's 
car pool, the fines for gas flaring and whatever else they can think of. The 
production cost sharing formula in use today were negotiated 10-20 years ago 
when oil price realities were much different than today. (Environmental Right 
Action, 2009:5)  
 
An interviewee, a tax expert who has been involved in auditing the tax payments of 
major IOCs in Nigeria for eight (8) years, corroborates the above statement, 
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maintaining that the IOCs have various ways of manoeuvring their tax payments to 
keep it at the barest minimum at the expense of the government. She also agrees that 
the low level of knowledge and expertise within the FIRS makes the situation even 
worse (Interview no. 43). 
 
The third key issue is that the companies also share secrets of the details of the oil 
deals and contracts with government agents. This has been a major source of 
contention especially as it concerns the implementation of the NEITI. Many believe 
that the NEITI implementation will achieve very little impact with the contract details 
remaining sacred (Interview no. 1). For instance, details of agreed signature bonuses 
are often kept secret and a writer observes that: 
 
Oil blocks licensing has become a b azaar in Nigeria. Huge signing fees are 
exchanged as though the players in the game were soccer or music stars. It is 
sad that these huge revenues are not adequately accounted for. The NEITI 
auditors recorded that they could not confirm all Signature Bonus payments in 
the year 2005 reported to us by DPR and the companies. The management of 
signature bonus in 2005 was not transparent. We need not add to this. (ERA, 
2009:8) 
 
However, despite this ‘marriage of convenience’, companies would be quick to admit 
that Nigeria is one of the toughest places to do business. This is largely due to the 
high level of corruption among public officials and the inconsistency of government 
policies. Lately, the Niger Delta crisis has also become a m ajor source of 
disagreement between the government and the companies. While the government 
accuses the companies of insufficient corporate social responsibility (CSR), the 
companies blame the crisis on g overnment weakness, insisting that CSR cannot 
replace effective governance (International Crisis Group, 2006). Also the IOCs have 
been known to have resisted certain government policies. Although most of the 
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companies support the implementation of the EITI in Nigeria, greater pressure was 
required from government to make them accept the disaggregated reporting format for 
NEITI Audit Reports 34 (Shaxson, 2009). IOCs were also not comfortable with the 
recent decision by government to review all Memoranda of Understanding with 
companies in order to bring them up to date with prevailing circumstances (NNPC, 
2008).35 Government and the IOCs have also often disagreed on such other issues as 
gas flaring and the local content policies. But the companies almost always find 
strategies of manoeuvring these policies to ensure that they have minimal negative 
impact on t heir business. Public officials on their part are also not unwilling to be 
flexible with the application of the policies knowing that whatever affects business 
interests invariably affects their own interests as well (Interview nos. 1, 3, 9, 34). 
 
Therefore, the argument is that although they may sometimes disagree, the 
fundamental relationship between government and the IOCs which is a mutually 
beneficial ‘marriage of convenience’ is rarely affected. The implication is that the 
NEITI outcomes most often are easily predictable because as partners, the oil 
companies and government are less likely to pursue significantly divergent objectives. 
(Environmental Rights Action, 2009:8). Many believe that the overall effectiveness of 
NEITI depends, to a considerable extent on fundamental changes to this ‘marriage of 
convenience’ between government and key industry stakeholders (Interview nos. 2, 7, 
11, 34, 42). 
 
                                                 
34 Companies often prefer the aggregated reporting format to the disaggregated format, which discloses 
all information contained in the audit according to specific companies. Nigeria was among the first 
countries to adopt the disaggregated format 
35 NNPC News 
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5.3.2 Companies and Civil Society/Communities: Mutual Suspicion 
and Distrust 
 
In addition to a cordial relationship with the government, the IOCs also understand 
the significance of a ‘social license to operate’. In their bid to secure this, they face 
enormous challenges especially from the communities in the environment they 
operate and civil society organisations. The relationship between companies and the 
civil society in Nigeria is anything but cordial. The communities especially believe 
that the companies, with government collaboration, deprive them of their human 
rights and degrade the environment without restraint. The IOCs often claim that their 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) projects in Nigeria are sufficient to earn them 
the ‘social license to operate’. However, communities and CSOs maintain that some 
of the CSR projects are ill- executed and sometimes divisive. A civil society activist 
notes that the IOCs are: 
 
“... enmeshed in project diversion hence their community projects are not done 
on the basis of needs assessment in most cases. The whole thing is like 
stealing a shirt from a man and throwing the button back at him and you 
expect him to be happy” (Publish What You Pay Nigeria, 2005:36). 
 
An interviewee for this study also revealed that a road constructed by Shell in Uzere 
Community in Delta State is recorded as a CSR project even when this road leads to 
the Shell facility in the community (Interview no. 7). Furthermore, CSOs also accuse 
the IOCs of fuelling the crisis in the Niger Delta through their discriminatory 
strategies in their relationships with communities (International Crisis Group, 2009), 
and through their employment of militants to provide surveillance and protection for 
their facilities (International Crisis Group, 2006). For instance, communities accuse 
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IOCs of indirectly funding violence and militant activities in the Niger Delta through 
payments that they make to: 
 
“… militant leaders in return for “surveillance” and protection of pipelines and 
other infrastructure. This practice, frequently cloaked as community 
development, has fuelled conflict through competition for contracts and by 
providing income to groups with violent agendas. Oil companies also pay 
allowances, perks – and sometimes salaries – to “supernumerary police”, as 
well as regular duty police and soldiers deployed to protect oil installations. 
Security forces consider these plum postings and are alleged to use excessive 
force to protect company facilities and their jobs” (International Crisis Group 
2006:1). 
 
The relationship between CS and IOCs is characterised by mutual suspicion. Aware 
of the implications, the IOCs are often unwilling to grant the request of the CS 
activists for access to their vital information especially as it regards contract details 
and their environmental impact assessments. Access to company information is an 
impediment to the resource transparency campaign and NEITI implementation. A 
recent report by the Amnesty International on the Niger Delta acknowledges that:  
 
“Communities frequently do not have access to basic information on oil 
projects – even when they are the “host” community. An internal SPDC 
[Shell] report highlighted the lack of transparency in the company’s operations 
in relation to many issues that affect communities, and the negative impact 
this has. According to this 2003 report, SPDC does not “provide substantial 
information about the scope, impact and duration of major projects” and “there 
is a widespread corporate assumption that any information can be used by 
communities against the company… As there is no mechanism available to 
communities to obtain accurate information the company leaves itself 
vulnerable to misinformation and rumours that feed grievances.” (Amnesty 
International, 2009:62) 
 
The IOCs’ unwillingness to yield vital information is linked to their fear of the 
consequences of such exposure on t heir reputation and competitiveness. This is a 
challenge to NEITI because without the release of relevant information the confidence 
of the civil society, and indeed that of the Nigerian population, on the effectiveness of 
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NEITI is weakened (several interviews). It is believed that the implementation and 
effectiveness of NEITI is also hinged on t he nature of the relationship between 
industry and the civil society and communities where they operate. 
 
5.3.3 Civil Society and Government: Distrust and Antagonism 
 
The nature of the relationship between government and the civil society also has a 
considerable impact on the implementation and effectiveness of NEITI. As earlier 
noted, before the signing up t o NEITI, the nature of the relationship between 
government and CSOs was largely characterized by the antagonism that existed 
during the period of military rule (Lakemfa, 2005 in PWYP Nigeria, 2005: 28). NEITI 
ushered in a new era in this relationship but there is evidence that the feeling of 
mutual distrust and antagonism still pervades. The NEITI civil society Liaison Officer 
notes that: 
 
“One thing that lingered from our days under the military is the 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion that existed between civil society 
groups and government” (Interview no. 20). 
 
He aptly describes the nature of this relationship as “us and them” whereby the civil 
society and government view each other to belong to two different antagonistic 
factions rather than part of the overall governance process. The implication is that 
government fails to carry the civil society along, while the civil society on the other 
constantly opposes government. Some interviewees note that the problem is that 
government is often poised to win these battles. This is because government can 
easily weaken the civil society through patronage, lobbying or through the use of 
sheer force.  
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This relationship is a challenge to the NEITI implementation as government is often 
accused of being “hesitant in carrying genuine civil society working on the issue [of 
resource transparency] along” (PWYP Nigeria 2005:35). A civil society activist 
claims that there seems to be “competition for space” between the government and the 
civil society. While the civil society body acknowledges that the NEITI, especially 
with its multi-stakeholder framework, offers a genuine opportunity for it to advance 
the resource transparency campaign in Nigeria, observers believe that government 
seems to be weary of allowing civil society to have considerable control of the 
initiative.  
 
In summary, managing these interrelationships has presented some challenges to the 
implementation of NEITI. However, evidence also suggests that there are yet some 
stakeholders beyond the three broad categories whose role in the resource 
transparency campaign are considered crucial.  How does the NEITI implementation 
recognise these other key stakeholders considered crucial to the deepening of the 
initiative but who do not clearly fall within the three broad categories?  
 
5.4 Gaps in the Identification and Involvement of Stakeholders and 
Implications for NEITI 
 
The recognition of key stakeholders along the broad categories recommended by the 
global EITI is not without some consequences. There is the tendency that given the 
characteristics of the NEITI key stakeholders discussed above, the wider stakeholders 
seem to be alienated from the implementation process. Many interviewees 
acknowledged that the hope of deepening the NEITI implementation depends on the 
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ability to incorporate the wider stakeholders who are the ultimate principal in the 
resource wealth management chain. The Nigerian population including workers, 
youths, women, students, the unemployed, farmers, etc., especially in the hinterland 
across the country need to be somehow involved in the NEITI implementation for any 
chance of achieving optimal effectiveness (CISLAC, 2007). The NEITI currently 
relies on the CSOs participating in the NEITI to carry out the role of extending the 
initiative to the wider stakeholders. However the challenges highlighted under section 
5.2.3 above greatly undermine the ability of the CSOs to effectively discharge this 
function. It is believed that NEITI lacks a systematic strategy for achieving an 
inclusive implementation. 
 
NEITI has attempted to mitigate these consequences by introducing slight adjustments 
to its implementation process such as representation according to geopolitical zones. 
However, evidence suggests that there are some stakeholders who are considered key 
to the NEITI but who are not yet properly integrated in the implementation process, 
and this also undermines the effectiveness of the initiative. Despite the suggestion of 
the three categories of stakeholders above, the global EITI also acknowledges that: 
 
In some countries the number of stakeholders will be relatively few and easy 
to identify. However, in many countries the size and complexity of the sector 
has led to a proliferation of interested parties. In these cases, a fuller, formal 
analysis of these parties and of the drivers for EITI implementation will help 
to inform a country’s decision on how to implement the EITI. (EITI, 2005: 17) 
 
But certain considerations are necessary in order to reflect the domestic realities that 
are inherent in individual implementing countries. As Dr. Emmanuel O. Emmanuel of 
the Centre for Social and Corporate Responsibility (CSCR), and an ardent campaigner 
for resource transparency in Nigeria, has noted: 
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The oil industry is complex and the Nigerian oil sector is no exception. The 
EITI template should be designed to reflect the complexities of the oil industry 
(Emmanuel, 2004:2). 
 
The extractives industry in Nigeria is the mainstay of  the nation’s economy and as 
such there are varied stakeholders beyond the categories recognised by the NEITI 
implementation. It is believed that the ability to include certain key stakeholders 
whose power to influence decisions in a multi-stakeholder setting is only limited by 
the “social status, their representation in public fora or their negotiation capacities” is 
critical to the effectiveness of collective action (Edmund and Wollenberg, 2001: 249). 
The non-inclusion of these groups of stakeholders may mean that the opportunity of 
building “situated alliances” and agreements among some, if not all stakeholders, may 
be lost.  
 
For instance, the Niger Delta crisis has created new key stakeholders whose 
involvement in the resource transparency campaign is highly imperative (ICG 2006). 
Ex-militants are increasing being recognised as key players in the extractives sector 
and in the overall political economy of Nigeria. The Federal Government’s Amnesty 
Programme (which has recorded some success in addressing the Niger Delta crisis) 
seems to present an opportunity for a possible engagement of the ex-militants some of 
whom have assumed the role of opinion leaders even beyond their local communities 
after embracing the government’s amnesty programme. The possible role of the ex-
militants in the NEITI implementation has not yet been explored. A staff of NEITI 
interviewed for this study acknowledged that there are challenges in involving ex-
militants in the NEITI implementation especially considering their wider public 
perception as criminals. However, Mitchell et al (1997:878) suggest that: 
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“... failure to identify dangerous stakeholders would result in missed 
opportunities for mitigating the dangers and in lower levels of preparedness, 
where no accommodation is possible. Further, to maintain the integrity of our 
approach to better define stakeholders, we feel bound to "identify" dangerous 
stake-holders without "acknowledging" them, for, like most of our colleagues, 
we abhor their practices. We are fully aware that society's "refusal to 
acknowledge" after identification of a dangerous stakeholder, by counteracting 
terror in all its forms, is an effective counteragent in the battle to maintain 
civility and civilization. The identification of this class of stakeholder is 
undertaken with the support of this tactic in mind.”  
 
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that despite the negative public perception of 
the militants, key stakeholders including government are increasingly (but reluctantly) 
recognising the need to engage with the militants in non-violent strategies. For 
example, before the Amnesty Programme was introduced, a “Stakeholders’ Forum” 
convened in April 2006 by President Obasanjo to discuss the rising unrest in the Niger 
Delta “was attended by the governors of the Niger Delta states, national security force 
officers and international oil company representatives, as well as politicians and some 
militant groups” [emphasis mine] (International Crisis Group, 2006:190). 
Furthermore, IOCs have organised similar seminars and workshops involving 
militants and have sometimes engaged well-known militant groups for business and 
security activities. A report on the Niger Delta crisis notes that: 
 
… in May 2006, Shell admitted that two companies owned by known militant 
leaders “are on t he list of approved contractors from the Shell Petroleum 
Development Company” to carry out pipeline surveillance and waste disposal. 
The companies – Shad-Ro Services and IPPS – were owned by two leaders of 
another well-known militant group, the Federated Niger Delta Izon 
Communities, which led Ijaw militants during ethno-political violence against 
rival Itsekiri and government forces in 2003 and 2004. The conflict resulted in 
hundreds killed and more than $500 m illion in infrastructure damage, 
including sabotage to ChevronTexaco facilities. The violence also forced the 
shutdown of 40 pe r cent of Nigeria’s oil industry for several weeks 
(International Crisis Group, 2006:11). 
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However, it is understandable that limiting the NEITI implementation to the 
‘manageable’ elite stakeholders could be essential for the smooth take off of the 
initiative in Nigeria. Observers believe that at some point, the initiative should be able 
to broaden its scope of participation to be more reflective of the Nigerian context in 
order to deepen the impact of the initiative and also indicate the seriousness of 
implementation in achieving the objective of resource transparency and 
accountability. Hemmati (2002) suggests that a two-tiered or an Electoral College 
form of representation could be considered if necessary in order to broaden the 
participation of wider stakeholders. 
 
5.5 The Research Question Revisited 
 
In this chapter, the research question explored is: how and why do the characteristics 
of the component agents (stakeholders) influence the effectiveness of collective action 
for resource transparency? The evidence analysed in this chapter shows that in 
participating in collective action for resource transparency, different stakeholders are 
driven by different interests and their perception of the benefits or costs associated 
with collective action differ considerably. The divergence of goals and interests 
hinders implementation and effectiveness as it is  usually a ch allenge to build 
concensus. For instance, evidence shows that government’s commitment in the NEITI 
implementation seems to be influenced by the underlying concern that the initiative 
could threaten some vested interests in the management structure of resource wealth 
in Nigeria. As a result, there is often the tendency to maintain considerable control of 
events and outcome of the initiative. Similarly, while industry commitment to 
resource transparency at the global level is motivated by the need to address 
reputational concerns and growing risk to investments, IOCs operating in Nigeria 
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seem to have less need to demonstrate this commitment in the NEITI implementation 
because their interests are strongly tied to that of government through their joint 
venture (JV) agreements. 
 
 
Furthermore, the NEITI example shows that the system or process for defining or 
identifying stakeholders can complicate the problem. This is particularly because the 
identification of stakeholders to the NEITI implementation seems to leave gaps in 
participation as certain stakeholders considered to be key to the effectiveness of the 
initiative are not yet properly integrated into the process. Evidence shows that there is 
a focus on ‘ key’ rather than ‘wider’ stakeholders (see section 5.2). In practice the 
NEITI implementation treats government and industry as the key agents involved in 
the management of resource wealth. Civil society organisations are merely involved 
as monitors of the process in order to fulfil the key requirements of the the global 
EITI.  
 
Available evidence also shows  that the implementation and effectiveness of NEITI is 
also influenced by the nature of the interrelationships between the participating 
stakeholders (see section 5.3). For instance, crude oil production in Nigeria is 
dominated by JVs between government and IOCs and as such there is a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ between the two groups of stakeholders. The implication is that NEITI 
outcomes are often predictable and are rarely contrary to the objectives of this 
‘marriage of convenience’. Civil society organisations also lack the requisite capacity 
to make considerable impact especially in the face of the strength of the alliance 
between government and the IOCs. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that the character of the 
stakeholders to the NEITI determine the implementation and effectiveness of the 
initiative. The perception of the various stakeholders of the benefits and costs of their 
participation in the NEITI process influences their commitment and contribution. 
Furthermore, available evidence also suggests that the entire implementation process 
is shaped by the nature of the interrelationships between and amongst the key 
stakeholders to the NEITI namely government, industry and civil society. For 
instance, the strong ties between government and industry through common business 
interests (Joint Ventures) imply that they hardly pursue divergent objectives in the 
implementation of NEITI. This alliance seems considerably stronger than the CSO 
participation in the initiative and as such the outcome of NEITI implementation is 
often easily predictable.  
 
There are also suggestions that the strict adherence to the identification of the key 
stakeholders to the NEITI based on the broad categories of government, industry and 
civil society does not sufficiently represent the overall stakeholders to resource 
transparency in Nigeria. The complexity of the Nigerian situation implies that the 
exclusion of some stakeholders weakens the effectiveness of the NEITI as an 
inclusive platform for achieving the objective of resource transparency and 
accountability in Nigeria. 
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However, the challenges presented by the nature and character of the component 
agents to collective action as highlighted in this chapter could be overcome or 
reinforced through  the governance structure that emerges for the collective action. 
Therefore, the next chapter explores the influence of the governance structure of 
NEITI on its implementation and effectiveness.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE, INSTITUTIONS 
AND PROCESSES OF NEITI 
 
“Who gains, who loses in these ... policy arenas is rarely an accident. More 
often than not, the distributional consequences of public policies are the 
intended result of the private interests which have been instrumental in their 
design, passage and i mplementation.” (Soludo, et al, in Soludo, Ikpeze and 
Chang eds. 2004:342) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 5, we examined how the characteristics of the stakeholders to the Nigerian 
extractives industry, and the interactions between them, influence the implementation 
of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI). However, a key 
argument often made is that “multi-stakeholder standards’ development is not only 
affected by the quality and nature of the stakeholders, but also by the specifics 
[emphasis mine] of the interaction between stakeholders and companies” (Fransen 
and Kolk, 2007:670). It is generally believed that the challenges to collective action 
for public goods provision could be overcome through appropriate governance 
mechanisms, institutional arrangements and strategies. For instance, Ostrom (2000) 
argues that “the rate of contribution to a public good is affected by various contextual 
factors including the framing of the situation and the rules used for assigning 
participants, increasing competition among them, allowing communication, 
authorising sanctioning mechanism, or allocating benefits” [emphasis mine] (p141). 
Hence, for effective implementation, multi-stakeholder initiatives often depend on 
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appropriate governance mechanisms to coordinate diverse interests towards achieving 
desired objectives. 
 
Therefore, the key question explored in this chapter is: to what extent is the 
implementation and effectiveness of NEITI influenced by its governance structure and 
processes? We examine how the NEITI governance structure is designed, the 
institutions, processes and strategies that the NEITI operates with, and how effective 
they are in addressing the inherent challenges to collective action towards resource 
transparency in Nigeria. Essentially, this chapter analyses evidence from the study 
that shows what the NEITI implementation reveals about the organisation of 
collective action for the provision of ‘globalised national public goods’. Specifically, 
we examine three key aspects of the NEITI: the design, the institutions, and the 
processes.  
 
This chapter is organised in five broad sections. This introduction is followed by 
section 6.2 which focuses on the design of NEITI, while section 6.3 discusses the key 
NEITI institutions including the governing body of NEITI - the National Stakeholders 
Working Group (NSWG); and the governing law - the NEITI Act. Section 6.4 
discusses the key NEITI processes which we identify as the NEITI Audits and the 
Communication Strategy, while section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 The Design and Structure of NEITI 
 
Apparently, the NEITI design is shaped, to some extent, by the global EITI which 
requires that: 
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“All EITI programmes must follow the internationally-agreed EITI principles 
and criteria. In addition, implementation should be carried out by a multi-
stakeholder group, consisting of government, companies and civil society. 
Beyond these two core requirements, however, the country can decide which 
structures are most effective” (EITI and IBLF 2008:17). 
 
The EITI Principles and Criteria (see Appendix I and II) embody the minimum 
requirements for countries wishing to implement the initiative. They emphasize the 
basic assumptions that underlie the achievement of resource revenue transparency 
through a multi-stakeholder initiative. Implementing countries draw from these 
principles and criteria to interpret and create their local design and structure for the 
initiative ensuring, however, that they “must regularly publish payments by 
companies to governments, and governments must publish their revenues” and that 
“these reports must be regularly audited, and the company and government data 
reconciled” and also guarantee “civil society participation through a multi-stakeholder 
process.” (Haufler, 2010:66) 
 
Beyond these minimum requirements, the global EITI also presupposes that 
participating countries should establish institutions for the implementation of the 
initiative. A key objective of the global initiative is that local implementation would 
form part of institutional capacity building in implementing countries and as such 
would require the evolution of appropriate frameworks and processes that would 
ensure its sustainability. Therefore, the global initiative acknowledges that it is  
equally imperative that participating countries adapt the initiative to their local 
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circumstances. With the flexibility that the global initiative allows, and also driven by 
the need to ensure local ownership of the process, implementing countries strive to 
evolve their own distinct designs and governance structures for the local EITI. The 
NEITI, for instance, is widely acclaimed as unique because it has made some 
introductions far beyond the prescriptions of the global EITI. But it has also fallen 
short of the prescriptions in a number of ways. We identify and analyse the unique 
aspects of the NEITI governance structure and their implications to the overall 
implementation of the initiative in Nigeria. 
 
6.2.1 Multi-stakeholder Initiative or Government Agency? 
 
At first, popular opinion across the categories of interviewees for this study was that 
NEITI is a multi-stakeholder initiative. NEITI is also often identified, both locally and 
internationally, as a multi-stakeholder initiative. The global EITI criteria stipulate that 
a multi-stakeholder initiative, independent of government, and equally the enabling 
law (the NEITI Act) provides for the establishment of “an autonomous self-
accounting body”. However, closer observations of the governance structure of the 
initiative suggest that NEITI is rather implemented as a government agency 
established under the office of the Presidency. An obvious suggestion to this 
conclusion is an inscription on the sign post in front of the NEITI Abuja office, which 
clearly acknowledges that the NEITI is an establishment under the “Office of the 
Presidency”. Furthermore, a former secretary to the NEITI referred to the NEITI as a 
government agency during a speech at a public function organised by NEITI36. In 
fact, NEITI may not be alone in this practice as it is not uncommon to find heavy 
                                                 
36 “NEITI: A Collective Responsibility” A Speech by Mallam Haruna Yunusa Sa’eed, the Executive 
Secretary of NEITI at the NEITI South West Road Show July, 2010  
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government involvement in many of the EITI implementing countries (Goldwyn, 
2008). The question therefore is: why does the global initiative seem to accept this 
practice as normal, when it emphasizes that the initiative should be implemented as a 
multi-stakeholder initiative? Is the overwhelming control of government in the local 
implementation somewhat inevitable? 
 
There are some explanations often given for the substantial control of government in 
the local implementation of the EITI. First, is that there is need for government to lead 
the initiative. The global EITI recognises that for any meaningful achievement to be 
made in the provision of resource revenue transparency, government leadership of the 
initiative is inevitable. This is more so when implementation involves some form of 
governance reforms (Hemmati 2002:219).  A s earlier highlighted in chapter 3, t he 
EITI is essentially an attempt to provide a ‘globalised national public good’. The 
problem targeted is largely due to the inability of the national government and key 
stakeholders in the local environment to guarantee the transparent management of 
natural resource revenue. Therefore, the solution would include efforts to influence 
positive governance changes in the local environment. The global EITI, in recognition 
of the vital role of government, advocates a government-led multi-stakeholder 
initiative akin to what Heritier and Eckert (2007) refer to as ‘a shadow of hierarchy’. 
Bernstein and Cashore (2007) also acknowledge that the need for political legitimacy 
further justifies the inclusion of governments in collective action. The need for an 
international standard that codifies resource revenue transparency suggests that there 
are gaps in domestic regulation which need to be addressed.  An example is the 
adjustment of national trade policies as necessary for changing the conditions for 
diamond trade under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). However, 
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Fransen and Kolk (2007:676) note that “in such situations, governments cannot 
always be expected to assist in enforcement and compliance, because they are 
themselves parties subject to the standard.”  
 
Therefore, the indispensability of government leadership of the initiative raises 
enormous concerns about the effectiveness of the EITI in achieving resource revenue 
transparency. The foremost attempt at resource transparency made by the Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign, was targeted at the extractive industry companies 
and required minimal or no participation from national governments, perhaps mindful 
of the challenges that government involvement could engender. Apparently, involving 
national governments appeared to be the next best option when the PWYP Campaign 
was not popular especially amongst industry stakeholders. Haufler (2010) notes that: 
 
“Blair shifted the focus of the EITI away from company reporting, which is 
the target of PWYP activism, to reporting and membership by governments. 
This latter shift mollified many firms concerned that public disclosure of 
payments would create tension with host governments and potentially put 
contracts at risk. It remains a point of contention for some activist groups.” 
(2010:65). 
 
Presently, the decision to implement the EITI and the direction of implementation 
seems to rest almost entirely on government leaders. Although, there may be a few 
other factors that play a role in this government decision (see Pitlik et al, 2009). But 
evidence from the NEITI example suggests that a lot of political will is required to 
sustain local implementation of the initiative. The influence of President Obasanjo 
was undoubtedly required to ensure that the initiative was first established and 
sustained. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo- Kwaako (2007) acknowledge that the EITI was 
introduced in Nigeria personally by President Obasanjo. The success achieved in the 
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first few years of NEITI implementation in Nigeria is also attributable to the influence 
of President Obasanjo who ensured that the right people were involved, and those 
people in turn took advantage of their relationship with the President, and his personal 
interest in the initiative, to set the appropriate momentum.  
 
Government also provides the political and regulatory framework required for the 
enforcement of the agreed standards of the initiative. The provision of ‘globalised 
national public goods’ often times require adjustments in local institutional 
arrangements which can only be achieved with the political authority that resides with 
governments. It would be extremely difficult, if at all possible, to achieve this without 
the involvement of governments. However, as the NEITI example illustrates, the 
design leaves a lot of room for the initiative to be hijacked by government and the 
implication is that in an attempt to create a government-led MSI, a government 
agency is created instead. 
 
Furthermore, the extractive industry is considered the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy, and as such is the pivot around which all political and economic activities 
revolve. Expectedly, information about the management of the extractive industry is 
perceived as very sensitive and critical to any government in power. Therefore, it 
becomes important for government to be very much in control of such an initiative as 
the NEITI. The NEITI, with its objective of resource transparency, is perceived as a 
threat to both government agents and their company partners’ control of the 
extractives sector. Therefore, it becomes imperative for government to ensure as 
much control of the NEITI as possible to ensure that key interests are adequately 
protected (Interviewee Nos.6, 7, 11, 13, 31, and 43).  
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Another explanation for the overwhelming government influence is that the NEITI 
evolved at a time that the Obasanjo administration was implementing an elaborate 
governance reform agenda. This included major reforms in the area of anti-corruption 
including the establishment of the popular Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) which aims at fighting fraud and economic and financial 
malpractices in both the public and private sectors. The NEITI was thus perceived as 
part of this reform agenda albeit targeted specifically at the extractives sector. This 
heightened the fears of the political and industry elite considering the exploits of the 
EFCC, and coupled with the pedigree of the inaugural Chairperson of the NEITI, Mrs 
Obiageli Ezekwesili, who had become popular with her reform of Public Procurement 
processes popularly known as the “Due Process” mechanism.  
 
6.2.2 The NEITI Design and the Local Context Argument 
 
In chapter four, we highlighted the key contextual challenges to the NEITI 
implementation and effectiveness. The design and governance structure of MSIs is 
also aimed at dealing with identified challenges within the structural context. One 
way that the NEITI attempts to deal with the environmental (and stakeholder) 
challenges is through the governance structure and processes. The explanation often 
given for the marked deviations from the global EITI design is the need to reflect the 
local context (Interview nos. 1-5). However, how well does the NEITI design reflect 
the political and administrative configurations in the country? Muller (2010) believes 
that the inability of NEITI to recognize and respond the Niger Delta crisis suggests 
that it does not truly reflect the Nigerian local context. Some interviewees (especially 
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the civil society activists) also believe that the NEITI design was deliberate in order to 
reduce the risk exposure of government that could come from expanding the scope of 
the initiative. Government would rather be content with the ‘elitist sensitization’ 
which characterizes the current implementation of the NEITI. One interviewee 
specifically noted that: 
 
In the end, it is the poor masses who lose out because NEITI, as currently 
designed, does not reflect the yearnings of the citizens and as such cannot 
deliver the desired objectives of providing greater transparency and 
stimulating accountability in the management of resource wealth in Nigeria 
(Interviewee No. 17). 
 
The implication is that the argument that NEITI is designed to reflect the local context 
seems to be weak.  
 
6.2.3 How does the Design Influence Implementation? 
 
Kolstad and Soreide (2009) believe that: 
 
Improving the institutional environment is not necessarily easy, and it is 
particularly difficult where key players benefit from dysfunctional institutions. 
It is unlikely that corrupt government officials would support or implement 
reform significantly reducing their take (2009:218). 
 
The ‘government agency’ structure of NEITI pervades the implementation of the 
initiative in Nigeria. However, while this structure may not be acceptable by all 
stakeholders, it h as facilitated the establishment of the initiative in Nigeria, and 
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introduced the much needed entry point towards achieving resource revenue 
transparency in Nigeria. Nevertheless, it is  not without some implications. For 
instance, like most other government agencies in Nigeria, NEITI is subject to political 
configurations and seems to depend heavily on the aspirations and disposition of 
political leaders, especially the president. There appears to be a general belief that 
NEITI “will therefore hardly be able to overcome the political patronage that engulfs 
Nigeria’s political system” (Muller, 2010:40). 
 
This is also highlighted by the apparent loss of momentum in the NEITI 
implementation in the years following President Obasanjo’s departure from office. 
The first phase of implementation, from 2004 t o 2007 w itnessed a number of 
landmark achievements in quick successions. But there was a noticeable lull in the 
period after 2007. It is believed that this was partly because late President Yar’ Adua, 
who took over from Obasanjo in 2007, had a weaker vision for the initiative than his 
predecessor, coupled of course with his prolonged period of inactivity due to illness 
(Shaxson 2009; Müller, 2010).  
 
The key objective of NEITI is to monitor and publicize the activities of both 
government agencies and companies in the extractives sector. It is imperative 
therefore, that for success, the NEITI should be as independent as possible of both 
government and companies. NEITI lacks the adequate level of independence required 
to effectively carry out its functions. How well can a government agency monitor the 
government of which it is a part? Most of the civil society participants interviewed for 
this study believe that NEITI in its current designed, lacks the level of motivation 
required to achieve the desired objectives of resource revenue transparency (Interview 
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nos. 14-24).  This breeds a feeling of disenchantment especially among civil society 
activists who were initially attracted by the prospects of a multi-stakeholder initiative. 
The Programme Officer of PWYP Nigeria acknowledges that: 
 
“Of course, the current practice of NEITI was not what we expected at the 
beginning of the initiative in Nigeria. Most of us who are still involved are just 
hanging on because, in the fight for revenue transparency, something is better 
than nothing” (Interviewee No. 20). 
 
This feeling is shared by many civil society participants who follow the 
implementation of NEITI. They believe that the views of the civil society are not 
appropriately incorporated in the design of NEITI. This is more so considering that 
NEITI was initiated at a time in Nigeria when an adequate co-ordination of Civil 
Society was lacking. Hemmati (2002:100) believes that there is an “often reported 
experience that participants’ commitment to a process largely depends on their 
involvement in the process from the outset, including the design”, and that “involving 
stakeholders in every aspect of the design process is crucial to achieve the best design, 
commitment to the process, credibility, legitimacy and trust” (Hemmati 2002:213). 
The first Civil Society gathering to articulate views on revenue transparency in 
Nigeria was on the eve of the inauguration of NEITI (PWYP, 2006). There are claims 
that the late invitation given to the Civil Society Organisations to the inauguration of 
NEITI was deliberate (Interview No. 24).  This is coupled with the general feeling of 
distrust and apathy often expressed by citizens about government programmes. For an 
initiative expected to generate public debate on the resource revenue management, the 
overall potential impact of the initiative is further diminished by this perception of the 
initiative as just another government agency.   
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6.3 The NEITI Institutions 
 
6.3.1 The National Stakeholders Working Group (NSWG) 
  
Collective action involving a diverse group of stakeholders requires a form of 
facilitating or governing body. A facilitating body is equally important because it is  
practically impossible to involve every stakeholder in a collective action in decision 
making and coordination of the initiative. As a multi stakeholder initiative, such body 
is required for the effective coordination of the initiative. There are various forms that 
this facilitating body can take and it has been suggested that this body could also be 
an independent body constituted from outside the stakeholders to the  collective action 
as a way of ensuring that the process is managed by a “trustworthy honest broker” 
(Hemmati, 2002:223). Hemmati (2002) also believes that for such governing bodies 
to be effective they need to be: 
 
• Explicit about their interests or possible interests; 
• Of diverse composition themselves – that is made up of representatives of 
various stakeholders; and 
• Acceptable to everybody involved. 
 
The establishment of a stakeholder working group is a mandatory requirement for the 
implementation of the EITI. The governance structure that exists at the global level, 
made up of representatives of the various stakeholders, is essentially advocated for the 
local level implementation. The global EITI Programme Officer notes that “adopting 
a clear governance structure like this will provide a very powerful and efficient 
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decision-making system and it w ill help widen buy-in and participation” (EITI 
Website37). However, it is  imperative that great care is taken when constituting this 
body as it has a direct influence on the outcome of the initiative (Fransen and Kolk, 
2007) and could sometimes hinder its operation. It is believed that, given the 
significance of a stakeholders’ working group, its organisation could indicate how 
serious a country is with its commitment to the EITI. Kolstad and Soreide (2009) 
argue that the composition of the stakeholders working group could indicate how 
serious a country is with the implementation of the EITI. They note that: 
 
“Analyzing the composition of this group suggests whether a government is 
committed to real reform, as would not be the case if the group consists of 
government cronies and clients” (Kolstad and Soreide, 2009:224). 
 
The National Stakeholders Working Group (NSWG) is the apex body of NEITI 
charged with the responsibility of facilitating and overseeing the implementation of 
the initiative in Nigeria. In this section, we discuss the details of the NSWG including 
its establishment and functions, composition, leadership, and how it deals with 
identified challenges. Although, we find further evidence to demonstrate the 
overwhelming dominance of government in the NEITI implementation, the objective 
is to highlight the role that a governing body plays in the organisation of collective 
action, and how effective the NSWG is in performing this role.  
 
Establishment and Functions of the NSWG 
 
Section 5(2) of the NEITI Act (discussed in 6.3.3 below) establishes the NSWG as a 
body “responsible for the formulation of policies, programmes and strategies for the 
                                                 
37 http://eiti.org/node/689 accessed 15/07/2010 
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effective implementation of the objectives and the discharge of the functions of the 
NEITI” while the NEITI Handbook describes it as “the platform through which the 
Federal Government of Nigeria is implementing the global initiative.” The NSWG is 
charged with the overall responsibility of overseeing the implementation of the EITI 
in Nigeria. The global EITI expects that a stakeholders’ working group should, among 
other things, take charge of the overall strategic decision making and implementation 
of the local initiative (World Bank, 2008). In Nigeria, the NSWG draws its powers 
from the NEITI Act which empowers it to  initiate and undertake necessary actions 
and programmes towards achieving the overall mandate of resource revenue 
transparency and accountability in the country. However, the greatest challenge to its 
effectiveness appears to be emanating from its very constitution. 
 
At inception, a NSWG made up of 28 members, and led by Mrs Obiageli Ezekwesili, 
was constituted by former President Olusegun Obasanjo. This inaugural board 
successfully established the initiative in Nigeria and set the motion for the rest of the 
implementation of the initiative. Among its major achievements was the first ever 
comprehensive audit of the extractives sector in Nigeria covering the period 1999 – 
2004; establishing the NEITI law; and achieving candidate status – the first nod of  
approval from the global EITI indicating acceptable progress with the implementation 
of the initiative in Nigeria (Goldwyn, 2008).  
 
But the new NEITI Act signed into law on the eve of Obasanjo’s departure from 
office in May 2007 required that the NSWG should be re-constituted with reduced 
membership strength of 15. T herefore, after much hesitation, President Yar’ Adua 
constituted the current board in January, 2008, chaired by Prof. Assisi Asobie, a civil 
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society activist who is also a member of the global EITI governing board. The NEITI 
Act also introduced a new consideration for representation on t he NSWG based on 
geopolitical zones. Therefore, six (6) out of the 15 m embers of the board, besides 
representing their stakeholder groups, equally represent the geopolitical zones of their 
origin. 
 
Some interviewees from the NEITI Secretariat think that this reduction in the size of 
the NSWG has enhanced the decision making process and cut down on t he 
administrative requirements (Interviews nos. 1-5). However, a former member of the 
28-member board whose position was made redundant by the downsizing of the 
NSWG board thinks that on t he contrary this would have a negative effect on 
implementation. He believes that the new NSWG is a far less representation of the 
key stakeholders to the NEITI implementation, and disagrees with the claim that 
decision making was encumbered in any way by the size of the first board (Interview 
no. 7). For instance, he argues that the government agency he represented on t he 
NSWG is very vital to any meaningful progress on implementation of the initiative. 
There are further worries expressed that with the NEITI plans of extending the 
implementation to cover the solid minerals sub-sector, there would be need to expand 
the size of the NSWG as the current board does not include representatives of the 
sector (Interview no. 14). 
 
However, the global EITI equally recognizes the challenges that achieving adequate 
size of the governing board could pose. It acknowledges that: 
 
“No single formula has emerged as to how different stakeholder groups are 
represented on t he steering groups, and the issue of weighting has been 
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debated extensively in several EITI countries. In countries where there are a 
very large number of major companies, where there are no ot her subsidiary 
forums that bring stakeholder groups together, or where there are numerous 
government agencies involved in the revenue collection process, it has 
sometimes been necessary to give greater weight to the participation of 
company and government representatives than to representatives from other 
sectors. In such cases, countries have needed to be particularly careful to 
ensure that civil society groups are adequately represented and involved in the 
process” (World Bank, 2008:16). 
 
We discuss the key issues with the NEITI NSWG under the following headings. 
 
Selection Process: There seems to be a general agreement that many of the NSWG 
members probably deserve their appointments on the board, given their individual 
credentials. However, what seems to be controversial is that their appointments are 
made solely by the President. Many believe that this casts a credibility doubt on the 
entire NEITI implementation. Ikubaje (2006:66) argues that the NEITI 
implementation is challenged by “the manner in which the NSWG was constituted by 
the federal government; it deliberately imposed representatives on different 
constituencies that are represented. This has impacted negatively [on] the 
transparency and democratic credentials of NEITI”. The need for stakeholders to have 
an input on w ho represents them is emphasized in the literature. Hemmati (2002) 
argues that: 
 
“The integrity and hence the effectiveness of a process can be compromised if 
the participating stakeholders are not given the opportunity to determine their 
representatives through their own processes and mechanisms” (Hemmati 
2002: 221). 
 
Goldwyn International Strategies (GIS) LLC, advisors to the NEITI, also suggested 
that: 
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“The NSWG would be enhanced if some of its members were selected by the 
legislature or by private organizations to ensure its effectiveness in the event 
that future president is less committed to NEITI than the incumbent 
President”.38  
 
The global EITI also acknowledges that: 
 
“Countries with successful EITI programs are those that have allowed 
different stakeholder “constituencies” to select their own representatives. 
When governments directly appoint members of steering groups, it is more 
difficult for governments to demonstrate that civil society representatives are 
operating independently” (World Bank and EITI, 2008:17).  
 
Civil society participants in Nigeria have requested that even if they cannot elect their 
representatives, they should at least select nominees from which the President can 
make his appointments (Interviewee No.20), but this request has not been given due 
consideration in the selection of the NSWG members. 
 
Composition: While it may not be possible to achieve an exact balance of 
representation of stakeholders, it is important to achieve a fairly acceptable balance to 
ensure effective implementation (Hemmati, 2002). The global EITI again advocates 
that: 
 
“Since the number of stakeholders is likely to be large and membership of a 
co-ordination committee will necessarily be limited, a pragmatic decision 
needs to be made about membership – reflecting the diversity, inclusivity and 
representation of stakeholders” (EITI, 2005:20). 
 
Civil society activists believe that the NSWG composition has been negatively 
skewed against civil society participants even though their participation is recognised 
                                                 
38 Goldwyn International Service in a memorandum to Obiageli Ezekwesili, Chairperson of NEITI 
dated 
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as key in the implementation of the EITI. The first NSWG board, with half of it 
comprised of government representatives, had only 3 c ivil society representatives. 
However, the NEITI Chairman argues that in numerical terms, the composition is in 
fact skewed against the industry stakeholders (Interview no. 1 ). However, the 
imbalanced composition was more pronounced in the first board of 28 members than 
the current board of 15 members. The first board had all half of its membership drawn 
from the government (NEITI, 2008). 
 
Even with the adjustments made in the constitution of the second board, certain 
composition issues, especially gender and regional imbalance, were yet to be properly 
addressed. For instance, the NSWG composition is considered to be gender 
insensitive. The first board had only the Chairperson, Ezekwesili, as a female 
representative. The second board, for a long time, had only the representative of the 
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) - the government agency responsible for the 
determination and collection of extractive companies’ taxes, as a f emale 
representative. With the exit of the former Executive Secretary, a woman was 
appointed as his replacement. But some gender activists believe that more 
opportunities should be given to women in the NSWG. An interviewee believes that 
women constitute a very important constituency in Nigeria especially in the campaign 
for resource revenue transparency and accountability and should be adequately 
represented on the board for effective implementation (Interview no. 18). 
 
However, a vital observation is that it is  sometimes difficult to determine which 
constituency each of the NSWG members represent. For instance, the FIRS 
Chairperson (mentioned above) primarily represents the FIRS, which is a government 
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agency, on the NSWG but is sometimes considered as a representative of ‘Nigerian 
women’ on t he board, which is an entirely different constituency. In addition, the 
representatives of geopolitical zones also belong to professional bodies and 
institutions who are also stakeholders to the Nigerian extractives industry. This further 
complicates the relationship between representatives and the (perceived) 
constituencies. Hemmati (2002) notes that: 
 
“People should not be expected to represent more than one stakeholder group 
because individuals can only ‘wear a limited number of hats’… it makes no 
sense to count a woman from Zimbabwe who is working with an 
environmental NGO as representing the views of women, developing 
countries NGOs, and environmental NGOs. Expecting such representation is, 
quite simply, ridiculous” (2002: 226).  
 
Interestingly, most civil society interviewees do not seem to be overly concerned by 
the inadequate numerical representation of civil society in the NSWG even though it 
is apparently evident. There are a couple of reasons why this may be so. First, as 
earlier mentioned, there is still a strong feeling of euphoria that civil society is 
involved at all in such a sensitive issue as resource transparency in Nigeria. Second, 
some civil society participants are confident that if properly organised, the little 
representation so far achieved has the potential of achieving the key objectives of the 
civil society. Participants at a capacity building workshop on NEITI implementation 
organised for members of Transparency International, Nigeria (TIN) noted that:  
 
“Even if they were unable to get their candidates into the NSWG, they could 
engage with the eventual persons and outline the interests of CSOs and thus 
establish a mandate from their constituency.” (TIN 2009:28).  
 
However, the NEITI implementers are not unaware of the implications of an 
inadequate participation of civil society on the entire process, and on the global EITI 
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perception of the credibility of the initiative in Nigeria. The Civil Society Steering 
Committee, discussed in Chapter 5, is among the strategies that the NEITI 
implementers have adopted to make up for imbalanced composition of the NSWG and 
bridge the participation gap.  
 
The Role of Leadership/ Key Personalities 
 
Leadership plays a vital role in the organisation of collective action. Ostrom (2000) 
argues that: 
  
“The world contains multiple types of individuals, some more willing than 
others to initiate reciprocity to achieve the benefits of collective action.”, and 
that “…not all players enter a collective action situation as pure forward-
looking rational egoists who make decisions based solely on i ndividual 
outcomes. Some bring with them a set of norms and values that can support 
cooperation.” (2000: 138 and 146). 
 
Apparently, the role of leadership seems to be even more critical in the early stages of 
the organisation of collective action. Ostrom (2000:149) also acknowledges that the 
presence of an individual or group of individuals with the essential leadership 
qualities is often an ‘important initial stimulus’ for effective collective action. This is 
more so when “the political sensitivity or the lack of definition of a problem require 
strong leadership to overcome obstacles for collaboration” (Biermann et al, 2007:12). 
 
Similarly, the NEITI process has also benefitted from the vital roles of some key 
personalities. President Obasanjo is often credited with the implementation of the 
initiative in Nigeria and the international recommendation achieved in the first few 
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years following inception. However, the leadership of the NSWG itself have equally 
been quite instrumental. 
 
In the opinion of many of the interviewees, the inaugural Chairperson of the NSWG, 
Mrs Obiageli Ezekwesili, deserves a lot of credit for most of the achievements 
recorded under her leadership of the NSWG. With her background in good 
governance campaigns especially from Transparency International she was able to 
adequately drive the implementation of NEITI in Nigeria. She is identified as 
belonging to the ‘reform team’, a group of technocrats under the Obasanjo 
administration who were popular for their commitment towards far-reaching 
governance and institutional reforms in Nigeria (Shaxson, 2009). Her vision for the 
NEITI implementation in Nigeria was quite glaring and she made maximum use of 
her proximity to power as captured in the statement below: 
 
“She had a very good relationship with the president, and got things done for 
NEITI through sheer political will and executive decree – and saying ‘it 
should be so’. When we started the audits and the oil companies were not 
cooperating, they were summoned to the ‘presidential’ villa and ordered to 
cooperate. Politically you have to have the strong support of the president to 
do this” (Shaxson 2009:17). 
 
The global initiative equally recognises that it is  essential for the leadership of the 
governing body to be as close to power as possible as a means of ensuring effective 
implementation. It acknowledges that a “sustained high-level political leadership has 
often been helpful to maintain the momentum of the EITI and resolve issues as they 
arise during implementation” (EITI, 2005:19). Hence, the global EITI recommends 
that: 
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“The government should appoint an individual to lead on EITI implementation 
who is sufficiently senior and whom all stakeholders trust. EITI 
implementation typically requires the collaboration of several ministries and 
agencies so the individual will need to be empowered to manage this process” 
(EITI, 2005:19). 
 
However, many interviewees strongly agree that the fact that Ezekwesili worked 
closely with President Obasanjo both as a Special Adviser and as Minister made a lot 
of difference (Shaxson 2009:17). In contrast to Ezekwesili, Prof. Asobie, the current 
chairman of the NSWG, is known to have neither additional executive portfolio nor is 
there a clear evidence of a strong link with the presidency, especially considering his 
(Asobie’s) well-known civil society activism background as a unionist and political 
activist. Although both Ezekwesili and Asobie belonged to the Transparency 
International (alongside the President Obasanjo), it is believed that Asobie’s  lack of a 
strong linkage to power may have also contributed to the dwindling momentum of the 
NEITI implementation during the early years of his leadership of the initiative. 
However, Asobie enjoys enormous goodwill from the public and especially from the 
civil society body and expectations are quite high. Nevertheless, some observers are 
rather sceptical insisting that a NEITI leadership without clear and strong linkage to 
the President can only record minimal achievements. A writer notes that: 
 
“Fixing this mess is beyond NEITI. It will take the willingness of Mr President 
to cleanse the rot because experience has shown that the chief perpetrators of 
the rot are not the angry uninformed mob on the streets; rather they are highly-
placed persons in the Presidency or those close to them”  (Ugbechie, 201039)  
 
Interestingly, much as it p ropelled NEITI implementation in Nigeria, Ezekwesili’s 
leadership of the NSWG was not without some negative effects. Some interviewees 
                                                 
39 Ken Ugbechie, “Asobie Thesis on the Nigeria Paradox” Businessday Online, Thursday 10/06/2010. 
Accessed 02/09/2010 
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felt that her leadership alienated certain key players who had strong opinions about 
the entire reform agenda of President Obasanjo.  Her leadership underlined the heavy 
involvement and domination of government in the whole process. She perhaps 
unconsciously, personified the ‘government agency’ structure of NEITI as she never 
hesitated to invoke the ultimate political power which was often readily available 
(Interview nos. 25, 31 a nd 39). As earlier noted, the initiative suffered because this 
strategy could not be easily sustained after her departure.  
 
NSWG Administrative Institutions 
 
The NSWG relies on special committees constituted by its members and the NEITI 
Secretariat to carry out its functions. The committees handle specific issues relating to 
the achievements of the objectives of the NEITI while the Secretariat is responsible 
for the day-to-day administration of the initiative. The NEITI Executive Secretary 
heads the Secretariat and also acts as a secretary to the NSWG.  
 
The NEITI Secretariat is particularly significant in the implementation of NEITI. It 
takes care of the day-to-day activities of NEITI. However, while it f acilitates the 
smooth running of the initiative, the secretariat has also presented some challenges to 
the implementation of the initiative. Prominent among these challenges was the 
apparent tension that existed between the Executive Secretary and the NSWG 
leadership in the period between 2008 and 2010. This tension seemed to characterize 
events in this period and also had some negative impact on the implementation of the 
initiative. An interviewee noted that: 
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“The way things are playing out at NEITI's secretariat in recent times, is a 
source of worry for most civil society groups in the country. Internal 
wrangling between top officers of the secretariat has turned the place into a 
notorious centre for corruption and this calls into doubt the country's 
commitment to implementing the EITI principles” (Interviewee No. 14). 
 
Furthermore, in 2010, widespread allegations of financial mismanagement levelled 
against the then Executive Secretary (several newspaper reports) presented threats to 
the credibility of NEITI as a prime institution for transparency and accountability in 
Nigeria. The Executive Secretary in question has since resigned and a new one was 
appointed in late 2010.  
 
However, in an interview for this study in May 2009, Asobie, the NEITI Chairman 
emphasized that one of the challenges that faced the NEITI implementation was that 
the Secretariat lacked the requisite capacity to meet its responsibilities. He noted 
specifically that the Secretariat required a t otal overhaul of its structure in order to 
reposition it for a new phase of implementation of the initiative. A key issue in this 
transformation was the need to improve the staff strength of the NEITI Secretariat 
(Interview no. 1 ). Muller (2010:40) also acknowledges that “for a long time the 
[NEITI] Secretariat operated without full capacity and complement of the required 
staff strength”. Presently, this problem seems to have been substantially addressed. 
An elaborate staff recruitment exercise was initiated in July, 2009, and the newly 
recruited staff assumed duty in September, 2010. Three new Directors were among 
the newly recruited staff and the Chairman believes that this recruitment of staff to fill 
vacancies would boost the activities of the NEITI especially as they launch a n ew 
phase of the implementation in Nigeria (Interview no. 1 – follow-up).  
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The NSWG has also increased its in-house committees from 5 to 8. It is evident that 
events surrounding the allegations of fraud and malpractices against some of the staff 
of the NEITI Secretariat must have necessitated the creation of additional 3 
committees on P rocurement; Ethics; and Staff Appointment, Promotion, and 
Disciplinary. The initial 5 committees are: 
 
• Finance and General Purpose Committee. 
• Oil and Gas Committee. 
• Solid Mineral Committee. 
• Civil Society Committee. 
• Communications Committee. 
 
These committees are constituted by the 15 NSWG members who are supported by 
relevant staff of the secretariat. 
 
Overall, the NSWG reflects the overwhelming government dominance on t he 
implementation of the NEITI. To ensure this, government wields enormous influence 
on the NSWG through the control of its composition. A significant observation is that 
the selection process of members of the NSWG is not transparent. The members are 
appointed by the President while many interviewees think that it would be best for 
stakeholders to have some input into the appointments. Even if they may not elect 
these representatives they want to be able to at least suggest nominees for the 
president’s appointment. However, while the government dominance helped the 
inaugural NSWG board to record rapid achievements, the dwindling momentum in 
the period 2007 – 2010 heightened concerns about the future of the initiative in 
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Nigeria. Will the initiative stand the test of time? Many believe that the NEITI Act 
offers a key source of confidence that the initiative, at least, can be sustained in the 
medium to long term. 
 
6.3.2 The NEITI Act 
 
When Nigeria signed up t o the EITI in 2004, t here were doubts that the initiative 
would outlive the Obasanjo administration that established it (Interview no. 20). The 
civil society activists particularly were sceptical that the political elite would willingly 
embrace resource revenue transparency. One way of forestalling this was through 
enacting an establishing law that would confer some legal and constitutional status to 
the existence of the NEITI in Nigeria. The NEITI bill was initiated in December, 2004 
and it took about two years for the legislators to pass the bill, after extensive 
consultation and lobbying by mostly civil society activists who were keen on resource 
revenue transparency and accountability (Interviewee No.14). Interestingly, President 
Obasanjo assented to the NEITI bill on the eve of his departure from office in 2007.  
 
In this section, we examine the role of an enabling law in the organisation of 
collective action and how effectively the NEITI Act plays this role. What does the 
NEITI Act represent in the overall MSI or collective action architecture? In addition 
to ensuring continuity of the initiative in Nigeria, The NEITI Act also establishes the 
structure of the initiative and defines the rules governing implementation as well as 
spelling out punishments for non-compliance of targeted stakeholders. Therefore, we 
explore the question: how effective is NEITI Act in achieving these objectives? 
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Establishing and Institutionalising the NEITI  
 
The NEITI Act is considered as the greatest achievement of the initiative in Nigeria so 
far. This is essentially because it confers confidence that the initiative would at least 
last for some time. Radhika Sarin, the International Co-ordinator of the PWYP 
Campaign, acknowledges that “the NEITI Act serves as insurance that the progress 
Nigeria has made in implementing the EITI to date will continue to be built upon.” 
(CISLAC, 2008: iv). Although quite a few EITI participating countries are 
enthusiastic about following Nigeria’s example of establishing a law to back up the 
implementation of the initiative, the global EITI acknowledges that: 
 
“In some cases it may be necessary to enshrine EITI legally; create new 
transparency, revenue and industry policy and legislation; or make changes to 
existing EITI related policies and legislation” (EITI, 2005:18). 
 
In addition, the NEITI Act also extends the mandate of the initiative in Nigeria, thus 
introducing some unique components to the implementation of the EITI in Nigeria. 
The law, among other things, empowers NEITI to: 
 
“Ensure due process and transparency in the payments by extractive industry 
companies and accountability in the revenue receipts of the Government and 
other statutory recipients” (Section 2a);  
 
And also to: 
 
“Ensure transparency and accountability by government in the application of 
resources from payments received from extractive industry companies and 
eliminate all forms of corrupt practices in the determination, payments, 
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receipts, and posting of revenue accruing to the Government from extractive 
industry companies [emphasis added] (Section 2b). 
 
These provisions of the Act empower the NEITI to go beyond the requirements on 
payments disclosure to also venture into transparency of resource revenue 
expenditure, extending its coverage of the resource transparency chain (see Chapter 
3). However, at the moment NEITI is yet to exercise this empowerment. The 
Chairman believes that it is a g radual process and that NEITI would surely ask 
questions about revenue expenditure but needs to first consolidate on t he 
achievements made so far on resource revenue transparency (Interview no. 1). 
 
Defining Incentives/ Disincentives 
 
One of Mancur Olson’s hypotheses on c ollective action is that there must be some 
form of coercion or ‘special device’ to facilitate co-operation towards the provision of 
public goods. Most authors equally agree that some form of incentive or disincentive 
is required for collective action to be effective.  For instance, Fehr and Gachter (2000) 
argue that the existence of sanctions to non-cooperative behaviour is likely to boost 
cooperation not just because it is a deterrent but because of the confidence it gives co-
operators that no one  is free riding. While acknowledging the importance of such 
instruments, Ostrom (2000) also admits that they can sometimes “frustrate, rather than 
facilitate, the private provision of public goods.” (Ostrom 2000:138) and that “if some 
users get all the benefits and pay few of the costs, others become unwilling to follow 
rules over time.” (Ostrom, 2000:150). In addition, Bernstein and Cashore (2007) 
argue that political legitimacy is essential for collaborative efforts because relying on 
the strategic interests of stakeholder for compliance cannot be effective.  
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Hence, it s eems imperative for NEITI to create a level playing field for the 
implementation of the initiative in Nigeria to ensure that certain stakeholders are not 
unduly disadvantaged by their participation in the initiative. This is essentially 
important for industry stakeholders who are constantly in competition with one 
another and mindful of the impact that information disclosure could have on t heir 
competitive edge. The NEITI Act attempts to address this by making it mandatory for 
every company operating in Nigeria country to participate in the initiative, and also 
stipulating punishment for non-compliance. 
Is the NEITI Act Sufficient? How does it reflect the MSI principle? 
Much as the NEITI Law has been widely commended, there have been some concerns 
about its sufficiency in achieving the desired objectives. There were calls for its 
amendments even before it was signed into law. And afterwards, there have been 
persistent calls from civil society activists for amendments to the law. Expectedly, 
prominent among these concerns is the enormous power that the law confers on the 
President especially in the appointment of members of the NSWG as representatives 
of the stakeholder groups. Many interviewees believe that this greatly undermines the 
credibility of the NEITI and hence its effectiveness (Interview nos. 14, 20, 24 and 31). 
This supports Edmund and Wollenberg’s (2001:240) argument that “the relationship 
between a representative and his/her constituency is perhaps most politically-charged 
when representatives of a group are designated by outsiders or are accountable to 
them”. Although they acknowledge that achieving adequate representation is a 
challenge in itself noting that “even a carefully planned effort to represent a 
constituency – with frequent and broad consultations and mechanisms of 
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accountability – may founder on the enormous number of interests associated with 
such contradictory and fast-changing identities” (2001: 241). 
It is also believed that the process of drafting the law was not inclusive and this may 
be responsible for the inherent deficiencies in the law. There is evidence that civil 
society participants were not adequately incorporated in the process of drafting the 
bill. The statement below from the PWYP Coalition in Nigeria captures the lack of 
inclusiveness of the process: 
 
“If NSWG had done extensive consultations before drafting the Bill, the 
perception of the civil society would have changed” (PWYP Nigeria, 2005: 
70). 
 
Although a public hearing was held to provide an opportunity for the public to make 
contributions towards the bill but the PWYP Nigeria further notes that: 
 
“The public hearing recently conducted on the Bill was nothing short of 
window dressing as there was virtually poor attendance on such an important 
Bill, which 24-hour notice was given to civil society to appear for hearing”40 
(PWYP Nigeria, 2005:2).  
 
This did not however diminish the civil society strong support for the passage of the 
Bill because as one interviewee put it “something is better than nothing at all” 
(Interviewee No. 20). 
 
However, many believe that the NEITI Act leaves a lot of areas considered critical to 
the achievement of resource revenue transparency uncovered. Therefore, the clamour 
                                                 
40 PWYP Nigeria, Transparency in the Extractive Sector, No.1 Oct – Nov 2005 p2 
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for an amendment of the law has been constantly rising. Among the issues agreed in a 
recent workshop organised by one of the leading CSOs was that:  
 
“There should be an amendment to the NEITI Act, especially on the 
provisions that help protect multinationals from divulging information, also 
the issue of oil prospecting and licensing and other grey areas that would help 
strengthen the effectiveness of the NEITI Act in meeting its mandate” 
(CISLAC Communiqué July 25 2008). 
 
The provisions referred to above are the provisos contained in Sections 3 (d) and (e) 
and further reaffirmed in in Section 14 (1) of the NEITI Act. These provisions are  
believed to have been added because it was necessary to protect industry and 
government entities from any possible abuse or misuse of information that they 
provide in the course the implementation of NEITI (Interview nos. 3, 6, 7, 11, 28). For 
instance, Section 14 (1) of the NEITI Act requires, among other things, that: 
 
“…the independent auditor shall submit the [NEITI Audit] report with 
comments of the audited entity to the NEITI which shall cause same to be 
published for the information of the public, provided that the contents of such 
report shall not be published in a m anner prejudicial to the contractual 
obligations or proprietary interests of the audited entity.” [emphasis added]. 
 
These provisions appear to be somewhat contrary to the objectives of the NEITI. 
Asobie (2009: 8) notes that “it is NEITI that is mandated to publish the report; and as a 
Multi-Stakeholder Group, it would, or should know how to do it in a manner that protects 
the interests of all”. All the civil society activists and some analysts interviewed for 
this study believe that this provision gives some leeway to government and industry 
stakeholders and is capable of undermining the role of the NEITI in effectively 
achieving the objective of resource transparency and accountability (Interview nos. 
14-25, and 39, 40, 41, 43). 
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Furthermore, the NEITI law is also believed to be unclear and ambiguous in certain 
areas. For instance, an observer notes that: 
 
“With regard to expenditure, the NEITI law names “transparency and 
accountability by governments in the application of resources” merely as an 
objective of NEITI, without conferring upon NEITI any related precise 
function” (Muller, 2010:31). 
 
This lack of clarity has also created challenges to the NEITI implementation. There 
are implications for the enforcement of the NEITI Act, despite its identified 
shortcomings. The NEITI Chairman also acknowledged that interpreting and 
enforcing the law has contributed in slowing down the pace of implementation of the 
initiative (Interview no. 1 ). As is often acknowledged by ardent followers of 
developments in Nigeria, the problem is often not the absence of laws but their 
appropriate implementation (Frynas, 2000). An interviewee notes that: 
 
“Just like other critical legislations in the country, the NEITI law came with 
good intentions but many people fear the inability of government to 
implement its contents for the apparent reason of ‘vested interests’.” 
(Interviewee No. 14). 
 
There are fears that operating in its current design as a government agency; the NEITI 
seems to be subject to the same factors that engendered the poor management of 
resource revenue in Nigeria. A writer notes that: 
 
“The political context also has repercussions on NEITI’s ability to enforce 
compliance of oil companies with the legal requirements of information 
disclosure (NEITI Act of 2007, N o. 16)… This is a crucial issue because 
NEITI can only reduce corruption by international companies (bribing 
officials to reduce actual payments) if compliance is enforced” (Muller, 
2010:40). 
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However, what the enactment of the NEITI Act in Nigeria further reinforces is the 
uniqueness of collective action efforts towards the provision of ‘globalised national 
public goods’. The Law makes participation for all stakeholders mandatory while 
voluntary participation is a common feature of most multi-actor collective action for 
the provision of global public goods. At the global EITI level participation is also 
voluntary. This also supports the view that NEITI cannot be viewed purely as a multi-
stakeholder initiative, but rather as a government agency. Wood and Gray (1991) 
believe that if participants in collaboration agree to relinquish all their autonomy to 
the collaborative alliance, the resultant organisational form is no longer collaboration.  
 
In addition, The NEITI Act also reflects the control of the political elites, in 
collaboration with their company counterparts, which runs through the entire 
implementation process. For instance, most of the provisions of the Act that appear to 
be targeted at the companies contain “get out” clauses (Shaxson 2009:38). Recently, it 
was alleged that NEITI invoked some provisions of the Act to justify its refusal to 
publicly disclose information on companies found to be engaged in malpractices in its 
recent review of the crude oil metering infrastructure (NDEBUMOG 2010:8). This 
further reinforces the belief that: 
 
“While the enactment of the NEITI Act 2007 is a very bold and commendable 
initiative, the Act can only be meaningful if faithfully implemented.” (TIN 
2009:50).  
 
A test for the law, however, seems to be its application towards the findings of the 
NEITI Audits. 
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6.4 The Processes 
 
6.4.1 The NEITI Audits 
 
The NEITI Audits are closely linked with the core objectives of the EITI framework 
which is the improvement of resource revenue management through the disclosure of 
information on extractive industry payments and government receipts: 
 
“The general provisions of the EITI are that members must regularly publish 
payments by companies to governments, and governments must publish their 
revenues. These reports must be regularly audited, and the company and 
government data reconciled” (Haufler, 2010:66). 
 
However, in order to achieve this objective it is not only important that information 
about company payments and government receipts is published, it is also imperative 
that the required type, amount and quality of such information are guaranteed. To 
achieve this, the EITI requires that “where such information is not readily 
available….an independent audit should be conducted” The entire framework is 
targeted at addressing the agency problem through the provision of information to the 
public who are the principals. Audit is essential to ensuring transparency in the 
extractives sector. It ensures that the information provided is reliable. Asobie 
(Interviewee No.1) insists that the main objective of the audit reports is to generate 
public debate on the management of the extractives sector.  
 
“To achieve this major objective of the NEITI, Nigerians and the whole world 
need to know what happens in the extractive industry, and especially how 
revenue is generated across the chain” (Interviewee No.1) 
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Therefore, there are three key roles that the audits are expected to play: to produce 
information and data that can stimulate public debate on t he management of the 
extractives industry; to ensure the validity and reliability of information so provided 
and; to identify lapses and issues for possible remediation. The NEITI Audits have 
received enormous credits internationally as the most elaborate (Goldwyn, 2006). Of 
all the EITI implementing countries, the Nigerian audits are adjudged the best and 
most complete and often used as a standard.  An analyst notes that “the audit report 
remains the single most useful and credible publicly-available document on Nigeria’s 
oil sector” (Alexander Gillies, quoted in Shaxson 2009:5). NEITI Audits are quite 
comprehensive covering not just financial audits but also physical and process audits. 
Information contained in the audit reports are also disaggregated both by company 
and by payment type. Commenting on the first audit, an industry expert notes that it 
was: 
 
“…a remarkable feat of political courage. Nigeria’s leaders were keenly aware 
that the audits would reveal great weaknesses in government systems in a very 
public way yet they sought to make the audit as broad and deep as possible” 
(Goldwyn, 2006: unpaginated).41  
 
The disaggregation of information by company, for instance, was keenly resisted by 
industry stakeholders who were concerned about the potential exposures that it could 
portend. As at the time of writing this chapter, two audit exercises have been 
successfully completed and published: first for the period 1999 -2004 (published in 
2006); and the second for the year 2005 (published in 2009). However, in this sub-
section, the three forms of the audits are explored further. We examine the role of the 
                                                 
41 David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn International Strategies, LLC in a testimony on the EITI 
Implementation in Nigeria before the US Congress International Relations Committee Subcommittee 
on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, May 18th, 2006) 
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NEITI audits by exploring how the audit processes are conducted, what the key 
findings of the audits are, how the audit reports are published or disseminated, and 
how the remediation of the audit findings are carried out. 
 
The Audit Process 
 
The audit exercise begins with the appointment of independent auditors by the NSWG 
However, the NSWG takes such key decisions as the agencies and companies to be 
covered by the audit (called ‘covered entities’), the level of materiality and the 
disaggregation of audited information both by company and by payment type. This is 
in line with the global EITI requirement that: 
 
“It will be necessary to appoint an administrator to collect and evaluate the 
revenue data provided by companies and government. It is essential that there 
is stakeholder trust in the administrator’s impartiality and competency. The 
administrator may be a private audit firm, an individual or an existing or 
specially created official body that is universally regarded as independent of, 
and immune to influence by, the government” (EITI, 2005:23). 
 
For the 1999 -2004 audit, the NSWG chose to first appoint advisors who would assist 
it in designing the scope of the audit and in the selection of the eventual auditors. For 
the purpose of selecting the advisors, a sub-committee made up of four members of 
the NSWG was set up to “prepare the scope of work for the engagement of Advisors”, 
and another sub-committee made up of three members was also set up to evaluate the 
bids received for the role (NEITI online archive42). With the assistance of DFID, the 
advertisement for Expressions of Interest (EOIs) was widely publicised in local and 
international print media, and eventually Goldwyn International Services (GIS), an 
                                                 
42 www.neiti.org.ng accessed 14/09/2009 
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American based international consulting firm, was chosen and contracted as advisors 
to the NEITI. GIS then went on to draft a comprehensive programme for the audit 
exercise and also assisted the NSWG in selecting auditors for the audits. The Hart 
Group, a UK-based firm, leading a consortium made up of  both local and 
international firms was selected as auditors. 
 
The selected auditors designed templates that would enable them to obtain required 
data from the ‘covered entities’. The ‘covered entities include “extractive industry 
companies that have oil blocks allocated to them for exploitation, and the regulatory 
agencies of the Federal Government, as well” (Asobie, 2009:7). The audit templates 
are only administered to ‘covered entities’ and is considered confidential amidst 
requests by some civil society activists that it should be made public (NDEBUMOG 
2010:28). An interviewee argued that it would be necessary for the templates to be 
made public in order to improve the credibility of the entire audit process (Interview 
no.23). 
 
A key challenge to the audit process is that when the templates are administered to the 
‘covered entities’ ‘the audit could only progress when the data was returned by the 
slowest provider’ (NEITI, 2009:9). In addition, there were varied interpretations of 
the data required by auditors making the audit analysis a bit complicated. This was 
due to the inconsistency inherent in the management of the sector in Nigeria and the 
unwillingness of some of the ‘covered entities’ to cooperate with the auditors. DPR, 
for instance, was specifically mentioned as uncooperative in the 2005 audit exercise.  
 
208 
 
Another challenge to the audit process is that when the audit reports are eventually 
produced, the NSWG, after consultation on t he audit, submits the Audit to the 
President for his approval. This sometimes creates delays in the publication of the 
audit reports. For instance, the 2005 Audit exercise which was concluded in October, 
2008, was published almost a year later in August 2009, because presidential approval 
was delayed. The need for presidential approval before publication of the audits also 
gives room to suspicions of manipulations of the audit findings. Civil society activists 
have insisted that: 
 
“Since the Act establishing NEITI does not require it to submit the audit report 
of the extractive industry companies to the President or the Federal Executive 
Council (FEC) for approval before making it public, there can be no basis for 
the current practice where the report is tabled before the FEC before it is 
released. This practice should be discontinued forthwith” (CISLAC 
Communique, 2009: 43). 
 
Many observers of the NEITI implementation also agree that this practice of seeking 
presidential approval raises credibility concerns about the entire audit process 
(Interviews 39-45). The argument is that if the audits were carried out by competent 
auditing firms, applying international standards, why should further approval of the 
President be required for the publication of the audit reports, rather than just that of 
the NSWG?  
 
The Forms/Types of the Audits and some Key Findings 
 
                                                 
43 Communiqué issued at the end a Civil Society Workshop organised by CISLAC on the 7th of July, 
2009 
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The NEITI Audit of the 1999 – 2004 periods was conducted in the three different 
forms. This precedence was maintained in the 2005 a udit. Below, we highlight the 
key points of these two audits under the three different forms. 
  
 
1. The Financial Audits 
 
The objective of the financial audits is quite straightforward: it is aimed at verifying 
the material payments made by oil and gas companies to the federal government and 
the receipts confirmed by the revenue receiving agencies. The objective is to discover 
discrepancies in the records of these financial flows and to also identify their chain of 
custody and the role and performance of specific players (NEITI, 2007). Essentially, 
the audit: 
 
“Compared the amounts oil producers said they paid in Petroleum Profits Tax 
(PPT), royalties and other revenues, with what the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN), the government’s banker, said it received. It compared this data with 
notifications from the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) which is 
responsible for assessing taxes, and from the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR), the regulator. Then the auditor sampled some companies’ 
tax returns and royalty statements in depth to verify the calculations, and the 
assessments of FIRS and DPR” (NEITI, 2007:3). 
 
The 1999 – 2004 financial audits revealed that $16 million could not be reconciled. 
However, before arriving at these figures the initial discrepancies found were quite 
higher than the reported amounts. In the first audit, a total amount of $232 million 
was initially reported and was eventually reduced to $16 million. The auditors 
explained that this adjustment was required when some evidence emerged after the 
audit exercise. This raised some doubts about the credibility of the audit exercise 
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because the reconciliation was prompted on the initiative of President Obasanjo and 
was secretly conducted, which left room for possible collusion between the indicted 
‘covered entities’ and the government (Shaxson, 2009).  
 
However, for much of the discrepancy recorded, the financial audit reveals that 
accounting, timing, and classification problems were responsible. For instance, the 
government accounting system is based on ‘cash basis’ while companies use ‘accrual 
basis’ accounting. Furthermore, there were problems created by the: 
 
“inadequacy of systems at government level, including the absence of 
independent records by the Accountant General of the Federation (AGF), the 
failure of the CBN to maintain complete records, the failure of the FIRS to 
effectively audit the accounts of state owned or private companies, and the 
failure for the DPR to regulate the calculation and payment of royalties by 
companies operating in the sector” (Goldwyn, 2006: unpaginated).44  
 
Many interviewees believe that the findings of the financial audits do not reflect the 
true situation in the management of resource revenue in Nigeria. An interviewee 
(Interview no. 39 ) particularly noted that the differences of about 0.02% and 2% 
reported in the 1999 – 2004 and 2005 audits respectively which are in fact within the 
acceptable margin of error for such audits, were misleading. Yet the common belief, 
as noted by an observer, is that: 
 
“The final revenue discrepancy identified in the report suggests important 
details about the nature of revenue mismanagement in Nigeria. The relatively 
small percentage of unaccounted for revenue … to total transactions suggests 
that, in general, revenues are not disappearing because companies make 
official payments to the central bank that are then diverted by public officials 
at the federal level” (RWI, 2007:3). 
 
                                                 
44 Testimony of David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn International Strategies, LLC before the US 
House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and 
International Operations May 18th, 2006 
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But many Nigerians are not easily deceived by the findings of the financial audits. An 
interviewee noted that: 
 
“Going by the findings of the financial audits, there is little or no difference 
between what the companies pay and what the federal government agencies 
receive. But we all know that resource revenue somehow disappear into 
people’s pockets. These financial (audit) reports suggest that the companies 
are actually doing the right things and that the government officials are the 
thieves. I don’t accept that. This report does not show where the companies go 
wrong” (interviewee No. 24). 
 
However, by its objective, the financial audits are limited in the role they can play 
towards achieving resource revenue transparency. Interestingly, the global EITI often 
emphasizes an audit of material payments and receipts. It is evident therefore that 
financial audits alone cannot reflect the often complex configurations within the 
extractive sector that serve to protect the interests of key agents at the expense of the 
principals. 
 
2. The Physical Audits 
 
The Physical Audits are aimed at examining the management of hydrocarbons (crude 
oil and gas) flows from extraction to sale. The audits cover the chain of oil and gas 
production from the oil wells to the terminals where crude oil and gas are either lifted 
for export or transported (through flow lines) to the refineries in Nigeria (figure 6.1). 
However, production in Nigeria takes place both onshore (on land, and in the 
swamps); and offshore (in shallow and deep waters) and the chain for both differ 
slightly.  
 
The Physical Audit of the year 2005, for instance: 
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“encompasses the mapping of hydrocarbon flows, the assessment of the 
quality of procedural systems, the technical assessment of measuring 
hydrocarbon streams, the volumetric analysis and reconciliation of data, 
recommendations for improvements and reporting templates, and the 
aggregate reporting of hydrocarbons produced and fiscalised in the audit 
period 2005” (NEITI, 2009:58). 
 
Figure 6.1 Crude Oil Production Chain  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from the NEITI 2005 Audit Report (NEITI, 2009) 
 
The audit findings highlight avenues of revenue leakage along the crude oil 
production chain most of which arise from the poor hydrocarbon metering 
infrastructure. The findings, among other things clearly indicate that, given the 
existing infrastructure, it is impossible to effectively determine the amount of crude 
oil production in Nigeria (NEITI, 2009). However, a combination of improper 
management, greed, and corruption, by both government and company officials, has 
engendered an enduring inefficient system which has characterized the management 
of resource revenue in Nigeria. The auditors reported that: 
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“The quality of data available on product movement is insufficient to validate 
the reconciliation of product flows. This is due to the widely varying 
measurement practices in place at downstream depots” (NEITI, 2009:62). 
 
The Physical Audits are particularly significant because the determination of revenue 
is essentially based on t he amount of production of crude oil. Unlike the Financial 
Audits, issues concerning what ‘ought to be paid’ to government, as opposed to what 
‘is paid’ which are considered more pertinent for meaningful resource revenue 
transparency to be achieved, are addressed in the Physical Audits. (Interviewee No. 1). 
For instance, the poor monitoring system gives room for ‘oil bunkering’ - a seemingly 
intractable problem in Nigeria considering the strong networks of both national and 
international actors involved in this crime cum business (discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
With the inability of the financial audits to meet the expectations of many who believe 
that a lot of funds have been stolen from the extractive sector in Nigeria, the physical 
audits appear to be the greatest achievement of the audit exercise (Interview no. 14). 
This is in consideration of the amount of information relating to the operations of the 
sector that are now available in the public domain. An observer notes that the audits 
provide plenty of “information on the structure of and activities within the oil and gas 
sector, thus truncating poverty of information about the sector” and “insights into the 
effects of  hi therto “black box” operations within the sector” (Ariyo, 2010: 
unpaginated).   
 
3. The Process Audits 
 
The Process Audits examine the policies and procedures involved in the licensing 
rounds and award of contracts; crude oil marketing, refining and product imports; and 
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budget and management of capital and operating projects in the extractives sector 
(NEITI, 2009). These policies and procedures are compared to international best 
practices to ascertain their suitability. The Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC) - the state-owned oil company, and the IOCs, especially those operating the 
joint venture agreements with the federal government are the key focus of the Process 
Audits. However, the DPR as the regulatory agency is also covered by the Process 
Audit. 
 
Similar to the Physical Audits, The Process Audits conducted so far have been quite 
revealing. According to the reports, the management of the extractives industry in the 
periods reviewed was characterised by lack of transparency; low capacity of the DPR; 
political interference; complex, bogus, and out-dated policies; poor documentation; 
and lack of clarity of rules and procedures (NEITI, 2007). These factors leave ample 
room for manipulations and corruption, and hence immense loss of government 
revenue (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). For instance, the statements 
below, on t he 2005 oi l licensing round, are typical of the management of the 
extractives sector as reported in the Process Audits: 
 
“Complex and unwieldy bidding criteria deterred well-capitalised and 
experienced companies, while others were put off by the granting of rights of 
first refusal on some blocks to selected firms on the eve of the auction. Both 
problems ran counter to the principles of transparency proclaimed for the 
round... It is still unclear how so many ill-suited companies managed to 
prequalify, given their opaque ownership and finances. The implication is that 
the DPR was negligent in due diligence, partly because it was swamped by 
sheer numbers, and partly perhaps because of discretionary political 
intervention on behalf of these companies’ owners” (NEITI, 2007:22-23). 
 
Like the Physical Audits, the Process Audits are equally revealing.  Many transactions 
were discovered to be carried out without recourse to due process. It was also 
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discovered that the capacity of the regulatory agency DPR was weak and it lacked 
adequate human and material resources to effectively carry out its functions. There 
was also a weak interaction first between the government agencies, and also between 
government agencies and the companies. This made it extremely difficult for online 
information sharing and gave ample room for manipulations and mismanagement.  
 
However, of greater interest to many citizens would be the findings that partly explain 
the incessant shortages of petroleum products in the domestic market, in a country 
with abundant oil and gas production. Petroleum products are imported from the 
international market to meet domestic demands because the four (4) existing 
refineries in Nigeria, with a combined design capacity of 445, 000 ba rrels per day 
were performing at an average of 42.7% capacity utilization for the period covered in 
the 1999 – 2004 (less than half of the global average of 85%). It was noted that: 
 
“Nigeria’s refining, or downstream sector is the Cinderella of the industry. 
The country’s four refineries have underperformed for decades, forcing the 
government to import oil products such as gasoline, kerosene and diesel at 
vast cost, and in a reputedly chaotic manner – evident in port congestion, late 
deliveries and occasional product shortages” (NEITI, 2007:27). 
 
It was also revealed that although sabotage and vandalization of oil pipelines which 
occasionally disrupted the flow of crude oil to the refineries contributed to this 
problem, “the poor performance was due mainly to management failure to allocate 
enough resources to repairs and maintenance” and in 2004 a lone, savings of about 
$120 million would have been made if the refineries had worked more efficiently 
(NEITI, 2005:30).  
 
Remediation of Audit Findings 
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Overall, the audit exercises reveal anomalies in the management of the Nigerian 
extractive industry which make remediation of the audit findings a key aspect of the 
NEITI implementation. To this end, the Federal Government set up an Inter-
Ministerial Task Team (IMTT) in 2007 to implement the recommendations of the 
audit reports. The IMTT is charged with the responsibility of devising and 
implementing strategies for rectifying the gaps (NEITI, 2007). The team consists of 
representatives of core government agencies such as Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR), the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), the Federal 
Inland Revenue Services (FIRS), the Office of the Accountant General of the 
Federation (OAGF), and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). NEITI was mandated to 
coordinate the remediation effort. The team thereafter developed a comprehensive 
remediation programme, which was also approved for implementation. The 
remediation plan covers five key areas: developing a revenue-flow interface among 
government agencies; improving Nigeria’s oil and gas metering infrastructure; 
developing a uniform approach to cost determination; building human and physical 
capacities of critical government agencies; and improving overall governance of the 
oil and gas sector ( NEITI website). 
 
However, as at the time of this report, it w as difficult to confirm the impact of the 
remediation exercise on the overall management of the extractives sector. The best 
way to confirm the impacts would be perhaps in subsequent audits because the 
remediation of the findings of the 1999-2004 which was published in 2006 would 
reflect in the 2006 audits which are yet to be conducted as at the time of writing up 
this chapter. However, there have been reports of improvement in a number of areas. 
Regarding the audit findings of deficiencies in crude oil metering infrastructure, the 
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NEITI commissioned a comprehensive study of the metering infrastructure in 2009 
titled “The Nigerian Oil and Gas Upstream and Downstream Sector Measurement 
(Metering Infrastructure) and Handling Study” by Telemetry Nigeria Ltd, an 
indigenous company specializing in custody transfer accuracy measurement, oil and 
gas measuring equipment installation, calibration and verification in the oil /gas 
industry in Nigeria (Telemetry Website)45. Although, the details of the report of this 
study were yet to be made public as at the time of writing up t his chapter, the 
erstwhile NEITI Secretary, commenting on the study, hinted that “the era where 
Nigerians do not know how many barrels of oil is produced will become history when 
these recommendations [of the study] are implemented” (NEITI Website46).  NNPC 
has also conducted a study of its products pipeline network and it was reported that  
“its $15 million plan includes replacing 33 sections of pipeline between Atlas Cove 
and Mosimi, and other sections between Port Harcourt and Abia” (NEITI 2009:35). 
 
Some observers do not seem to be impressed with the progress of remediation so far 
made. Ikubaje (2006) thinks that “the willingness to correct what the NEITI audit 
reports found to be wrong with the Nigeria oil sector remains one of the greatest 
challenges to the Nigerian government” (2006: 66-67). There is a widespread 
perception across the interviewees for this study that the IMTT set up to implement 
the remediation of the audit findings has not been effective. In fact, one of the leading 
CSOs in the resource revenue transparency campaign recommends that the IMTT 
“should be disbanded and a new one to be headed by the EFCC [Economic and 
                                                 
45 Telemetry Nigeria Ltd website http://www.telemetryng.com/industry_History.html  Accessed 
03/03/2010 
46  Mallam Haruna Yunusa Saeed, Executive Secretary, NEITI Speech at the High Level Stakeholder 
Roundtable 01/04/2010 
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Financial Crimes Commission] set up with NEITI serving as Secretary of the Team.” 
(NDEBUMOG 2010:29). However, one interviewee believes that:  
 
“The inability of NEITI management to assert itself and demand 
accountability from erring companies has been the main reason why a lot of 
things have been swept under the carpet in recent times” (Interviewee No. 14). 
 
However, a great deal of the lapses uncovered by the audits is expected to be 
addressed by the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) currently being deliberated 
in the National Assembly. Although the PIB has attracted enormous opposition 
especially from the IOCs, proponents are optimistic that the bill would be passed, and 
when passed, is capable of ushering in a new era of a more efficient, and transparent 
management of the sector. Again, some interviewees feel that even if the PIB is 
passed, the greater challenge would be in the proper implementation of the dictates of 
the law which promises to overhaul the management of the sector, especially the 
state-owned oil company – the NNPC. 
 
NEITI Audits and Achieving Resource Revenue Transparency: An Analysis 
 
The NEITI audits are targeted as instruments for observing and monitoring the 
activities and behaviour of the key agents in resource revenue management. It is 
expected to address the information asymmetry between the agents: the government 
and companies; and the principals - the Nigerian population, in the management of 
resource revenue.  T herefore, the information provided by the audits is expected to 
empower the citizens to request the agents to give account of their stewardship and 
hence ensure a b etter management of resource revenue. The general belief is that 
accountability is the important issue, and transparency is only one aspect of this 
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(Kolstad and Soreide 2009:224). The key question therefore is: how effective are the 
NEITI audits in engendering resource revenue transparency and accountability? We 
examine the strong points of the audit, as well the impediments towards its 
effectiveness in achieving the desired objectives of resource revenue transparency and 
accountability. 
 
Many analysts believe that because the audits are unprecedented in Nigeria, they 
would arguably have far reaching impacts, if sustained. The audits attempt to open up 
discussions and create public knowledge on what was hitherto a ‘no-go area’. One 
interviewee acknowledged this impact of the audits stating that: 
 
“Today, everything is in the open. One would visit websites and see 
operational processes and actual figures and data about oil companies' 
operations, which was not the case before” (Interviewee No. 41). 
 
The disappointment often expressed about the financial audits notwithstanding, the 
physical and process audit reports are quite revealing. They seem to be the more 
significant audits especially because rather than focusing on pa yments made, they 
address the key question of ‘what ought to be paid’. Critiques believe that a narrow 
focus on payments, as encouraged by the global EITI, would reveal little and hence 
not deliver the desired results towards resource transparency. Probing how the 
payment figures are arrived at reveals fundamental and institutionalised structures that 
undermine effective management of the extractives sector.  
 
However, many believe that the failure of the audits to address the area of contracts 
leaves a huge gap. It is widely believed that the mismanagement of the sector often 
begins from the contract deals which are always kept secret. Shaxson (2009) 
220 
 
expresses doubts that the more sensitive issues about contract transparency would 
ever be covered by the NEITI Audits. He notes that the initiative: 
 
“... for all its good intentions, so often finds obstacles put in its way once it 
starts to touch on an issue of real significance ... NEITI cannot easily force 
change; it c an only fit into the political environment that already exists” 
(2009:36). 
 
Furthermore, as at 2010, only the audits of the periods 1999-2004, and 2005 have 
been conducted. That leaves a backlog of 5 years yet undone. This makes it difficult 
to assess the impact of the remediation done so far. As a result, the two audits so far 
conducted only serve the purpose of revealing the deficiencies in the management of 
the extractives and do not reflect the impact of NEITI because they are for periods 
predating the implementation of NEITI. For instance, the auditors noted in the 2005 
audit report that they: 
 
“...previously recommended steps that PPMC should take to improve their 
capacity to report to NEITI and also for management purposes. It should be 
noted that our recommendations were made at the conclusion of the NEITI 
1999-2004 audit, at which time it would have been too late for PPMC to take 
any action that would improve the 2005 situation; accordingly, the recurrence 
of these findings and recommendations is not surprising (NEITI, 2009:15). 
 
Although some analysts interpret this recurrence as a lack of remediation effort 
(Young, 2009) while in fact the first audit (1999-2004) was published in 2006. 
However, further audits going forward would be crucial in assessing the impact of 
NEITI as they should reflect efforts at remediation of the previous audit findings. 
CSO leaders have requested that: 
 
“…efforts need to be made so that NEITI’s yearly audit reports come out on 
time, rather than through a backlog of so many years, and at points when 
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specific issues of revenue inflow and utilization are no longer very topical in 
the public’s memory. It is imperative to follow the spirit of the NEITI Act that 
mandates the audit to be conducted within six months of the previous auditing 
year (CISLAC, 2009: unpaginated47).  
 
There are also disappointments expressed by majority of the interviewees on the 
minimal financial discrepancies revealed by the financial audits. In fact, the 
differences appear to be within the acceptable margin of error for such audits 
according to international accounting standards. This many believe is misleading 
because in the same periods audited, there were plenty of allegations of fraud and 
mismanagement within the sector. It is surprising therefore, that the audits failed to 
uncover substantial financial discrepancies. More so, there were suggestions that parts 
of the audit findings might have been withheld. A CSO actively involved in the 
NEITI implementation alleged that: 
 
“NEITI’s NSWG withheld and froze some (sensitive) elements of the report 
for reasons not known by the larger Civil Society partners of NEITI and 
against principles of the EITI global family at a time Nigeria is in dire need of 
EITI Validation” (NDEBUMOG 2010:4). 
 
Some interviewees also think that the failure of the financial audit to reveal 
substantial financial differences makes it difficult to ‘name and shame’ corrupt 
government and company agents (Interview nos. 21 and 31). An exercise which many 
believe would raise the profile of NEITI in the fight against corruption and resource 
revenue transparency. Since the release of the audit reports no hi gh profile case of 
punishment of indicted officials and or companies have been recorded. It is argued 
that: 
 
                                                 
47 Communique issued at the end of a Civil Society Organisation Workshop organised by CISLAC on 
the  7th of July, 2009 
222 
 
“…transparency is not sufficient in itself for reducing corruption; credible 
sanctions of corrupt officials are also required. In countries where democratic 
institutions are weak, and the ability of other agents to sanction or punish the 
misappropriation of funds is low, more information is in itself unlikely to 
result in improvements in the behaviour of public officials. (Kolstad and 
Soreide 2009:223) 
 
Many interviewees for this study were sceptical about the ability of NEITI to 
effectively carry out the ‘naming and shaming’ function expected of the initiative 
(Interview nos. 11, 14 – 27, and 31 ). In a public event organised by NEITI it was 
acknowledged in a statement that: 
 
“NEITI has the power to implement sanctions on c ompanies that fail to 
comply with the law but the enforcement of this power is impeded by political 
implications. NEITI currently carries out Alternative Dispute Resolutions 
before any matter is instituted in court. (NEITI, 2009: upaginated48) 
 
Finally, the vital role of the audits in achieving resource revenue transparency would 
be greatly undermined if the audit reports are not properly communicated to the wider 
stakeholders, and if there are no clear channels for citizens to respond to the findings 
of the audits. It was observed that contrary to popular reports that the NEITI audit 
reports ignited “a significant outcry at the signs of mismanagement and corruption” 
(Haufler, 2010:68), the knowledge of the audit findings was only popular among the 
political elites and few CSO who participate in the NEITI implementation. The 
majority of the Nigerian population is largely unaware of the details of the audit 
reports. This however, highlights that there is possibly a problem with the 
communication strategy in place for the NEITI implementation. 
                                                 
48 Report on the NEITI South East Road Show held on the 13th of November, 2009. www.neiti.org.ng 
accessed 20/06/2010. 
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6.4.2 Communication Strategy/Feedback Mechanism 
 
Information dissemination is critical to achieving the objectives of NEITI. It is 
important therefore to establish a clear and elaborate strategy for communicating with 
stakeholders and obtaining feedback from key and wider stakeholders. The global 
EITI advocates that “it will be important to ensure that outreach includes smaller 
companies and civil society organisations; and that outreach extends beyond the 
capital city to include regionally based organisations” (EITI 2005:21). 
 
Designing an appropriate strategy for communication is one of the greatest challenges 
to the implementation of the initiative in Nigeria. In 2005, Goldwyn International 
Services LLC, the Advisors to NEITI, designed a fairly comprehensive 
Communication Strategy for the NEITI implementation. This document, which is 
available on the NEITI website, contains a framework which could enable NEITI to 
effectively communicate its programmes and activities to the general public. 
However, it was observed that this framework has not been fully implemented, and 
Asobie, the NEITI Chairman acknowledged in an interview for this study that an 
elaborate communication strategy for NEITI implementation was still lacking and 
would be addressed in the next phase of the implementation of the initiative 
(Interview no. 1).  
 
We identify two clear channels of communication which seem to be critical to the 
implementation of the NEITI: communication between the NSWG members and their 
constituencies; and that between the NEITI and the general public. NEITI has so far 
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relied on a  number of activities to carry out its function of information disclosure. 
Some of these activities include print publications, road shows, consultative forums, 
town hall meetings, and the NEITI Website. While it h as achieved some progress 
through these channels, it is evident that there exists a huge gap in the knowledge and 
awareness of the general public about NEITI programmes and activities. 
 
The road shows for instance, are organised periodically on the basis of geopolitical 
zones. A road show event features presentations by NEITI officials and resource 
persons drawn from the academia and industry; interactive question and answer 
sessions; and sometimes drama presentations in local language depicting the ideals of 
NEITI. The road shows appear to be the most popular public event of the NEITI and 
the NEITI Chairman describes it as: 
 
“a stakeholders outing meant to stimulate public evaluation of the work of 
NEITI; its main purpose is to explain to the people what the NEITI is 
established for; its main activities, how such activities can impact on the lives 
of the people; and also to solicit external input for improvement and greater 
social relevance. Through it, we explain to Nigerians what we do and how we 
do it. Then we also learn how what we do is perceived, and understand how to 
do it even better next time. In road shows, NEITI listens proactively to absorb 
and appreciate what Federal, State and Local authorities, the private sector, 
and civil society organizations in different zones, have been doing, the 
challenges they face, and the progress they have made in the application of 
resources from the extractive industries, and in holding government to account 
in that respect. The road show is, in short, an opportunity for mutual 
communication in furtherance of Nigerian development” (NEITI website49). 
 
Sometimes, the road shows are focused on achieving specific objectives. For example, 
the road show for the South East geo-political zone held on the 3rd of November, 2009 
was: 
 
                                                 
49 NEITI Website, www.neiti.org.ng accessed 15/08/2010 
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“…was to present the report of the 2005 Audit … to the state governments and 
people of the geo-political zone, to create the necessary awareness among the 
citizens on the events within the Nigerian Extractive Sector and the work on 
NEITI” (NEITI website50). 
 
However, many interviewees for this study admitted that the road shows can only 
achieve very minimal impact. First, the road shows are organised at major cities in the 
geopolitical zones. This means that the road shows are poorly attended and the 
majority of the attendees are usually the elite. Second, they are predominantly 
conducted in English and involve presentations that are considered complex for the 
apprehension of rural illiterate citizens even if they were to attend. This further 
reinforces the view that “the discussion about oil revenue transparency is largely 
confined to elite circles” (Müller, 2010:36). 
 
In addition to its own internal communication activities, the NEITI relies heavily on 
participating NGOs to disseminate information on t he initiative through their 
publications and programmes such as workshops and seminars (sometimes funded by 
NEITI). These NGOs are in turn limited by resources in what they can achieve. 
Moreover, the information they disseminate to the public are sometimes subject to 
their own perception and interpretation of the NEITI agenda which sometimes vary.  
 
It was further observed that that there was no c lear channel of communication and 
feedback between representatives on the NSWG board and their constituencies. This 
creates a huge gap in implementation as stakeholders are not properly involved in the 
implementation of the initiative. There is need for representatives of the government 
agencies, companies and the Civil Society to have a clear platform for communicating 
                                                 
50 NEITI Website, www.neiti.org.ng accessed 10/05/2010 
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agreements reached at the NSWG to their constituencies. A senior staff of the FIRS 
interviewed for this study reckons that only about 5% of the entire staff of the agency 
might be aware of the NEITI and its activities (Interviewee No. 6). The 
representatives of civil society also lack a platform to communicate decisions and 
obtain feedback. A writer observed that:  
 
“A 2006 report on EITI said that there was no mechanism for the civil society 
representatives on t he NSWG to report back to larger civil society and 
insufficient civil society consultation in the design of the work plan and the 
reporting formats” (Shaxson 2009:4-5). 
 
Publication and Disclosure of Audit Reports 
 
The publication of the audit reports appears to be the most crucial part of the audits, 
and hence of the NEITI implementation. The audit, important as it may be, would 
have little or no e ffect on resource revenue transparency if they are not adequately 
communicated to the eventual consumers – the public. Many interviewees agree that 
the audit reports are not adequately publicised, and they are not in the best form that 
majority of the citizens can comprehend (Interview nos. 14 – 25). A writer also notes 
that: 
 
“NEITI did not disseminate the audit results widely enough and in an 
appropriate format that could reach the wider population, e.g. via radio or in a 
local vernacular. A lot more effort in this direction would therefore be needed 
to reach ordinary people in the Niger Delta” (Muller, 2010:36). 
 
However, a number of CSOs participating in the NEITI have taken up the challenge 
of re-presenting the audits in different publications and disseminating information to 
the public. However, a number of these materials found still contain information just 
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as they appear in the audit reports, albeit in abridged versions. In terms of appealing 
to the majority of the rural dwellers who are mostly illiterate, these materials arguably 
do not achieve any better results. Some CSOs also organise Town Hall meetings, 
workshops and seminars to enlighten attendants on t he audit findings. Some 
interviewees agree that these strategies guarantee better results because it allows a 
face-to-face interaction and sometimes, they are conducted in local languages, and 
attendants have the opportunity to ask questions and receive clarifications (Interview 
nos. 14, 15, 17, and 31). However, it was also noted that attendants at such events are 
also limited owing to a number of reasons including limited financial and human 
resources, accessibility to venues, and the general apathy of the public (Interview nos 
16, 21, and 24). Some other CSOs, for instance CISLAC and the National Democratic 
Institute, go a step further to organise technical workshops which would include 
enlightenment and training on the audit reports for national and state legislators and 
other CSOs (Interview nos. 14 and 25). 
 
Apart from the discrepancies in payments and receipts, the audit reports contain 
ample information on the operations of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria and would 
be a substantial source of education to majority of the citizens who often rely on 
speculations about the industry. A Nigerian journalist notes that: 
“As an oil journalist I have struggled for years to understand what is going on 
in the Nigerian oil industry. For the first few years, there was no information 
on how things were supposed to work on t axation, measuring oil and gas 
production, and crude pricing and marketing. The audit put the processes and 
data out there for the first time, and highlighted gaps needing urgent attention. 
From that perspective, it was like gold. However, in that format, it was like a 
forest, and had limited value to ordinary Nigerian citizens. You needed total 
dedication and a lot of time to make sense of it a ll, and to make it 
comprehensible to the intelligent layperson” (Christina Katsouris quoted in 
Shaxson 2009:5-6). 
 
228 
 
Therefore, the limited communication framework for the NEITI seems to hinder 
implementation a great deal. To achieve its objective of resource revenue 
transparency and accountability, NEITI requires an elaborate framework for 
communication and feedback that would take into account the local conditions of the 
Nigerian society and also the characteristics of both key and wider stakeholders.  
 
6.5 The Research Question Revisited 
 
The research question addressed in this chapter is: how and why does the governance 
structure influence the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency? 
Evidence analysed in this chapter strongly supports the assertion that the governance 
structure of a co llective action is crucial to its effectiveness. In the NEITI example, 
achieving resource transparency would require some far-reaching reforms that can 
only happen with the commitment of government. Government leadership of the 
NEITI process was hence imperative but this invariable translated to government 
domination of the initiative. The evidence shows that government tends to take full 
advantage of the inevitability of its involvement in MSIs for GNPGs provision to take 
control of the implementation process. NEITI is implemented as an agency 
established under the Presidency (see section 6.2.1). This objective is further 
maintained through the institutions and processes designed for the implementation of 
NEITI. For instance, the composition of the governing board of NEITI, the NSWG, is 
dominated by government representatives, and in fact all appointments onto this 
board, including representatives of other stakeholders, are made by the President. The 
NEITI Act, the law enacted for the implementation of NEITI further institutionalises 
this government dominance and includes clauses that specifically protect government 
and business interests from undue exposure (see section 6.3.2).  
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Evidence analysed in this chapter shows that the governance structure of NEITI 
hampers the effectiveness of the initiative. For instance, the public perception of 
NEITI as a government agency diminishes the confidence of the public and hence the 
chances of stimulating wider public demand for accountability as envisaged for the 
initiative. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have explored the governance structure and processes of NEITI 
and how these shape the implementation of the initiative in Nigeria. A significant 
conclusion from the analysis of available evidence is that the resultant governance 
framework of a MSI tends to reflect the character and aspirations of the dominant 
stakeholders. In the Nigerian EITI, the governance structure is designed to ensure 
government control of the implementation and to guarantee that it does not lead to a 
negative outcome for the political elite and their business counterparts in the Nigerian 
extractive industry. The evidence from the design and implementation of the NEITI 
implementation has key revelations about the organisation of collective action for the 
provision of ‘globalised national public goods’. Again, available evidence reveals the 
strength of the perception of stakeholders of the incentives and disincentives of 
resource transparency on the implementation and effectiveness of collective action. 
For example, political leaders take full advantage of the seeming indispensability of 
the role of government in the NEITI implementation to ensure that their interests (and 
that of their industry partners) are not threatened by any undesirable outcome of the 
NEITI implementation. Hence, this implies that the effectiveness of the initiative in 
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achieving the objectives of resource transparency and accountability is heavily 
dependent on the political will and aspirations of the government of the day. 
 
The argument is that the heavy government dominance defines the rest of the 
implementation of the NEITI. The landmark achievements recorded in the early years 
of the initiative seem to be linked to the overall commitment of the government of the 
day towards reform and the eagerness to convince key international institutions of its 
commitment to reforms especially in the pursuit of debt relief and the attraction of 
foreign investment. The NEITI at the time sought to go beyond the minimum 
prescriptions of the global EITI on payments disclosure to venture into such issues as 
contracts, licensing and even expenditure transparency. However, beyond that period, 
the implementation was less decisive especially in the determination of ‘what ought to 
be paid’ as opposed to ‘what is paid’ as revealed by the discussions on the focus of 
the NEITI audits (see section 6.4.1).  
 
Therefore, there are clear indications that factors within the local environment, 
important as they seem, are insufficient in explaining the determinants of the 
effectiveness of NEITI. The following chapter explores the possible influences on the 
effectiveness of NEITI exerted by actors and factors outside the Nigerian local 
environment. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
ON NEITI 
 
“With lateral thinking one realizes that a pattern cannot be restructured from within 
itself but only as the result of some outside influence” (Edward de Bono, 1970:41). 
7.1 Introduction 
 
When Edward de Bono made the above remark in his book he may have been strictly 
explaining his concept of lateral thinking. Arguably, the unfolding trend in the 
provision of ‘globalised national public goods’ (GNPGs) appears to be conforming to 
this statement. In the campaign for resource revenue transparency (RRT), there seems 
to be an overwhelming recognition that “because many governments that have 
endorsed EITI suffer from weak or even collapsed governance structures, robust 
international support is necessary to help these states implement the initiative” (RWI 
2006:19). Evidence from the preceding chapters suggests that given the inherent 
factors within resource-rich (developing) countries, achieving resource revenue 
transparency without some external influence is very unlikely.  However, the critical 
questions to be considered are: how much external influence is required to engender 
the desired level of resource transparency provision? How best can external influence 
be applied? And to what extent does it influence the provision of resource 
transparency?  
 
In this chapter therefore, we explore the specific external actors and institutions that 
influence the way that the NEITI is implemented, how they achieve this and the 
reasons that make external influence seemingly inevitable especially at this stage of 
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the initiative. However, it is  also likely that external influence on local 
implementation could, much as it is necessary, present some challenges to the 
effectiveness of NEITI. This chapter identifies the various sources of external 
influence on the NEITI, explores the means through which they exert influence on the 
implementation of the initiative and also attempts to measure their impact on the 
outcome of the initiative.  
 
This chapter is arranged in six sections. In section 7.2 we identify the key external 
factors that have considerable influence on the NEITI implementation, and in section 
7.3 we examine their roles in the NEITI implementation. Section 7.4 e xplores the 
justifications for external involvement in the local implementation of the initiative. 
Section 7.5 analyses the challenges that external factors present to the NEITI 
implementation and the impact of these challenges on the effectiveness of NEITI. 
Section 7.6 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Identifying the External Actors 
 
As earlier highlighted (in chapter 4), Nigeria’s strategic significance to global energy 
security attracts considerable foreign interest. From the onset, Nigeria’s participation 
in the EITI was considered very strategic to the global EITI campaign. So for a 
chance of achieving a greater reach for the EITI, NEITI’s successful implementation 
was vital to the proponents of EITI. Nevertheless, given her enormous crude oil 
reserve, Nigeria is also significant to the energy security considerations of a number 
of key countries especially the home countries of the major IOCs. A better managed 
extractive sector, apart from the prospects of socio-economic development of the 
country, would also ensure a favourable atmosphere for IOCs to further their 
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businesses. At the time of launching the EITI, the former UK Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair admitted that: 
 
“Better openness and accountability are essential to securing the stability and 
prosperity that the developing world needs, and on which our mutual business 
success depends” (Hilson and Maconachie 2009:56). 
 
Nigeria’s close ties with the United States (US) and Europe, and more recently with 
the emerging Asian key players – China, South Korea and India are quintessentially 
defined by its huge oil and gas potential (Vines, 2007).  Hence, the NEITI offers an 
opportunity to improve the management of the Nigerian extractives industry, and as 
such enjoys the support of the home country governments of the IOCs. Thus, with the 
objectives of the EITI closely tied to the management of natural resource wealth, the 
NEITI implementation was considered crucial. An observer remarks that: 
 
“NEITI is central to the energy question in Nigeria, particularly in light of the 
failure to channel massive oil and gas revenues to the benefit of national 
development” (The Bretton woods Project Website51).  
 
In effect, some external actors have seized the opportunity that the EITI presents to 
further their interests and agenda in the implementing countries. Beyond financial 
contributions to the multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) administered by the World Bank, 
a number of countries have also made direct contributions to the implementation of 
the initiative especially in Nigeria. Sometimes, external support for NEITI is 
subsumed in harmonised development assistance programmes of multiple donors such 
as the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) - a funding arrangement that includes the World 
Bank, DFID, USAID and the African Development Bank (AfDB). In the current CSP 
                                                 
51 http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-561198 
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for the period 2010-2013 these partners jointly account for over 80% of Nigeria’s 
development assistance (World Bank, 2009). However, the key actors who influence 
the implementation of NEITI are discussed below under the following 4 categories of 
external actors: the global EITI, bilateral donors, multilateral donors, and the global 
Civil Society. 
7.2.1 NEITI and the Global EITI 
 
The global EITI maintains a relationship with the country EITI governing leadership 
and secretariats to ensure that the initiative is implemented according to the agreed 
principles and criteria. In addition, the global EITI also provides some funding and 
technical support to local EITI implementation. These activities are coordinated 
through the EITI Secretariat based in Oslo, Norway. The local EITI executive is also 
responsible to the global EITI Secretariat for purposes of monitoring and reporting. 
However, the validation exercise, the quality assurance mechanism of the EITI, 
appears to be the greatest influence that the EITI wields on t he implementing 
countries (see section 7.3.1). 
 
The NEITI, through its national coordinators, maintains a close link with the 
international Secretariat and the Board of the EITI. This is done through periodic 
meetings, conferences, and reports on the progress of the local implementation of the 
initiative (Interview nos. 1 and 3). The Board of the EITI, through the Secretariat and 
dedicated committees, reviews the validation and progress reports of implementing 
countries and takes decision on the country status, and may sometimes revoke a 
country’s membership status. Hence, the global EITI wields considerable control over 
the outcome of the implementation of NEITI. In October, 2010 after an unsatisfactory 
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review of NEITI’s validation report, the board refused to elevate Nigeria to a 
‘compliant’ status but gave the country an ultimatum of six (6) months to rectify 
identified irregularities.  
 
However, before the failed validation bid, the EITI secretariat had helped to boost 
NEITI’s profile with its very high recommendations of NEITI’s activities and 
achievements (Goldwyn, 2006 a nd 2008; EITI Website, 2007). Despite obvious 
anomalies in implementation, the global EITI approved NEITI’s progress and only 
seemed to notice irregularities during the review of the validation report. It promoted 
NEITI as a flag bearer for the global initiative and a model for other implementing 
and prospective countries. Some people in Nigeria believed that the essence and drive 
for implementation may have been lost in the overwhelming recommendation that the 
NEITI often received which created the false appearance that the initiative was being 
properly implemented (Interview Nos. 31 follow up, and 43). However, with a number 
of countries achieving compliant status ahead of Nigeria, NEITI appears to have lost 
its ‘pride of place’.  
 
7.2.2 NEITI and Bilateral Donors 
 
The bilateral donors that have significant influence on NEITI implementation are 
mainly the home country governments of the IOCs operating in Nigeria. The United 
Kingdom and United States governments, through their development agencies, 
dominate foreign assistance to the NEITI implementation.  T his is because through 
support to their IOCs, these countries had established prior long standing relationships 
with the Nigerian government. However, while the DFID has been active from 
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inception, the USAID became active only in recent years. Other countries such as 
Norway, Canada, France, Germany, and Spain have also contributed in various ways 
towards the resource revenue transparency campaign in Nigeria. Beyond financial 
contributions, there are various ways through which NEITI receives support from 
bilateral donors. For instance: 
 
“Supporting governments ... pr omote more effective resource revenue 
management by providing policy advice and technical assistance to host 
country governments, consistent with EITI principles, and encouraging ... 
multinational companies to participate in EITI and disclose company 
payments by country of operation” (Natural Resources Canada Website52).  
 
 
Bilateral donors clearly understand the need to support NEITI in the drive for 
resource revenue transparency in Nigeria. Relations between Western countries and 
resource-rich developing countries are often underlined by the overwhelming interests 
in energy security. The form and extent of these interventions could be sometimes 
intriguing. A typical illustration is the British government’s alleged involvement in 
the release of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, the convicted Libyan Lockerbie 
bomber, on compassionate grounds. Despite government’s denial of any complicity, 
there was wide spread suspicion that: 
 
“..the release was the direct result of deals done in the desert between Tony 
Blair and Colonel Muamar Gadaffi, the Libyan leader, deals subsequently 
refined by British government ministers… to allow BP to explore for oil off 
the Libyan coast … to further Britain’s commercial interests in the country” 
(“Time to Shine Light on a Murky Deal” The Sunday Times 30/08/2009 p20). 
 
However, unlike the Libyan example, the EITI presents a safe and rather subtle 
opportunity for the UK and other Western countries to influence decisions in 
                                                 
52 http://www.eiti.nrcan.gc.ca/role/gove-eng.php 
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resource-rich countries by first showing support for the global EITI and also 
encouraging and supporting local implementation of the initiative. The global EITI is 
supported by a number of countries and as at end of 2010, there were 17 supporting 
countries most of which are OECD countries53. The global EITI expects these 
countries, among other things, to:  
“... encourage resource-rich countries, through diplomatic and commercial 
channels, to implement the EITI. And also to consider providing technical 
support in resource management to implementing countries which have low 
technical capacity. ... And also to finance the international management of the 
EITI and the World Bank-administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund. (EITI, 
200554 )”. 
 
To this end, the NEITI has been influenced by a number of home country 
governments of the International Oil Companies (IOCs) operating in Nigeria. 
Notably, the UK and the US have been at the forefront of the external support for 
NEITI, through their respective development agencies.  
 
i. The United Kingdom/ Department for International Development (DFID) 
For the global EITI, the UK government has played a vital role. The initiative was 
first mooted by former Prime Minister Tony Blair, and ever since the UK government 
has been supporting the implementation of the initiative, especially in strategic 
countries such as Nigeria. Most of UK government’s inputs into the NEITI process 
are through the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Since 
inception, the DFID has taken a ‘strong lead’ in supporting the NEITI, and in the 
process has had much influence on the implementation. Through the DFID, the UK 
government has provided enormous financial and technical support to the NEITI: 
                                                 
53 Qatar is the only non-OECD country supporting the EITI as at end of 2010. 
54 http://eiti.org/supporters/countries 
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“DFID has supported Nigeria's adoption of EITI with £3 m illion over four 
years. The DFID Minister told us that "we are probably the leading partners 
supporting the establishment" of NEITI” (UK Parliament Website55).  
 
The DFID support for NEITI has been in phases. Phases I and II, which lasted from 
2004 – 2009 focused on the launch and institutionalisation of the NEITI structure. 
Contract for a third phase of support which is aimed at expanding the reach and 
impact of NEITI is billed to start in 2011. This third phase which would be operated 
as a Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER) is expected to last for 5 years and 
would cost about £9 million pounds (Interviewees nos. 37 and 38). 
 
The UK government through the DFID has also provided funding for the NEITI 
Secretariat, including the payment of staff salaries, from inception up until 2009. In a 
recent review of DFID’s programme in Nigeria, the International Development 
Committee of the UK House of Commons admitted that DFID’s support to NEITI 
“has made a significant contribution to increasing accountability in the use of oil 
revenues and recommended that: 
 
“DFID take every opportunity to apply pressure to the Nigerian Government 
to prioritise oil industry reform measures, including publication of data on the 
contribution which oil revenues make to public finances and on the 
programmes which oil revenues fund, and the separation of oil from politics. 
These measures should also include provision of adequate resources to NEITI 
to build upon i ts excellent work to date and full co-operation with NEITI in 
the provision of data to ensure that publication of the audits for 2006-08 can 
be expedited” (House of Commons, “DFID’s Programme in Nigeria: 
Government Response to Committee’s 8th Report of Session 2008-2009”56,).  
 
                                                 
55http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmintdev/840/84008.
htm  
 
56 www.parliament.uk accessed 23/09/2010 
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ii. The United States /United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
 
With the enactment of the two laws mandating its companies to disclose payments 
made to foreign governments (and their agencies) for extractive activities, the US 
Government demonstrated its commitment to the campaign for resource transparency, 
which was lacking at the onset of the global campaign. However, the realisation of the 
significance of RRT to energy security may have prompted the USG to show greater 
commitment to the global campaign: 
 
“The US feels the immense pressure of the growing energy security concerns 
especially as substantial amount of its imports is from fragile states... With this 
pressure comes a growing commitment towards the improvement of good 
governance in these countries and the EITI is also … recognised as an 
opportunity to further the objective of ensuring transparency and 
accountability as a means of securing sources of energy supply to the US” 
(Global Witness, 2007:2). 
 
However, despite the US government’s late support for the EITI, it is  important to 
note that the USAID in Nigeria has been supporting NEITI implementation right from 
inception: 
 
“…prior to this increased interest in EI transparency, the USAID’s broad 
programme in Nigeria covered capacity building of civil society organisations, 
some of whom were actively involved in the implementation of the NEITI. 
That way, the USG has been, though indirectly, actively involved in the NEITI 
implementation” (Goldwyn, 2006:6).  
 
Through USAID-funded projects in Nigeria such as PACT and Advocacy Awareness 
and Civic Empowerment (ADVANCE), some CSOs involved in the NEITI 
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implementation (such as CISLAC) have received financial and technical assistance to 
execute their programmes and activities (Interview no. 14). 
7.2.3 NEITI and Multilateral Institutions 
 
Several multilateral institutions have publicly declared their support for the EITI and 
the global EITI has also relied on the soft powers that these institutions wield to 
expand the reach of the initiative. For instance, the UN, the G8, the G20 and regional 
multilateral organisations have played crucial roles in promoting the EITI as a key 
institution in the campaign for resource transparency. However, a number of these 
institutions have been more directly involved in the local implementation of the 
initiative in Nigeria. The Bretton Woods institutions have particularly influenced 
implementation in Nigeria in a much deeper way. 
  
i. NEITI and The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
The IFIs play an important role in the country implementation of the EITI. The EITI 
proponents recognise and maximize the influence that IFIs have on resource-rich 
developing countries through their financial assistance and advisory roles (EITI, 
2010). It is believed that: 
 
“The involvement of these IFIs in large-scale projects is often seen as a vote of 
confidence by private investors and plays a key role in leveraging financing 
which is vital for project development” (EITI, 2010:1). 
 
In Nigeria, the World Bank and the IMF appear to have had the greatest influence on 
NEITI. The World Bank, for instance, has been instrumental to NEITI 
implementation through its administration of the MDTF and a dedicated resident 
consultant for NEITI implementation. On the other hand, NEITI implementation is 
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strongly linked to the cancellation of Nigeria’s huge debt overhang, which was 
facilitated by the IMF in 2006 (Okonjo-Iweala, 2008). EITI implementation suited the 
IFIs’ new emphasis on governance reforms. The fifth mandatory criterion for the 
implementation of EITI seems to be a subtle invitation for the active involvement of 
the IFIs: 
 
“A public, financially sustainable work plan ... with assistance from the 
international financial institutions where required, including measurable 
targets, a timetable for implementation, and an assessment of potential 
capacity constraints” (EITI, 2005). 
 
This requirement provides an entry point for the IFIs to have considerable influence 
on the implementation and outcome of the local EITI programmes. Overall, the global 
EITI expects that the IFIs should promote the EITI and the benefits of its 
implementation, provide technical assistance to implementing countries, and also 
make financial contributions to the initiative (EITI, 2010).  
 
ii. The World Bank and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) 
 
The World Bank’s support for EITI is underlined by the recommendations of the 
Extractive Industries Review (EIR) conducted in 2004. T he EIR inter alia had 
recommended that the World Bank should cease funding extractive industry projects 
especially in countries clearly lacking stability and good governance (Hilson and 
Maconachie 2009). However, the World Bank rather opted to “balance the often 
diverse views of many stakeholders including shareholder governments, civil society, 
and industry” (World Bank, 2004: iii). Hence, the World Bank agreed to continue to 
fund the extractive industry but:  
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“...will require revenue transparency as a condition for new investments in 
extractive industries – in line with …the EITI. For new large projects, we will 
require transparency immediately to ensure that revenues are properly and 
transparently accounted for; for smaller projects, we will expect it in  two 
years” (WB, 2004: iv). 
 
With this new emphasis on t ransparency and governance conditions for financial 
assistance, the EITI appears to suit the Bank’s changing policy thrust, who as a matter 
of policy are not allowed to interfere in political configurations of nation-states 
(Marquette, 2001; Hilson and Maconachie 2009). Therefore, the launch of the EITI 
was timely for the World Bank (Gillies, 2008) who maximized the opportunity to 
deflect criticism from the EIR and in “shifting the focus of the resource curse debate 
toward developing world governments” (Hilson and Maconachie 2009:55). 
 
Presently, the World Bank plays a significant role in the implementation of the EITI 
at country level especially through the administration of the MDTF. A Global Witness 
report acknowledges that: 
 
“The World Bank administration and management of the EITI Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund has been an important source of support to countries participating 
in the [EITI] Initiative” (Global Witness 2008:6). 
 
The MDTF offers a platform for a cross-section of countries and other multilateral 
institutions to identify with and show commitment towards the EITI and the global 
resource transparency campaign. As at 2010, the MDTF had received a total of $30.8 
million from 13 d ifferent contributors (see table 7.1). Therefore, while majority of 
these countries and institutions may not have direct contributions to the NEITI 
implementation, it is important to note that they have indirect influence through their 
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contributions to the MDTF. However, the figures also show that the United Kingdom 
and the United States jointly contribute about 40.6% of the total MDTF, and this trend 
in funding is also common in the NEITI as much as in most other implementing 
countries (EITI, 2010).  
 
Table 7.1 Donor Contributions to the World Bank MDTF 
   
   As of 30/03/2010    
S/No Donor 
Amount Incepted ($ 
Million) 
Amount 
Committed ($ 
Million) Total 
1 Australia (AUSAID) 1.2 0.0 1.2 
2 Belgium (DGDC) 0.7 0.0 0.7 
3 Canada (CIDA) 0.9 1.5 2.4 
4 EU (European Commission) 0.8 0.0 0.8 
5 Finland (MFA) 0.4 0.7 1.1 
6 France (MEFI) 1.6 0.0 1.6 
7 Germany (BMZ) 1.3 0.7 2.0 
8 The Netherlands (MDC) 1.5 0.0 1.5 
9 Norway (MFA) 1.2 0.2 1.4 
10 Spain (MFA) 2.2 1.5 3.7 
11 Switzerland (FDEA) 0.0 1.5 1.5 
12 United Kingdom (DFID) 6.5 0.0 6.5 
13 United States (USAID) 6.0 0.0 6.0 
14 Investment income 0.3 0.0 0.3 
  Total 24.657 6.1 30.7 
Source: Global EITI Website http://eiti.org/about/mdtf accessed on 30/11/2010 
                                                 
57 The total incepted amount as it appears on the source document is $24.7. There is a difference of 
$0.1million, even though the individual figures are the same. This is possibly a calculation error. 
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7.2.4 Global Civil Society 
 
The global Civil Society is arguably one of the greatest driving forces behind the 
global resource transparency campaign. NEITI implementation has also benefitted 
from the extensive activities and programmes of the global Civil Society. Also 
recognising Nigeria as strategic to the overall campaign, international NGOs and 
other Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) movements have been keen on providing 
support to the NEITI implementation, especially through the strengthening of local 
CSOs involved in the initiative. The global Civil Society’s activities in exposing 
corruption and mismanagement in such countries as Nigeria helped to highlight the 
global resource transparency campaign, and the emergence of the Publish What You 
Pay (PWYP) campaign also triggered the initiation of the EITI (discussed in Chapter 
3). 
 
The PWYP, through its local chapter, has been a rallying point for Civil Society 
action towards resource revenue transparency in Nigeria. The PWYP campaign in 
Nigeria may have been weakened by internal politics and lack of funding (discussed 
in Chapter 5), but with continued support from the global PWYP, they are still a force 
to reckon with in the RRT campaign in Nigeria (Interview nos. 20, 22, and 24 ). 
Likewise, a number of other international NGOs (INGOs) have been rendering 
invaluable support to the NEITI implementation in Nigeria which influences the 
implementation in no mean way. The global EITI is supported by about nine CSOs, 
most of which are also part of the global Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign. 
The domestic branches of these CSOs are involved in the NEITI implementation and 
receive support from their global headquarters. They receive funding and training 
which are essential for their effective participation in the NEITI implementation. 
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Some of the  global CSOs active in NEITI implementation include Oxfam GB, Oxfam 
Novib (provided the sum of 100,000 euros to PWYP Nigeria for its operations in the 
year 2008 (PWYP Nigeria, 2008:16), Open Society Initiative for West Africa 
(OSIWA), Revenue Watch Institute (RWI),  National Democratic Institute (NDI) and 
Transparency International. 
 
Particularly, Transparency International’s publications and the consistent poor 
ranking of Nigeria in the Corruption Perception Index were influential in igniting and 
sustaining the resource transparency campaign in Nigeria (Idemudia, 2009). President 
Obasanjo, Obiageli Ezekwesili (the first NEITI Chairperson), and Assissi Asobie (the 
current NEITI Chairman), all key personalities involved in the NEITI 
implementation; have all been involved in various capacities with the global 
Transparency International. It is believed that their linkages with the global 
transparency organisation influenced their commitment to NEITI implementation 
(Interview nos. 1, 20, and 24, 31).  
 
7.3 The Role of External Actors in NEITI Implementation  
 
The implementation of NEITI has been influenced by the actors identified above in a 
combination of ways. Beyond the initial pressure to sign up to the initiative, donors 
and the global CS have also been very active in implementing the NEITI. In a meeting 
with the Donor community in 2008, the NEITI Chairman, Asobie acknowledged that 
“NEITI wouldn’t have achieved much without the critical support from donors”. 
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(Asobie, 2008:unpaginated58).  Nigeria’s participation in the EITI is also often 
believed to be due to:  
 
“...pressures exerted by the donor and NGO communities to address the 
corruption associated with payments and revenues generated from oil 
production” (Hilson and Maconachie 2009:72). 
 
In the following sub-headings, we discuss the specific ways through which these 
actors influence the implementation and outcome of NEITI. In providing support and 
assistance to the NEITI implementation, these actors have contributed in no m ean 
way to the outcome of the initiative in Nigeria. Through their involvement, external 
actors create and alter incentives and disincentives in the local environment in order 
to shape the implementation of NEITI.  
 
7.3.1 Global EITI Validation 
 
In July 2005, an International Advisory Group (IAG), set up t o review the 
implementation of the EITI, recommended inter alia that a validation exercise should 
form part of the EITI country implementation. This recommendation was accepted by 
the EITI Board and a Validation Grid developed by the IAG was equally adopted. 
Since then Validation has become an essential instrument with which the global EITI 
ensures that country implementation of the initiative is in line with the agreed 
principles and criteria. Proponents believe that validation “safeguards the EITI brand 
by holding all EITI implementing countries to the same global standard” (EITI, 
200759). 
                                                 
58 http://www.neiti.org.ng/ 
59 http://eiti.org/validation 
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The decision to adopt Validation is perhaps underlined by the understanding of the 
need for a ‘ quality assurance mechanism’ for EITI as an international standard of 
good practice. Hemmati (2002) notes that: 
 
“There is general criticism of voluntary initiatives…as ‘talk shops’ and for 
being misused as legitimization while not having to do anything. Monitoring 
MSP follow-up is important; otherwise the process may not lead to much 
result” (Hemmati 2002:119). 
 
Bernstein and Cashore (2007) also argue that for international standard setting 
initiatives to be effective and capable of delivering the set objectives they must 
possess: 
 
“...mechanisms to verify compliance and to create consequences for non-
compliance. This feature means that, in effect, they develop mandatory 
standards for those who sign onto the system. The most common compliance 
mechanism is a third-party audit in which auditors ‘‘certify’’ firm or producer 
compliance with the rules or identify improvements required for a successful 
audit” (2007:350). 
 
Hence, Validation has enhanced the credibility and legitimacy of the EITI (Fransen 
and Kolk, 2007). Some observers believe that without validation “the EITI would be 
little different from the many well-meaning but ineffectual initiatives on governance 
that exist around the world” (Global Witness 2009:2). 
 
The EITI now requires that on s igning up t o the initiative implementing countries 
have two years from the time of signing up to undergo validation. A successful 
validation elevates a country from the ‘candidate’ status to ‘compliant’ status. 
Compliant countries would need to be validated every five years, or at the instance of 
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the EITI Board. However, for an unsuccessful validation exercise, a country may be 
suspended or have its membership revoked. As at December, 2010, o nly five (5) 
countries have attained a ‘compliant’ status following a successful review of their 
validation reports. These countries include Azerbaijan, Liberia, Mongolia, Ghana and 
Timor Leste (EITI, 2010). 
 
Effect of Validation on NEITI Implementation 
 
Nigeria conducted its first validation exercise between February, 2009 and February, 
2010, but failed to attain the much desired ‘compliant’ status because apparently a 
review of the validation report found some irregularities in the NEITI implementation. 
Based on those findings Nigeria’s status in the implementation of the initiative was 
decided as ‘close to compliant’ and was given a six (6) months ultimatum (from 
October, 2010) to rectify the findings. 
 
The validation exercise and its outcome have had considerable influence on N EITI 
and would probably define the shape of future implementation. As at the time of 
writing this chapter, a task force set up by the NEITI leadership has been working 
frantically to ensure that the findings are rectified by January 15, 2011, well ahead of 
the expiration of the ultimatum. For instance, an earlier date of January, 2011 agreed 
with the auditors for the submission of the report of the 2006 – 2008 NEITI audit (one 
of the outstanding issues) was brought forward to December 15, 2010 (NEITI, 2010 
http://www.neiti.org.ng/). There are indications that the NEITI leadership takes the 
validation exercise very seriously and prioritizes the achievement of compliant status 
as soon as possible. An insider remarked that: 
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“It is embarrassing that after the widely acclaimed leadership role of Nigeria 
in the implementation of the EITI, 5 countries have attained compliant status 
ahead of us. One would expect that Nigeria should be the first country to attain 
this status, at least among the participating African countries” (Interview no. 
5). 
 
The EITI Board’s decision shows that NEITI’s role in pioneering the initiative 
through its earlier achievements - notably the enactment of the NEITI law, and widely 
acclaimed comprehensive audits – was not sufficient to guarantee a favourable 
decision. With this decision, the EITI Board demonstrated some level of objectivity 
which is viewed by some observers as very critical to the credibility of the initiative. 
The Global Witness, a global Civil Society Organisation at the forefront of 
implementation of the EITI insists that: 
 
“Validation needs to be as objective and credible as possible. Any suggestion 
that a country has been given special treatment, for political or commercial 
reasons, would be fatal to the EITI’s credibility. It would also be deeply unfair 
to other Candidate countries which are making good-faith efforts to reach 
Compliance. So all EITI stakeholders must be ready to defend the objectivity 
of the Validation process, even if it produces results which are uncomfortable 
for some. This is the only way to protect the achievement of the EITI and give 
it value in the eyes of the world.” (Global Witness, 2009:2).   
 
Beyond the need to achieve compliance, the NEITI implementation also benefitted 
from the outcome of the validation exercise. In line with the recommendations of the 
Validation report, the capacity of the NEITI Secretariat has been strengthened from 
17 staff to 56 s taff including the appointment of three (3) directors and a new 
Secratery/Legal Adviser (NEITI, 2010). Therefore, the validation exercise and its 
outcome have helped to rekindle a wave of activities in NEITI implementation that 
had hitherto dwindled. 
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7.3.2 Funding  
 
The key question that often arises generally about the provision of GPGs (and more so 
for GNPGs) is about their financing (Sandler 2001; Anand 2004). The issue of 
funding for local EITI implementation also remains contentious. NEITI 
implementation is still substantially funded by external donors. The demand for 
national governments to fund EITI implementation (to enhance local ownership and 
sustainability) also raises some concerns about the independence of the initiative 
(though already undermined by the governance structure in the case of NEITI, as 
highlighted in chapter 6). This could be worsened by the inappropriate funding 
administration procedure associated with government funding which could sometimes 
derail implementation. 
 
Funding is a key channel through which donors influence the implementation of the 
NEITI. Since inception in 2004, N EITI has relied heavily on donor  funding for its 
programmes and activities. Key achievements, such as the NEITI audits, were 
executed with the funds provided by donors (Shaxson, 2009:23). Attracting and 
retaining competent and dedicated staff for the NEITI Secretariat is crucial to the 
successful implementation of the initiative. The DFID ensured this by funding the 
salaries of NEITI Board members and Secretariat staff from inception up until 2009 
(Shaxson 2009). A move that some observers believe could create some sustainability 
problems when government takes over this responsibility (Interview No. 31). 
 
NEITI has benefitted mostly from the World Bank administered MDTF and the DFID 
(Goldwyn, 2006). Together, they ensured a pool of funds that “was instrumental in 
helping NEITI to be established” (WB MDTF Management Committee, 2008:7). The 
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World Bank has three (3) established channels for providing financial support for the 
EITI implementation: the GDF, the MDTF and through budget contributions. While 
Nigeria has not received much support from the GDF60, it has benefitted immensely 
from the MDTF. Nigeria was “the first country to complete a Grant Agreement 
Program” (World Bank, 2008:5). The World Bank first phase of support (Phase I) for 
NEITI cost the sum of $2.2million. This represented 46.6% of all MDTF grant 
agreements with implementing countries as at March 2008. Another Grant Agreement 
for the sum of US$900,000 for Phase 2 was signed on February 4th, 2010 and would 
be utilized for deepening the NEITI implementation (Ruhl, 2010). 
 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 suggest that the funds provided by donors are often sufficient to 
cover key aspects of the local EITI implementation. NEITI Chairman, Asobie equally 
acknowledges that NEITI has had no funding challenges (Interview No. 1), thanks to 
the benevolence of donors. A World Bank report states that MDTF funds availed to 
implementation countries are usually overseen and approved by the national EITI 
Board and Secretariat and cover “major expenses such as hiring Administrators for 
EITI Reports and hiring vendors for capacity building programs for CSOs, and 
others” (World Bank, 2009:10).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Nigeria received only a total of USD10, 500 as GDF grant for the period 2005-2008 out of a total 
sum of USD1,104,277 disbursed to EITI implementing countries in the period, representing less than 
1% (0.95%) of the total amount disbursed even though 31.6% of the total amount was disbursed to 
implementing countries in the Africa region. 
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Table 7.2 Indicative Breakdown of MDTF Grants Usage for EITI Implementing 
Countries 
MDTF Grants Usage for EITI 
Countries 
  % 
Operational Support to 
Secretariat 35 
Awareness 
Raising/Communication 
Dissemination 21 
Capacity Building/Civil 
Society 17 
Capacity 
Building/Government 15 
Audit and 
Reconciliation 12 
Total 100 
 
Source: Engagement with Civil Society: An EITI implementation case study by 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) program Oil Gas and 
Mining Policy and Operations Unit (COCPO) World Bank Group, 2009) 
 
Table 7.3 Indicative Breakdown of MDTF grants usage - for Nigeria (NEITI)   
 
Indicative Breakdown of MDTF grants 
usage - for Nigeria (NEITI)  Currency  
  Amount % 
 Goods 290,000.00 13.1 
Consultant Services 625,000.00 28.2 
Training and Workshops 1,260,000.00 56.8 
Operating Cost 45,000.00 2.0 
NEITI Special Account 0.00 0.0 
 Total 2,220,000.00 100.0 
Source: Engagement with Civil Society: An EITI implementation case study by 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) program Oil Gas and 
Mining Policy and Operations Unit (COCPO) World Bank Group, 2009) 
 
There is also continued financial support for the NEITI towards deepening 
implementation. The donors recognize the need for a:  
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“principle of continued support for Nigeria to consolidate NEITI and, in 
particular to support a clear process of implementing remedial actions 
recommended in the EITI reports, both in the area of fiscal flows and oil 
physical process” (WB MDTF Management Committee, 2008:8). 
 
It is widely believed that without continued donor support the NEITI implementation 
could dwindle further and the gains of the initiative might be lost (interview nos. 1 
and 5). Even with the Federal Government total budgetary allocation of about 
N1.4billion (about $9 m illion) for the year 2010, donors have put in place funding 
programmes to assist the NEITI in consolidating and deepening its impact on resource 
revenue transparency. In 2010, The World Bank, through the MDTF, agreed a total of 
$1.8 million (spread in two equal halves of $0.9 m illion) for Phases II and III of 
support for NEITI. As earlier mentioned, the DFID Phase III programme takes the 
form of a Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER) targeted at the overall 
improvement of oil sector transparency but closely tied to complementing the efforts 
of NEITI. This project which would start in the first quarter of 2011 and cover a 
period of five (5) years and would also be focused on deepening the impact of NEITI. 
(interview no. 45). The World Bank is of the view that: 
 
“...donors have an opportunity to help consolidate NEITI accomplishments 
and thus help Nigeria (and donors) to optimize the return on their investment 
to date by supporting a clear program of NEITI implementation follow-up and 
expansion into mining” (WB MDTF Management Committee, 2008:7-8).  
 
In addition to funding, donors have equally influenced NEITI implementation through 
technical assistance and capacity building activities. DFID, for instance, has provided 
advice and support that facilitated the recruitment of suitably qualified and competent 
consultants for NEITI auditing and validation exercises.  For the first NEITI Audit 
conducted in 2006, the NEITI Secretariat sought assistance from the DFID “to place 
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adverts in the international editions of the Wall Street Journal and the Economist” the 
outcome of which was considered very crucial to the success of the audit exercise 
(NEITI, 200661). Furthermore, the recent study of the metering infrastructure of the 
oil and gas industry in Nigeria by Telemetry Nigeria Ltd was “conducted with the 
financial assistance” of the DFID (NEITI, 2010).  
 
7.3.3 IFIs Conditionality 
 
The IFIs have also used the instrument of conditionality to ensure that first, Nigeria 
signed up to the EITI, and second that implementation is sustained. An illustration is 
the IMF’s Policy Support Instrument (PSI). In order to secure the cancellation of its 
over $30 billion debt overhang with the Paris Club in 2005, Nigeria required the PSI 
to ensure the support and facilitation of the IMF. Among other things, the IMF PSI 
required a h igh level of government commitment towards resource revenue 
transparency, and the implementation of the EITI was considered sufficient evidence 
for this requirement. The PSI specifically required Nigeria to publish “a draft report of 
the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) oil sector audit by 
end-December 2005” (IMF, 2006:7).62 
 
The PSI was devised by the IMF in 2005 a s a means of lending support to  “ low-
income countries that do not  want—or need—Fund [IMF] financial assistance but 
seek to consolidate their economic performance with IMF monitoring and support” 
(IMF Website63). Nigeria became the first country to benefit from the instrument 
                                                 
61 http://www.neiti.org.ng/Press%20Releases/selectofhartgrp.pdf, accessed 25/09/2010 
62 The NEITI audit report was published on the 12th of January, 2006. 
63 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm, accessed 08/07/2010 
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(Bretton Woods Project, 200864), but the implementation of NEITI was an essential 
consideration in the process (Shaxson, 2009: 9-10). 
 
7.3.3 External Political Support for NEITI  
 
NEITI has enjoyed an overwhelming international political support. Perhaps, this is 
due to its pivotal role as one of the pilot countries for the EITI. However, this 
propaganda also influenced the local implementation of the initiative in no mean way 
(Shaxson 2009:42). While NEITI lacked awareness within Nigeria, the initiative was 
globally recommended as a model for other implementing countries. The statement 
below is typical of most assessments of the NEITI implementation made by outside 
observers:  
 
“The goals of NEITI far exceed the criteria mandated by EITI. Nigeria has 
taken the transparency initiative to a new level by expanding the program to 
audit the physical flow of hydrocarbons and by taking a holistic approach to 
examining the energy sector, investigating government agencies in addition to 
private and state owned companies” (Goldwyn 2006:2). 
 
At a public event organised by NEITI, a World Bank official declared that: 
 
“In less than a year and half … one  can point with justifiable pride to a 
considerable list of achievements: an impressive alliance of stakeholders has 
been forged in support of transparency; public awareness of the central 
importance of transparency has been dramatically raised; I might point out that 
the NEITI’s impact in this regard has extended well beyond Nigeria. Nigeria’s 
example has brought transparency to the attention of not just its neighbours in 
Africa, but also the global community…From the outset, Nigeria has been at 
the forefront of this global effort, arguing persuasively for extractive industry 
transparency, and setting an example” (Charles Mcpherson, quoted in 
Transparency in Extractive Sector, PWYP Nigeria No 1 Oct-Nov 2005:4). 
 
                                                 
64 http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-561198, accessed 11/09/2010 
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Another illustration is that while many civil society activists, insist that the NEITI law 
is weak and incapable of strengthening the NEITI effectiveness (see chapter 6), the 
IMF acknowledges the NEITI law as a “good progress in efforts to improve 
governance and reduce corruption” (Baker 200865). 
 
Nevertheless, this international recommendation has worked as a strategy to sustain or 
improve the commitment of the Nigerian political elite towards resource revenue 
transparency. Some analysts believe that without the international profile of NEITI, 
the momentum would have been completely lost (Shaxson, 2009, M uller, 2010). 
Successive governments since inception have assumed the responsibility of sustaining 
NEITI’s international profile. As a result, there seems to be more pressure to sustain 
the implementation of NEITI than there is for the reform of key complementary 
institutions such as the electoral system and the Freedom of Information Bill 
(Interview no. 39). 
 
7.4 External Influence as a Catalyst: An Analysis 
 
Available evidence on the NEITI implementation seems to suggest that little would be 
achieved in the provision of ‘globalised national public goods’ without external 
influence. External influence on country EITI implementation is often viewed as a 
catalyst (EITI, 2006) – necessary for initiating the process, but not part of the process 
of EITI implementation. A member of the global EITI board once noted that “the 
EITI is simply a catalyst. It will not exist forever. It will convene companies and 
governments over the coming years to implement transparency standards and build 
                                                 
65 http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/update/60/bwupdt60_ai.pdf, accessed 11/09/2010 
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capacities” (Henry Parham quoted in Schumacher, 2004:7). This seems contrary to 
the assumption on the provision of ‘globalised national public goods’ which considers 
the external environment as part of the overall process because benefits (and 
consequences of non-provision) are shared between the domestic and external 
environments. And as such collective action (from both environments) is required for 
adequate provision. 
 
However, the catalyst view of external influence on the EITI country implementation 
seems to define the nature and extent of external influence on NEITI. It tends to limit 
external influence on country EITI implementation to funding and technical 
assistance. The key question therefore is: can external influence sufficiently provide 
or alter the incentives and disincentives necessary for the provision of resource 
revenue transparency through collective action? Available evidence suggest that 
external influence and their methods of influence, much as it has been useful, may 
have equally inhibited the deepening of the impact of NEITI in Nigeria. We explore 
these areas in the following sub-headings. 
 
7.4.1 Distortion of the Chain of Accountability 
 
NEITI implementation is such that there is the tendency for NEITI implementers to be 
accountable first to the government who appointed them and then to donors, who 
provide funding and technical assistance. As such the linkage between NEITI and the 
wider stakeholders is further weakened. The EITI as a global initiative relies heavily 
on external forces (rather than internal) to get countries to sign up and also to sustain 
local implementation (Muller, 2010). Shaxson (2009) believes that:  
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“Western influence may have had an effect in a perceived failure to build a 
coalition to support and sustain the reform process, and a failure to 
institutionalize the gains, beyond a limited number of initiatives” 
 
With so much donor support for the NEITI implementation, NEITI is sometimes 
focused on satisfying donor conditions rather than on the core objectives of 
stimulating the demand for accountability in the management of natural resource 
wealth. 
 
7.4.2 Inadequate Coordination 
 
There are signs of overlapping funding programmes for NEITI implementation. For 
instance, the Federal Government made budgetary allocations for NEITI for the 2010 
fiscal year, and the World Bank and DFID also have planned funding programmes 
covering the same period. The problem is that the current practice tends to give room 
to misuse of funds (Interview no. 31 ). An illustration is the allegation against the 
former Executive Secretary of NEITI that he received salaries from both the DFID 
funds and the Federal Government provisions at the same time. In addition, The 
World Bank established three (3) Public Information Centres (PICs) across the 
country which were not functional as at the time of this study (Interview no. 1). The 
funding pattern also raises concerns about sustainability of the initiative as there could 
be pressure on the Federal Government to meet up with the funding level established 
by the donors when donor funding ceases. 
 
The payment of salaries for NEITI staff could also be a source of controversy. An 
observer notes that:  
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“Another technical problem that is connected to the salary support is that, the 
present NEITI salary structure is not feasible and or obtainable in the Nigerian 
civil service salary scales/structures. The highest wage in the Nigeria federal 
civil service is less than $2,000 per month and some staff of NEITI earns [sic] 
as much as $3,000 per month. This is going to generate internal crisis within 
the secretariat as the government cannot accommodate the NEITI salary scale. 
Also important, is the fact that for the initiative to maintain it present caliber 
of staff, the NEITI employees must be well remunerated beyond what is 
obtainable in the Nigerian civil service” (Ikubaje, 2009). 
 
7.4.3 Inadequate ‘Globalization’ of the Resource Revenue 
Transparency Campaign 
 
There are suggestions that the amount and quality of external influence on l ocal 
implementation could be improved by expanding the reach and buy-in of the global 
resource transparency campaign. At the moment, the campaign seems to be popular 
among the home countries of the major IOCs and the resource-rich developing 
countries. Paul Collier, for instance, argues that:  
 
“It is much easier for local politicians to guide citizens on this issue if there is 
an international campaign on which they can draw: then their message is less 
likely to be misconstrued as self-serving or misguided. The obvious analogy 
here is the campaign on climate change. In a remarkably short time citizens 
around the world have become aware and concerned about the ethical 
dilemmas posed by excessive emissions of carbon. Yet both the scientific and 
the ethical basis for the climate change campaign were far more contestable 
than the case for the protection of future citizens from the consequences of 
insufficient investment. Hence, my suggestion is that EITI consider organizing 
or encouraging an ethical campaign analogous to that on climate change 
around the theme ‘don’t plunder your future’. In effect, the agenda could be 
broadened from countering corruption to countering the neglect of the future” 
(Collier 2008:7). 
 
One way of achieving this is to encourage Western countries to not only participate in 
the EITI as ‘supporting’ countries but to also implement the initiative (Young, 2009). 
However, these countries often argue that they have “existing regulations and 
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financial disclosure requirements in place” (Natural Resource Canada66) and as such 
do not require to implement the EITI. Presently, Norway appears to be the only 
exception. Norway signed up to the initiative in 2009, and has since been successfully 
implementing it. The objective is that it addresses the North-South dichotomy in the 
global implementation of the EITI, and could also help in improving the awareness of 
the initiative and its objectives among Western country consumers who are potentially 
a formidable force in the global resource transparency campaign. 
 
Another way of improving the global reach of the EITI is to engage the emerging big 
economies from Asia especially China, India and South Korea who do not currently 
subscribe to the initiative. The activities and policies of these countries in resource-
rich developing countries sometimes undermine the resource transparency campaign 
(Manning, 2006; Collier, 2008). An analyst notes that: 
 
“The recent entry of China and India into Nigeria following bidding for oil 
blocks in 2005 and 2006 has produced new timidity regarding transparency, 
particularly as neither Asian giant has signed on to the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI)” (ICG, 2006:22). 
 
China has particularly been a source of  concern in recent years. The statement below 
aptly captures the concerns often expressed on the threat that China poses to the 
global resource transparency campaign: 
 
“We need to bring the emerging market players on board. China has a publicly 
stated policy that they don’t care about governance in other countries. They 
will invest to get resources and they are not going to “interfere” in internal 
policies. Over the long run, that will turn around and bite them. From our 
standpoint copying them is not the way to go. Trying to bring China to the 
table and have them be part of the international push to develop a global 
                                                 
66 http://www.eiti.nrcan.gc.ca/role/index-eng.php accessed 25/06/2010 
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standard of transparency and governance over these sectors is the way to go. It 
is possible that a concerted push from the G8 governments at the 2007 summit 
will bring China into the dialogue” (Karin Lissaker in Global Witness, 
2007:8). 
 
Of greater concern however is that this opinion of China is shared mostly by the 
Western countries alone. The opinion of policy makers in Nigeria for instance, may 
differ considerably as the statement below from a recent report suggests: 
 
“There are concerns (from the west) about the strategies of China and other 
‘new sources’ in Africa, but these concerns are note shared by Nigerians who 
view these as just another source of development funding. Interestingly, 
observers think that “Nigerians expect genuine South-South cooperation that 
is based on equality and mutual respect and does not replicate existing unjust 
and exploitative North-South relations” (Econ Poyry, 2008:27-28). 
 
The current profile of EITI implementing countries suggests that the initiatives 
focuses on resource-rich developing countries and portrays a north-south dichotomy. 
The western countries should do more than supporting the initiative. It is believed that 
until such countries as the US, UK and Canada accept to implement the EITI, 
attracting other countries, especially Brazil, Russia, India and China would remain a 
challenge. The geographical imbalance affects the credibility of the EITI as it portrays 
it as “…a policy mechanism marketed by donors and Western governments as a key 
to facilitating economic improvement in resource-rich developing countries-in sub-
Saharan Africa” (Global Witness, 2009:2). This view of the EITI seems to diminish 
the commitment of stakeholders in the local implementation of the initiative 
(Interview nos. 15, 18, 39). However, there is an argument in the literature on the 
provision of GPGs that tends to support the concentration of efforts on resource-rich 
developing countries. This argument is referred to as the ‘subsidiarity principle’ and 
according to Sandler (2001:25) “subsidiarity not only places the problem on the most 
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appropriate participants – those with most at stake – but it a lso economises on 
transaction cost”. The question that arises though is how can ‘those with most at 
stake’ be appropriately determined? 
 
7.4.4 Policy Incoherencies of Western Countries 
 
It is alleged that Policy incoherencies and double standards by key Western countries 
that support the initiative also inhibit the deepening of the global RRT campaign. 
Certain policies and decisions of Western countries’ governments are capable of 
sending the wrong signals to implementing and potential implementing countries 
about the seriousness of the resource revenue transparency campaign. In his report on 
NEITI Shaxson (2009) notes that: 
 
“Some interviewees were cynical about Britain’s apparently hypocritical role 
in all of this: chiding Nigerians for corruption and encouraging the EITI 
process, on the one hand, then refusing to cooperate on tracking cross-border 
financial flows in order to protect the secrecy space and the dirty money that it 
harbours in the City of London and its satellites in the Crown Dependencies 
(e.g. Jersey) and overseas territories (e.g. the Caymans) in particular. Britain – 
almost certainly the largest recipient of stolen Nigerian assets – was singled 
out as being remarkably uncooperative” (Shaxson 2009:40). 
 
Another illustration is the apparent volte-face on the Petroleum Industry Bill for 
Nigeria. A bill intended to restructure the Nigerian oil and gas industry but which was 
deemed not favourable to IOCs in Nigeria (see Chapter 4). It later emerged that the 
lawmakers were coaxed to alter some initial provisions of the bill in order to suit the 
IOCs. One of the lawmakers said that their intention was: 
“...to pass the bill as sent to us by the late President Umaru Musa Yar’adua but 
these companies put us under intense pressure, they even got the American 
government to intervene on t heir behalf.  Shortly after his return from the 
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United States early this year when he was acting, President Jonathan requested 
that the provisions of the bill be reviewed after which he asked the leadership 
of the two chambers to look at the issue of tax and reduce it to allow for 
“investment” in the sector” (Turaki Hassan, Daily Trust 08/10/201067,). 
 
Asobie (2009:14) also believes that “the major oil companies operating in Nigeria, 
including those from Europe obviously detest the bill and are likely to fight to kill it”. 
This opposition to the PIB, a law expected to introduce major restructuring in the oil 
and gas sector in Nigeria, seems to run contrary to the Western countries’ support for 
resource transparency and accountability in Nigeria.  
 
7.4.5 Validation versus Certification 
 
The key concern about the EITI Validation is its insufficiency as a quality assurance 
mechanism for an international standard of good practice. Critics of the EITI have 
argued that the choice of validation over a certification scheme was due to the need to 
protect the interest of the IOCs. It is believed that certification could place greater 
demands on bus iness. This is contrary to the view that validation was favoured 
because certification seemed impracticable in hydrocarbons trade especially for oil 
and gas. However, validation seems to offer minimal incentives for countries to 
remain committed to the objectives of RRT. Implementing countries who do not  
achieve successful validation only stand the risk of having their “candidate” status 
revoked or suspended. Suspension or revocation of membership from the initiative 
basically implies that a country could revert to the status quo with implications for the 
overall global campaign. Alternative sources of funding such as China also make the 
threat of loss of donor funding and development assistance unattractive. 
                                                 
67 http://allafrica.com/stories/201010080273.html accessed 18/11/2010 
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On the other hand, the reward for a successful validation is “international recognition 
for their efforts and achievements” (EITI, 2010 http://eiti.org/eiti/validation). This 
may not be much of an incentive to such countries as Nigeria, which has already 
received a lot of recognition for their participation in the EITI without achieving 
validation. In addition: 
 
“... these long-term benefits may not be visible at the point when a country 
achieves Compliance. So the international community must ensure in the short 
term that EITI Compliant countries receive the recognition that is due to 
them.” (Global Witness, 2009:2)   
 
In a critique of the NEITI, the PWYP Nigeria also advocated for the provision of a 
“Certificate of Transparency Compliance (CTC)” which would be issued to 
companies who have satisfied the requirements for the implementation of the EITI. 
This argument seems to be pertinent because at the moment validation appears to be 
focused more on assessing the involvement of governments and less on that of 
companies.   
 
Furthermore, the validation exercise also seems to divert attention from the core 
objectives of achieving resource revenue transparency to a mere box-ticking exercise. 
The questions on the Validation grid (a guide) tend to suggest that the focus of the 
validation is on government’s role in the implementation. This again undermines the 
multi-stakeholder framework originally intended for the initiative. For instance, the 
validation exercise asks minimal questions of business involvement in the 
implementation of the initiative. This observation further highlights the criticism 
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sometimes made of the initiative being a means of shifting emphasis from business to 
governments.  
 
The use of third party consultants also undermines the essence of the multi-
stakeholder framework of the EITI. The key objectives of the validation process 
includes to promote “dialogue and learning at the country level” and also to identify 
“opportunities to strengthen the EITI process going forward” (EITI, 200668). By 
relying on third party auditors for the validation exercise, the EITI seems to lose an 
essential channel for deepening the initiative. Some authors note that: 
 
“An interesting finding from the comparative analysis of different types of 
standards is that multi-stakeholder standards tend to rely as much on 
monitoring by professional audit companies as standards formulated by 
business groups only. They thus miss the chance of dividing this task among 
auditors that represent various groups, which would be much more in line with 
the philosophy of multi-stakeholder involvement—also because it would best 
use different groups’ expertise and give watchdogs the opportunity to fulfil 
that role” (Fransen and Kolk, 2007:678). 
 
7.4.6 Bogus or Too Simple Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)  
 
It is argued that donors often times measure the impact of their contribution by means 
of a s et of predetermined key performance indicators (KPIs). While KPIs may be 
necessary to justify donors’ contributions, in an issue such as RRT, there is the 
tendency that these KPIs may shift emphasis away from the key objectives. For 
instance, the WB and the EITI tend to measure the success of the initiative by: first, 
the number of countries that sign up; second, the number of countries that publish 
EITI reports, conferences and other activities. This is as opposed to the key objectives 
                                                 
68http://eiti.org/eiti/validation, accessed 25/10/2010  
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of achieving genuine RRT in the implementing countries and empowering citizens to 
demand accountability (Gouseva, 2008). A Global Witness assessment of World Bank 
and IMF support for local EITI implementation found inter alia that:   
 
... the institutions are mainly focusing on the disclosure of revenues, … and 
are largely not promoting contract transparency or ensuring meaningful civil 
society participation (Global Witness, 2008:5). 
 
This once more reinforces the debate on the narrow focus of the global EITI and the 
limitations that this sometimes places on the overall effectiveness of the local 
implementation.  
 
7.4.7 Competition for Funding among Local Civil Society 
Organisations 
 
There is evidence that local civil society participation in the NEITI implementation is 
also hindered by fierce competition among NGOs for scarce donor funding and 
assistance. PWYP Nigeria, for instance, depends heavily on donor funding, and this 
has been further diminished in recent years due to the activities of parallel 
organisations such as the DFID-funded Coalition 4 C hange (C4C), CISLAC, and a 
few others. The statement below captures the mood of the PWYP National 
Programme Coordinator during a donor conference organised in 2009: 
 
“We have engaged donors in several meetings to see how we can re-cement 
our relationship, so far the outcomes of such meetings have not been 
encouraging, hence we decided to call for this donor conference to hear from 
you where we have got it wrong, then we can amend our mistakes and forge 
ahead” (Giwa, 2009)69.  
                                                 
69 Kola Giwa “Welcome Speech to the PWYP Nigeria Donors Conference 2009 at Peace Haven Hotel, 
Wuye District” 
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What is also evident in the above statement is the readiness of the coalition to 
“amend” its strategies to suit the goals and aspirations of the donors in order to secure 
funding. However, it was obvious at this conference (personal observation) that the 
key donors targeted were DFID and USAID. This is a clear way through which the 
donors influence the implementation of the initiative. 
 
7.5 Revisiting the Research Question 
 
The research question addressed in this chapter is: how and why do external actors 
influence the effectiveness of collective action for resource revenue transparency? 
Using the NEITI example, we explored this question by first identifying the key 
external actors who influence the implementation and outcome of NEITI. The 
identified actors belong to three categories: the global EITI (mostly through its 
Secretariat which is based in Oslo, Norway); donors (Bilateral and Multilateral); and 
global Civil Society. These actors have a common objective which is to catalyse and 
support the establishment and sustained implementation of NEITI. Noble as this 
objective seems, the various strategies employed by these external actors in pursuing 
this objective have contributed in one way or the other to NEITI’s lack of 
effectiveness. For instance, the support that external actors provide to NEITI are 
sometimes underlined by policies and strategies (of their home countries) that run 
contrary to the core objectives of transparency and accountability. While external 
influence was essential in kickstarting the NEITI implementation process, it has also 
prevented the deepening of the initiative through funding, poor coordination of the 
external actors, incoherent policies of western countries, and other practices that tend 
to misalign the core objectives of the local implementation of the initiative. 
268 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have explored external influence as a critical factor that contributes 
to shaping the outcome of collective action for resource transparency. The NEITI 
example highlights that while external influence has been influential in stimulating 
and sustaining the EITI process, it has also, in some ways, constituted a hindrance to 
deepening the initiative. Essentially, the global EITI, bilateral and multilateral donors, 
and global CSOs, are among the key actors who influence the implementation and 
effectiveness of Nigerian EITI. They often aim to influence the incentives structure 
towards facilitating the implementation of NEITI through activities such as the 
mandatory validation exercise, funding, technical assistance, and overall political 
support.   
 
However, strategic concerns on energy security, more than anything else, often 
underline the contributions of external actors, especially bilateral donors, on t he 
implementation of NEITI. And this sometimes implies that there are incoherencies 
and contradictions in the pattern of external influence which sometimes constitute a 
hindrance to the effectiveness of the local implementation of the initiative. Therefore, 
the evidence discussed in this chapter reinforces the argument that the nature and 
pattern of external influence on MSIs at the local level significantly contribute to 
determining the effectiveness of the initiative.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
‘‘Tony Blair’s government and other governments have put millions into it, the industry 
wants it in part because it puts the burden on governments, and not them; IFIs, 
especially the World Bank, like it, civil society wants it to be successful. Every group 
wants it to succeed, but some also have an institutional interest in downplaying its 
shortcomings or overstating its impact’’ (Arvind Ganesan of Human Rights Watch 
quoted in Shaxson, 2009:42). 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter summarizes the arguments and evidence discussed in the preceding 
chapters and draws out their key implications to the overall understanding of the 
organisation MSIs.  The Nigerian EITI has been used in this study to demonstrate the 
challenges to the effective organisation of a MSI for resource transparency. Contrary 
to the design of the global EITI, the Nigerian EITI has failed to successfully achieve a 
truly multi-stakeholder initiative and overall impact of the initiative has been low. 
Essentially, the question here is: what does the evidence from NEITI implementation 
show about the key arguments raised in chapter three concerning the factors that 
influence the organisation and effectiveness of MSIs? 
 
This concluding chapter is arranged in five sections. Section 8.2 presents a summary 
of the key propositions that guided this study and re-states the research questions. 
Section 8.3 summarizes the key findings of the thesis, and section 8.4 i ndicates the 
implications of the findings to the current state of knowledge. Section 8.5 discusses 
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the limitations of this study and points out possible areas for future research while 
section 8.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
8.2 The Research Questions Re-stated 
 
This study began with an investigation of why the abundance of natural resources 
sometimes fails to transform into sustainable economic prosperity. The literature 
reviewed for this study showed a significant shift from the seeming belief in the 
existence of an inescapable ‘resource curse’ to an emphasis on t he quality of 
institutions in explaining the negative outcome of abundant natural resources. 
Furthermore, this focus on the quality of institutions gave rise to the suggestion that a 
more transparent management of resource wealth would empower citizens to demand 
accountability from agents involved in resource wealth management. Hence, there is 
the view that resource transparency is a key means of addressing the problem of poor 
resource wealth management. However, the key challenge therefore was how best 
could resource transparency be achieved? 
 
In investigating the best means of achieving resource transparency, this study first 
assumes that resource transparency belongs to a category of public goods known as 
‘globalised national public goods’ (GNPG) the provision of which presents certain 
unique challenges. For instance, resource transparency presents both benefits and 
costs for diverse stakeholders involved in resource wealth management, within and 
outside the local environment, and across generations. Hence, relevant literature 
further suggests that the collective action of all stakeholders would be required for the 
effective provisions of such GNPGs as resource transparency. However, there are 
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certain key factors that would determine the effectiveness of such collective action for 
GNPGs. Among these factors are the structure of the local environment; the 
characteristics of the component agents or stakeholders; the governance structure for 
the collective action; and the nature of external influence. 
 
However, the gap existing in the literature is that much as collective action is 
advocated for the provision of resource transparency, the significance of the above- 
mentioned key challenges to their effective organisation has rarely been explored. The 
focus of this study has therefore been to examine how and why these factors influence 
the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency. For this purpose, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was identified as a case study. 
The EITI is a global initiative that attempts to improve resource revenue transparency 
in resource-rich countries through a form of collective action known as multi-
stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). However, the EITI adopts a country-by-country 
strategy and as such only finds concrete expression in specific country 
implementation of the initiative. Therefore, this study used the Nigerian EITI in a 
holistic single case study approach. The specific research questions addressed in this 
study include: 
 
1. How and why does the structural environment influence the effectiveness of 
collective action for resource transparency? 
 
2. How and why do t he characteristics of the component agents influence the 
effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency? 
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3. How and why does the governance structure influence the effectiveness of 
collective action for resource transparency? 
 
4. How and why do external actors influence collective action for resource 
transparency? 
 
8.3 Summary of Findings  
 
The above research questions were applied to the implementation and outcome of the 
Nigerian EITI. Using available data gathered mostly from a field work conducted in 
Nigeria, the various aspects of the NEITI implementation were examined including 
the impact of the local environment, the characteristics of the stakeholders, the 
governance structure, and the external factors and actors that influence its 
implementation. The key findings of this study are summarised as follows. 
 
8.3.1 How and why does the structural environment influence the effectiveness of 
collective action for resource transparency? 
This study found sufficient evidence to support the argument that the structure of the 
local context is a key determinant of the outcome of collective action for resource 
transparency. Specifically, because resource transparency attempts to alter key 
configurations of the existing incentives structure within the local context, the forces 
and actors who benefit from the status quo tend to resist change. In the case of NEITI, 
it was found that three key aspects of the Nigerian structural environment, to a large 
extent, inhibit the effectiveness of NEITI. These three aspects include: the Nigerian 
political economy, the structure of the Nigerian extractives industry, and the nature of 
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complementary institutions to resource transparency. For instance, the political 
economy is such that the Nigeria government depends almost entirely on revenues 
from crude oil and as such does not need to effectively tax the population. This lack 
of effective taxation creates a seeming disconnect between the government and the 
governed (see section 4.2). Therefore, while NEITI may be able to publish 
information on t he management of the extractives industry, the core objective of 
stimulating demand for accountability is weakened by a pervading public apathy and 
lack of consciousness. 
 
Furthermore, the chance of stimulating public consciousness through the activities of 
NEITI and civil society organisations is also weakened by the absence of strong 
complementary institutions for the objective of resource transparency and 
accountability (see section 4.4). The channels of transparency and accountability 
required for the effectiveness of NEITI are either absent or very weak. For instance, 
the electoral system in Nigeria is believed to be ineffective as a tool for public 
participation in governance because it does not guarantee free and fair elections. 
These findings suggest that a corresponding focus on bui lding or strengthening 
complementary institutions that are necessary for the objectives of resource 
transparency and accountability is essential.  
 
8.3.2 How and why do the characteristics of stakeholders or the component 
agents influence the effectiveness of collective action for resource transparency? 
 
First, an examination of the process for identifying stakeholders for the NEITI 
revealed a focus on key rather than wider stakeholders (see section 5.2). The NEITI 
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implementation identifies government and industry as the key agents involved in the 
management of resource wealth. Civil society organisations are however involved as 
monitors of the process in order to fulfil a key requirement of the implementation of 
the initiative as stipulated by the global EITI. The implication of this arrangement is 
that there seems to be a gap in representation and participation as certain stakeholders 
considered to be key in the Nigeria context are not adequately represented in the 
NEITI process (see section 5.4). 
 
Another key finding is that each of the categories of stakeholders tends to be 
motivated by their respective perceptions of the benefits and costs of the NEITI 
implementation. Among other things, it was discovered that government’s 
commitment in the NEITI implementation seems to be influenced by the underlying 
concern that the initiative could threaten some vested interests in the management 
structure of resource wealth in Nigeria. As a result, there is often the tendency to 
maintain considerable control of events and outcome of the initiative. However, while 
industry commitment to resource transparency at the global level is motivated by the 
need to address reputational concerns and growing risk to investments, IOCs 
operating in Nigeria seem to have less need to demonstrate this commitment in the 
NEITI implementation because their interests are strongly tied to that of government 
through their joint venture (JV) agreements. 
 
Similarly, another key finding is that the implementation and effectiveness of NEITI 
is also defined by the nature of the interrelationships between the participating 
stakeholders (see section 5.3). For instance, crude oil production in Nigeria is 
dominated by JVs between government and IOCs and as such there is a ‘marriage of 
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convenience’ between the two groups of stakeholders. The implication is that NEITI 
outcomes are often predictable and are rarely contrary to the objectives of this 
‘marriage of convenience’. Civil society organisations also lack the requisite capacity 
to make considerable impact especially in the face of the strength of the alliance 
between government and the IOCs. 
  
8.3.3 How and why does the governance structure influence the effectiveness of 
collective action for resource transparency? 
 
This study found that government tends to take full advantage of the inevitability of 
its involvement in MSIs for GNPGs provision to establish control of the 
implementation process. The global EITI in recognition of the role of government 
advocates a government-led multi-stakeholder initiative for the local implementation 
of the initiative. However, available evidence indicates that this has necessitated that 
NEITI implementation is under full government control as a government agency (see 
section 6.2.1). Apparently, this is in furtherance of the perceived need to protect and 
safeguard government and by extension, business interests from potential adverse 
outcomes from NEITI implementation. This objective is further ensured through the 
institutions and processes designed for the implementation of NEITI. For instance, the 
composition of the governing board of NEITI, the NSWG, is dominated by 
government representatives, and in fact all appointments onto this board, including 
representatives of other stakeholders, are made by the President. The NEITI Act, the 
law enacted for the implementation of NEITI further institutionalises this government 
dominance and includes clauses that specifically protect government and business 
interests from undue exposure (see section 6.3.2).  
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8.3.4 How and why do external factors influence collective action for resource 
transparency? 
 
This study also found that external influence is a key determinant of the outcome of 
MSIs for GNPGs. This finding reflects the “think globally, act locally” mantra 
common in recent global governance platforms. Beyond the initiation of the local 
implementation of the EITI in Nigeria, this study found that global actors such as 
donors, the global civil society, and the global EITI as well, contributed towards 
shaping the outcome of NEITI in the period reviewed. Most of the achievements of 
NEITI, especially the audits of the extractive industries payments and processes, are 
closely linked to the support of external actors. External influence through funding, 
technical assistance, capacity building, and the validation exercise of the global EITI, 
have all combined to ensure that the impediments created by the other three factors do 
not completely undermine the NEITI implementation process. 
 
However, significant as it seems, external influence also sometimes inhibit the 
possible deepening of the impact of the MSI process. For instance, strategic 
considerations on energy security by some western countries sometimes run contrary 
to the objectives of resource transparency and accountability. As a result, the local 
implementation of the EITI is sometimes derailed by incoherent and contradictory 
messages and behaviours from external actors (see section 7.4.4). 
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8.3.5 The Emerging Patterns of Linkages between the Factors 
The above findings all contribute towards the overall argument of this study that there 
are fundamental factors that determine the effectiveness of collective action for 
resource transparency. The findings strongly suggest that the assumptions that 
resource transparency itself is a virtue and as such would be attractive to all 
stakeholders seem to be weak. Overall, the pattern that emerges is that these four 
factors are strong in explaining the effectiveness of collective action for resource 
transparency. In the NEITI example, there seems to be a strong interrelationship 
among the factors that are mostly inherent in the domestic environment which 
includes the structural context, the component agents and the governance structure of 
NEITI. While the factors each influence the NEITI implementation and outcome, they 
also shape one another. However, the fourth factor, which is the external influence, 
tends to be viewed as distinct from the other factors, highlighting the notion that 
external influence merely acts as a cat alyst in the whole process (see figure 8.1 
below).  
Figure 8.1 Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of NEITI 
 
 
NEITI Participating 
Stakeholders 
 
Nigerian Structural 
Context 
NEITI Governance 
Structure External Influence 
NEITI 
Effectiveness 
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Thus, the NEITI example displays a slightly different pattern in the interaction and 
role of these factors in understanding the organisation of MSIs. In the three examples 
of MSIs compared in table 3.2 in Chapter 3, what is striking is the minimal role of 
national governments in implementation and enforcement. The UN Global Compact 
for instance, which requires considerable implementation at the local level, works 
with ‘local networks’ rather than national governments. An observer notes that 
because the UN Global Compact aims at achieving transformative and system-wide 
changes at the local level “involving local actors into the governance framework 
allows integrating contextualized actions on the ground into a coherent framework for 
institutional change” (UN Global Compact, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2011_04_04/
UNGC_Governance_Note_Apr11.pdf, accessed 28/06/2010).  
 
Furthermore, the three MSIs also share a strong linkage between the global North and 
South in the issues being addressed. That linkage seems to be lacking in the case of 
the EITI and resource transparency. Evidence discussed in chapter 7 show that 
resource transparency is largely viewed as a problem within the Southern divide. This 
for instance, influenced the choice of validation as a monitoring and compliance 
strategy by the global EITI which tends to focus on checking the performance of the 
implementing (mainly Southern) governments (see section 7.4.5). 
8.4 Contributions to Current State of Knowledge  
  
8.4.1 Contributions to Theory 
This study particularly highlights the need for a more coherent theory of MSIs built 
on the foundations of the agency and collective action theories. It draws attention 
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specifically to the fundamental factors that influence the organisation and 
effectiveness of MSIs. It also demonstrates that these fundamental factors tend to be 
more critical to the success of MSIs when implementation is essentially at the 
domestic or national level rather than at the global level.  To date, this aspect of the 
analysis of MSIs has been rarely discussed in the literature. For instance, MSIs tend to 
be globally initiated and locally implemented thus implying that the influence of 
external factors on local implementation tend to be a critical factor. Hence, often 
times the key aspects of the organisation and operations of MSIs tend to be set from 
outside the local environment and would likely reflect the aspirations of the dominant 
stakeholders at the global level. For instance, monitoring or enforcement mechanisms 
of MSIs are considered key to success as they touch on the credibility of the MSI. In 
the EITI, the choice of validation over more stringent monitoring mechanisms such as 
certification, was made at the global level and seems to reflect the interest of business 
(see section 7.4.5) 
 
8.4.2 Policy Implications 
This study predicts that MSIs will continue to be a strategy of choice in the search for 
solutions to global problems. However, this prediction is based on the ineffectiveness 
of traditional mechanisms rather than on t he proven efficacy or successes of MSIs. 
This prediction also makes it ever more important for the better understanding of the 
critical success factors for the organisation of MSIs. 
 
Many MSIs fail to achieve beyond the provision of a common platform for dialogue 
among diverse stakeholders. Although some proponents view this as an achievement 
in itself, but for  MSIs to live up to the dream of filling gaps in global governance, the 
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critical factors highlighted in this study ought to be given due consideration in their 
organisation. 
 
The findings in this study generally have significant implications for the organisation 
of collective action for the provision of GPGs. This study shows that the organisation 
of MSIs is not as easily achievable as they are commonly advocated. This is even 
more so for controversial issue areas such as resource transparency. Evidence from 
the implementation of NEITI suggests that the key factors highlighted in this study 
play a significant role in how well the set objectives of MSIs could be achieved. 
Therefore, it is imperative that in organising such initiatives greater attention should 
be paid to these factors and the challenges they pose. 
 
Specifically, for the EITI it is apparent from this study that the assumptions based on 
the common perception of transparency as a virtue are not sufficient for the 
effectiveness of the initiative especially at the local level where implementation is 
mostly required. At inception the EITI received little criticism. Apparently, the two 
key concepts of RRT and MSI that the initiative embodies (in principle) are quite 
difficult to openly oppose. The universal approval that the EITI received, much as it 
had a p ositive effect in kick-starting the initiative, left little room for a critical 
evaluation of the fundamental assumptions on w hich the initiative was built. For 
instance, Hilson and Maconachie (2009:64) argue that the EITI makes rather naive 
assumptions that “host governments are interested in tackling these problems in the 
first place, and that citizens are capable of facilitating changes in government policy 
should it be discovered that mineral and oil revenues are being embezzled”. The 
consequence today, as the Nigerian example shows, is the need for a proper re-
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examination of these assumptions in order to safeguard the relevance of the initiative 
in the drive for resource transparency. The emergence of new global initiatives with 
similar objectives with the EITI illustrates the global realisation of the inadequacy of 
the EITI to effectively address the problems of poor natural resource management. 
The Natural Resource Charter (NRC) for instance, is a new global initiative set up by 
an independent group of foremost experts in economically sustainable resource 
extraction led by Paul Collier of the University of Oxford.  The Charter is a set of 
principles (precepts), put together in November, 2010, and intended to guide countries 
to ensure that the benefits of resource extraction are fully maximised. It addresses the 
narrow focus of the EITI on t ransparency of payments alone (see section 7.. It 
provides a framework that countries can adopt for a better management of the entire 
natural resources value chain beginning from the decision to extract to the application 
of revenues70. However, it is pertinent to note that while the NRC tends to be broader 
than the EITI, it faces similar challenges such as the policy environment and also the 
strategy for local implementation is yet unclear. As at the time of writing this thesis, 
the NRC has not yet been experimented in any country.  
 
This study suggests that a review of the EITI principles and criteria (see Appendix I 
and II) is necessary in order to accommodate some fundamental changes that would 
enable it to remain relevant both globally and in implementing countries. For instance, 
it is becoming evident that the focus of the initiative on t ransparency alone is not 
sufficient to deliver the desired results. Transparency is not corteminous with 
accountability. As highlighted in Chapter 4 of  this thesis, transparency will be 
ineffective if the complementary institutions necessary for achieving accountability 
                                                 
70 Natural Resource Charter Website: http://www.naturalresourcecharter.org/ accessed 11/05/2012. 
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are absent. Furthermore the EITI should require more concrete efforts from 
participating governments to improve the complementary institutions to the EITI and 
these efforts should be considered as part of the implementation of the initiative and 
should be embedded in the validation exercise. Furthermore, the incentives or 
disincentives of the various stakeholders need to be more concretely defined. For 
instance, the current validation exercise asks little questions of industry participation 
in the local implementation. Presently, IOCs do not  yet feel fully obliged to 
participate in the EITI implementation process. It is important that a review of the 
EITI principles and criteria should take this into account. In Nigeria, even though the 
NEITI Act makes company participation mandatory, it is still a challenge to enforce 
the participation of IOCs. The challenge is even greater when dealing with Chinese 
companies whose home country do not in fact subscribe to the principles of the EITI. 
Again, efforts are often concentrated at extending buy-in and widening international 
acceptance and there is the tendency to measure success by the rate of signing up and 
international buy-in. Hence, the key objective of impact on the domestic environment 
is pushed further down the agenda. So while initiatives such as the EITI are celebrated 
at the global level, little progress is made at the local level. Furthermore, in a bid to 
obtain some form of legitimacy, the initiative faces a pecualiar dilemma – what 
should be the role of government in the implementation of the initiative? As the 
Nigerian example has shown, while it is important for government to lead the 
initiative, in doing so there is the tendency for government to dominate the entire 
process. The risk is that the potential of the initiative to influence government 
becomes compromised. 
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For the Nigerian EITI and in fact other local implementation of the EITI, this study 
highlights the need for a review of the implementation of the initiative. The findings 
in this study to a great extent explain the very low impact of the initiative in Nigeria 
despite haven been implemented since 2004. It is difficult to substantiate the claims 
that NEITI has improved the management of resource wealth in Nigeria. For instance, 
claims of increased oil earnings and FDI inflow in recent years as a result of NEITI’s 
ability to block prior avenues of revenue leakage cannot be clearly established. For 
example, FDI inflow increased from 1.47 billion USD in 2000 to 7.6billion USD in 
2007. While GDP per capita (PPP) increased from 875USD in 2003 to 1500USD in 
2007. The claims that NEITI and its activities are responsible for these developments 
are however hard to substantiate. There are a number of other institutional and macro-
economic reforms and other initiatives that make it d ifficult to attribute these 
successes entirely to NEITI.  
 
The MSI framework is critical to the success and effectiveness of NEITI. It is 
important that NEITI, for instance, is not viewed simply as ‘just another government 
agency’. The key contribution that the initiative boasts of globally is its multi-
stakeholder framework and if that is taken out of the equation the initiative might lose 
its initial appeal. As this study has shown, this appears to be what is obtainable in the 
Nigerian case. If this is so, it amounts to the creation of additional bureaucratic 
arrangements when a number of existing government agencies could be adjusted 
adequately to play the same role. Our analyses indicate that the NEITI is largely 
another government agency though funded by donors, and this raises some key 
questions. If it is an inevitable outcome, given the nature of globalised national public 
goods, are there no e xisting institutions that could be strengthened to perform the 
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functions of NEITI – EFCC, ICPC, the judiciary, CSOs, etc? Does not the 
implementation of NEITI overlap with the functions of one or more of these 
institutions? 
 
NEITI surely has the potential of having some positive effects on the management of 
resource wealth in Nigeria. But there is no doubt that the potential is not yet fully 
realized. Realizing the full potentials of NEITI would depend largely on the four sets 
of factors discussed in this study and how these factors interact and influence the 
initiative. This study goes beyond the current impact of NEITI to illustrate the need 
for a proper consideration of these four critical factors in the overall effectiveness of 
MSIs. 
 
8.5 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
   
First, it is important to recognise that the use of a holistic single case study approach 
places some limitations to the outcome of this study. While it has facilitated an in-
depth examination of the Nigerian EITI implementation, it limits  the overall 
significance of the study in terms of generalisation of the findings. However, this 
research approach appropriately reflects the design of the EITI and indeed the overall 
resource wealth management which tends to be essentially country-specific. The 
implication is that it is likely that country experiences would vary markedly such that 
a cross-country study would be of limited relevance to an enquiry of this nature 
because the focus of the study was on highlighting what really happens in the country 
implementation of the EITI. However, what would have been more helpful would be 
a comparison across similar initiatives within the same country context. Such 
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comparison would have been able to show how the factors highlighted in this study 
influence other initiatives in different issue areas. Unfortunately, NEITI is Nigeria’s 
first attempt at MSI at a significant level. 
 
Furthermore, the field work for this study was conducted in the first half of 2009 
(February to June, 2009). At the time NEITI was experiencing a downward trend in 
the implementation hence the observations and data that influenced the analysis in this 
study. This implies that, to a large extent, the evidence gathered for this study may 
have reflected the prevailing trend during the period of the field work. Since after 
then, NEITI seems to have picked up momentum. It has published industry audits 
covering the period 2006 – 2008, and has achieved the coveted compliant status of the 
global EITI and has also begun to implement its national mandate which, among other 
things, includes the solid minerals sector, expenditure, and establishing sub-national 
units. However, what has remained consistent is that the MSI framework initially 
designed has yet to be properly achieved. The initiative still operates largely as an 
agency of government owing largely to the factors highlighted in this study. 
 
This study focused on investigating how and why the four factors derived from the 
combination of the agency theory and the collective action theory influence the 
organisation and effectiveness of MSIs. While effort was made to cover as much 
influencing factors as possible within the framework of these four broad categories of 
factors, it is important to recognise that all the factors that are likely to influence the 
organisation of MSIs may not have been sufficiently covered. They are not exhaustive 
and do not preclude other factors that can also shape the organisation and outcome of 
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MSIs. However, the purpose of having a guide was achieved by using the four 
identified factors as a theoretical framework was achieved. 
 
This study is also limited by the difficulty encountered in gaining access to 
information and some key informants because of the sensitive nature of the subject of 
research. In fact, the sample of interviewees for this study was biased against the 
industry stakeholders to NEITI. It would have been useful to probe deep into the 
participation of the IOCs operating in Nigeria on the NEITI implementation, but most 
of the companies approached either declined to participate or referred the researcher 
to head offices beyond the immediate reach of the researcher, given the limitations of 
time and resources. The researcher relied mostly on available documentary evidence 
and response from some non-private sector informants to gauge the contributions (or 
lack of it) of the IOCs to the NEITI implementation. Moreover, as demonstrated in 
Section 5.3.1, the ‘marriage of convenience’ between the IOCs and the government 
stakeholders also means that the views of the IOCs are not likely to differ 
significantly from that of the government stakeholder, who of course were well 
represented among the interviewees for this study. 
 
Similarly, the field research was carried out in Nigeria at a time there was heightened 
security tension because of the activities of militant youths from the Niger Delta. This 
limited travel to the Niger Delta areas to interview some key informants and there was 
also restricted access to key ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) within oil 
and gas sector which were considered targets for bomb attacks by the militants. In a 
more conducive environment, the researcher would have had access to more places 
and individual that could probably have yielded more relevant data. 
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The MSI framework, popular as it seems in global governance, has not yet attracted 
commensurate attention in the literature. More empirical and detailed studies of 
specific MSIs in key issues areas would elucidate the understanding of the key factors 
that influence the effectiveness of MSIs. Codifying and achieving a coherent theory of 
MSIs would require a possible profiling of the numerous initiatives that operate in 
global governance as MSIs. 
 
In addition, there seems to be a common agreement that the nature of the issue at hand 
would determine the nature and organisation for collective action. While this study 
has demonstrated that with emphasis on resource transparency, it would be necessary 
to the also compare across issues areas in order to possibly establish the extent to 
which this manifests in the four factors highlighted in this study. Further research is 
required to test the extent to which these factors influence the organisation of MSIs in 
other issue areas especially in emerging new areas such the Construction Sector 
Transparency Initiative (CoST) and the International Aid Transparency Initiative 
(IATI). Both of which adopt the EITI type strategy but in different issues areas. It is 
also important that further studies of these MSIs are conducted from time to time in 
the future because as new initiatives they are still evolving and future studies are 
likely to reveal new perspectives and insights on the organisation and effectiveness of 
MSIs. 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The propositions and key findings of this thesis have been summarised in this chapter. 
Specifically, this chapter re-stated the research questions of the study and 
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demonstrated how in exploring answers to them, the overall quest for the factors that 
determine the effectiveness of using MSIs to achieve transparency in natural resource 
management. The study shows that, given available evidence from the 
implementation of the Nigerian Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 
the fundamental challenges to effective collective action for resource transparency 
emanate from the structural environment; the character of the stakeholders; the 
governance structure for collective action; and the nature of external influence. 
 
The contributions of this study towards addressing the gap in the understanding and 
achievement of resource transparency as a ‘globalised national public good’ were also 
highlighted. Particularly, the implications of this study to the local implementation of 
the EITI as a global standard-setting initiative were also demonstrated. The hope of 
realising the vast conviction in the efficacy of collective action for resource 
transparency seems to lie in the deeper understanding of the intervening challenges 
discussed in this thesis. However, considering the limitations of this study, further 
research in expanding this understanding and application of collective action for 
GNPGs was also suggested. 
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APPENDICES 
 
I. The EITI Principles 
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, 
can create negative economic and social impacts.  
2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a 
country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised 
in the interests of their national development.  
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams 
over many years and can be highly price dependent.  
4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and 
expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of 
appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development.  
5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies 
in the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial 
management and accountability.  
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the 
context of respect for contracts and laws.  
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct 
investment that financial transparency may bring.  
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all 
citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure.  
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and 
accountability in public life, government operations and in business,  
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure 
of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use.  
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all 
extractive industry companies operating in that country.  
12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and 
relevant contributions to make – including governments and their agencies, 
extractive industry companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, 
financial organisations, investors, and non-governmental organisations. 
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II. The EITI Criteria 
1. Regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining payments by companies 
to governments (“payments”) and all material revenues received by 
governments from oil, gas and mining companies (“revenues”) to a wide 
audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner. 
2. Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues are the subject 
of a credible, independent audit, applying international auditing standards. 
3. Payments and revenues are reconciled by a cr edible, independent 
administrator, applying international auditing standards and with publication 
of the administrator’s opinion regarding that reconciliation including 
discrepancies, should any be identified. 
4. This approach is extended to all companies including state-owned enterprises. 
5. Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring and 
evaluation of this process and contributes towards public debate. 
6. A public, financially sustainable work plan for all the above is developed by 
the host government, with assistance from the international financial 
institutions where required, including measurable targets, a timetable for 
implementation, and an assessment of potential capacity constraints. 
 
 
  
Appendix III is not available in the digital version of this thesis. 
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IV. List of Interview Questions 
 
The following are some specific questions that guided data gathering from the 
different categories of key stakeholders. 
 
A. Government Stakeholders 
 
1. How were the individual representatives chosen, what is their respective levels 
of knowledge and understanding of the industry? 
 
2. What are their roles in the NSWG and how do they carry out these roles? 
 
3. What challenges do they face in carrying out these responsibilities? 
 
4. How do they relay information to the stakeholders they represent, and how do 
they receive feedback and how do they transmit same to the NSWG? 
 
5. How do they reflect or implement agreed standards and practices/ remediation 
of audit findings? 
 
6. What are the costs/benefits to government of participation in the initiative? 
 
7. How has NEITI affected the discharge of their normal duties? 
 
8. What is their perception of the performance of NEITI so far (and why)? 
 
9. What is being done well, and what is not (and why)? 
 
10. How helpful has the NEITI governance institutions and processes (e.g. the 
NEITI Act and Audit reports,) been? 
 
B. Civil Society Organisations 
 
1. How were the individual representatives chosen, what is their level of 
knowledge and understanding of the issues involved? 
 
2. What are their roles in the NSWG and how do they carry out these roles? 
 
3. What effect does the relative amount of representation in NSWG have on their 
participation and performance? 
 
4. What is there experience with access to necessary information? 
 
5. What are the challenges in implementing the initiative and how are they 
responding to them? 
 
1. What are the challenges to Civil Society in participating in the implementation 
of NEITI? 
 
6. What is their perception of the performance of the initiative so far? 
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7. How do t hey co-ordinate and mobilise the rest of the civil society towards 
follow-up actions? 
 
8. How helpful has the NEITI governance institutions and processes (e.g. the 
NEITI Act and Audit reports,) been? 
 
 
 
C. Extractive Industry Stakeholders 
 
1. How were the individual representatives on the NSWG Board chosen, what is 
their level of knowledge and understanding of the industry? 
 
2. What are their roles in the NSWG and how do they carry out these roles? 
 
3. How do they co-ordinate/ mobilise the rest of the industry on NEITI-related 
issues? 
 
4. How do they relay information to the stakeholders they represent, and how do 
they receive feedback and transmit to the NSWG? 
 
5. How are the aims and objectives of the extractive industry articulated? 
 
6. How do they reflect or implement agreed standards and practices? 
 
7. What challenges do they face in carrying out their responsibilities? 
 
8. What are the challenges/costs/benefits to industry of participation in the 
initiative and how are they addressed? 
 
9. What is their perception of the design and processes of the initiative? 
 
10. How has the initiative affected business? 
 
11. What can be done better? Are there any alternative strategies/frameworks? 
 
12. How helpful has the NEITI governance institutions and processes (e.g. the 
NEITI Act and Audit reports,) been? 
 
 
 
D. Donors 
 
1. What is your opinion of the overall implementation of NEITI? What is 
your judgement of the impact of the initiative? 
 
2. A number of reports are saying that there has been reduced momentum in 
implementation since 2007. Do you agree? If yes why is it so? If no, do 
you have any contrary evidence? 
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3. What is the role of your organisation in the implementation of NEITI? 
How do you ensure that your role does not conflict with, overlap, or 
duplicate that of other organisations? 
 
4. What is your view of the composition of the NEITI Board? 
 
5. What are the challenges you face in providing support to the NEITI 
Implementation? 
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V. List of Resource Rich Countries (Hydrocarbons) 
 
    
Average Annual Hydrocarbon 
Revenues 2000 - 2005 
Average Annual Hydrocarbon 
Exports (Goods) 2000 - 2005 
  Country 
% of Total Fiscal 
Revenue % of GDP 
% of Total 
Exports % of GDP 
1 Algeria 70.5 26.3 97.6 36.8 
2 Angola 79.8 33.4 91.8 68 
3 Azerbaijan 33.3 8.5 87.3 36.1 
4 Bahrain 71.3 23.2 74.4 53.7 
5 Brunei Darussalam 87.7 40.5 90.1 58.6 
6 Cameroun 27.7 4.8 44.7 8.3 
7 Colombia 10.0 3.0 26.7 4.4 
8 Republic of Congo 69.6 22.2 88.3 68.7 
9 Ecuador 26.0 6.6 46.9 11.8 
10 Equitorial Guinea 85.2 24.4 96.8 93.1 
11 Gabon 60.1 19.2 81.7 47.5 
12 Indonesia  30.3 5.5 22.8 7.3 
13 Iran 65.5 14.7 82.2 24.2 
14 Iraq 79.2 69.5 97.0 69.4 
15 Kazakhstan 25.1 6.3 52.6 24.1 
16 Kuwait 74.7 46.1 92.2 45.1 
17 Libya 80.2 43.2 97.1 53.6 
18 Mexico 33.3 7.5 17.2 3.0 
19 Nigeria 78.9 32.3 97.2 46.2 
20 Norway 24.0 13.0 60.0 19.8 
21 Oman 83.4 38.6 80.9 45.3 
22 Qatar 68.4 26.0 78.5 46.8 
23 Russia 19.5 7.3 54.0 17.9 
24 Saudi Arabia 83.1 31.3 88.8 39.8 
25 Sudan 49.8 8.3 80.6 12.9 
26 Syrian Arab Republic 46.3 12.8 70.2 24.6 
27 Trinidad and Tobago 36.4 9.3 59.9 28.4 
28 Turkmenistan 43.2 8.7 83.5 28.7 
29 United Arab emirates 66.1 19.7 42.4 32.6 
30 Uzbekistan         
31 Venezuela 48.8 15.8 82.5 25.8 
32 Vietnam 31.2 7.4 21.3 11.0 
33 Yemen 71.5 24.9 88.1 32.7 
34 Chad 31.0 3.8 80.8 42.9 
35 Sao Tome and Principe 57.7 73.4     
36 Timor Leste 63.8 38.8 72.1 26.0 
            
  Average 54.6 22.2 71.4 35.2 
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VI. List of Resource Rich Countries (Minerals) 
    
Average Annual 
Mineral Revenues 2000 
- 2005 
Average Annual 
Mineral Exports 
(Goods) 2000 - 2005 
  Country 
% of Total 
Fiscal 
Revenue % of GDP 
% of 
Total 
Exports 
(Goods) % of GDP 
1 Botswana 62.5 20.6 79.5 32.3 
2 Chile 9.4 2.2 39.1 11.7 
3 Dem. Republic of Congo     52.7 11.9 
4 Ghana     33.4 11.0 
5 Guinea 17.8 2.4 87.7 19.0 
6 Indonesia     7.3 2.3 
7 Jordan 0.7 0.2 12.4 3.5 
8 Kyrgyz Republic 1.7 0.3 39.1 12.5 
9 Liberia         
10 Mauritania     53.4 16.2 
11 Mongolia 8.2 2.9 51.2 26.3 
12 Namibia 5.9 1.9 59.9 20.0 
13 Papua New Guinea 17.9 5.6 77.6 47.9 
14 Peru 3.3 1.5 50.8 8.1 
15 Sierra Leone 0.9 0.2 87.0 10.1 
16 South Africa     27.2 6.4 
17 Uzbekistan     29.8 8.6 
18 Zambia     60.5 16.6 
  Average 12.8 3.8 49.9 15.6 
       
 
 
 
 
 
